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ABSTRACT 
 
 
What does it mean for a government to invest in education? Is it just spending 
money on schools and teachers, or does it include family benefits spending that 
specifically targets parents and their children who will be going to school? This 
dissertation expands the definition of education spending so that in addition to 
expenditures allocated to schools (supply-side expenditures), it includes benefits that 
enable all children to participate in the education system (demand-side expenditures). 
The simultaneous funding of both schools and family benefits, I argue, contributes both 
directly and indirectly to the development of a country’s level of human capital, or 
students’ level of marketable skills and knowledge. This dissertation presents evidence 
that both types of expenditures do make a difference for students – especially those 
coming from the most disadvantaged circumstances. 
To evaluate how spending matters for human capital development, I develop an 
Education Policy Index (EPI) capturing each country’s policy choices. The EPI features 
supply-side spending or expenditures allocated to schools for teachers and staff 
compensation, curriculum, and capital expenditures, as well as demand-side spending or 
expenditures allocated to families in the form of cash benefits, benefits in kind, and 
student financial aid. The political and economic factors that impact countries’ spending 
choices, namely proportionally representative electoral systems, left-leaning leadership 
ideology and the strength of organized labor, are evaluated and are strongly correlated 
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with increases in spending on families relative to schools. How education-spending 
policies affect students’ commitment to school as measured by enrollment rates, and 
how schools impact student performance as measured by cross-national assessments of 
skills and knowledge in 33 countries is also explored; family spending helps enrollment 
rates and investment in schools strongly correlate positively with student performance. 
Lastly, the dissertation examines how spending impacts students’ individual academic 
and professional expectations. Case studies of three schools in a rural municipality in 
Mexico show that when governments invest in families, it has an impact on students’ 
commitment to their education and their professional expectations, their social capital. 
This effect is especially apparent for girls. Thus, spending can have a direct and indirect 
effect on human capital development. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“One of the most fundamental obligations of any society is to prepare its adolescents and 
young adults to lead productive and prosperous lives as adults. This means preparing all 
young people with a solid enough foundation of literacy, numeracy, and thinking skills 
for responsible citizenship, career development, and lifelong learning.”  
- Symonds, et al. 2011 
 
What does it mean for a government to invest in education? Is it just spending 
money on schools and teachers, or does it include family benefits spending that 
specifically targets parents and their children who will be going to school? This 
dissertation contends that both types of spending are key markers for countries that want 
to see their economies grow by developing their population’s level of skill and 
knowledge – their human capital. Before students can learn at school, they need to show 
up healthy and ready to learn. The monies that governments invest for both purposes – 
helping families and providing worthwhile schools – are complements that together 
should make a difference for students’ academic and professional outcomes.  
In this dissertation I evaluate how countries spend their education funds, and I 
develop an Education Policy Index (EPI) capturing each country’s policy choices 
(Chapter II). Next, I explore what political and economic factors appear to be related to 
countries’ spending choices (Chapter III). I then evaluate how education-spending 
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policies affect students’ commitment to school as measured by enrollment rates, and 
how schools impact student performance as measured by cross-national assessments of 
skills and knowledge (Chapter IV). Lastly, the dissertation examines how spending 
impacts students’ individual academic and professional expectations – their social 
capital – that serve as strong indicators of their human capital. Case studies of three 
schools in a rural municipality in Mexico provide an example of how government-
spending decisions can have an effect on social and ultimately human capital 
development (Chapter V).   
 
Section 1.1. Money Matters  
“Socioeconomic status (SES) is probably the most widely used contextual 
variable in education research” (Sirin 2005, 417). Since the 1966 Coleman Report 
“Equality of Educational Opportunity,” family background has been understood to be a 
major influence on student performance in schools (Coleman, et al. 1966). Parents’ 
educational attainment, wealth, or occupation has repeatedly proven to be important 
indicators in determining student outcomes – from their academic success to their career 
choice (Whiston and Keller 2004; Lindstrom, et al. 2007).  
There is variation among countries in how much family background impacts 
student academic performance and subsequent careers. In the United States, the SES of a 
student’s family explains 17% of the variation in student performance on the Programme 
for International Student Assessment (PISA) exams, compared with 9% in Canada and 
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Japan (OECD 2011a).1 This difference has been attributed to several factors, notably the 
concentration of disadvantaged students in U.S. schools to the size of a school’s 
community (OECD 2011a, 32). Even with these differences, however, there is little 
doubt that disadvantaged students around the world do not attain the level of measurable 
learning outcomes as their wealthier classmates. If this is the case, does spending on 
education make any difference for those students from families with a lower SES?  
Based on the numbers cited above, in the United States over 80% of the variation 
in student performance and over 90% in Japan and Canada is not accounted for by 
families’ SES, leaving ample space for schools and other factors to affect student 
outcomes. The main factor of interest in this dissertation is the role of money in 
education. Specifically, school funding used to provide resources and qualified teachers 
to students, and family-oriented funding that helps families – especially disadvantaged 
families – prioritize education over work or other familial demands for their school-aged 
children.  
 
Spending Impacts on Schools 
There has been some debate as to whether or not schools are useful for helping 
students build skills and accumulate knowledge. Some political scientists and 
economists have argued that schooling in the U.S. does little more than signal credentials 
or does not matter as much as the influence of parents and peers (Coleman, et al. 1966; 
                                                 
1 Immigrant populations, though not directly addressed in this dissertation, do impact a country’s 
performance on exams of skill and knowledge. Among OECD countries, “the share of students with an 
immigrant background explains just 3% of the performance variation between countries” (OECD 2011d, 
29). 
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Jencks, et al. 1972; Spence 1973); others have argued that it does make a difference – 
especially high school and university-level attainment (Wiley and Harnischfeger 1974; 
Chubb and Moe 1990; Becker 1992). In the ongoing debate about the efficiency of 
education spending and student achievement, some key aspects of schools have been 
central to the discussion: teacher-to-student ratios, teachers’ level of education and 
experience, teacher salaries, expenditures per pupil, facilities, and administrative inputs 
(Hanushek 1989; Harris and Ranson 2005; Ansell 2008; Dolton and Marcenaro-
Gutierrez 2011).  
While there is wide variation in how school expenditures are allocated, at the 
national level it is possible to discern some key spending categories: teacher 
compensation, other school expenditures (spending on curriculum and supplies), and 
capital expenditures (facilities). In this dissertation these categories are considered 
supply-side expenditures because they are allocated to the quality of the education being 
supplied to students. These categories are explained in further detail in Chapter II and 
serve as a complement to demand-side spending, or spending designed to help families 
get students to school and keep them there until they graduate.  
 
 Spending Impacts on Students (Both Advantaged and Disadvantaged) 
Some countries allocate funds to families of all income levels. These funds are 
designed to help families meet their day-to-day expenses given the added costs of 
supporting one or more children. Countries also allocate funds to the most disadvantaged 
families and these benefits are means-tested; they are determined by the family’s level of 
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economic need. The analysis in this dissertation considers both types of expenditures to 
be investments in education because together these family-oriented monies act to even 
the playing field so all students can get to school. Cash benefits, benefits in kind, and 
financial aid to students are the categories of spending that satisfy the demands of 
families who take advantage of a country’s school system; I call these “demand-side” 
expenditures throughout this dissertation. To reflect the two types of demand-side 
spending, it is either means-tested or designed for all families regardless of their income. 
Chapter II explains these categories in great detail, and in Chapter IV cash benefits and 
benefits in kind have a positive impact on gross secondary school enrollment rates. This 
finding implies that demand-side spending could be having a positive impact on all 
students’ commitment to schooling.  
 
Section 1.2. Beyond Money 
In his 2009 book The Money Myth: School Resources, Outcomes, and Equity, W. 
Norton Grubb argues for a new model of schooling production that better incorporates 
all the factors that schools contribute to student outcomes. This new model should 
include school funding and resources, family background (SES), and other related 
policies that might impact student connectedness to schooling (Grubb 2009, 47 - Figure 
1.2). This dissertation attempts to address this challenge and in Figure I-1 I present a 
different approach for understanding spending and family influences, and indicates 
which chapters address which factors.  
  
Figure I–1. 
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The demand-side and supply-side spending discussed above make up the EPI 
index introduced in Chapter II. The EPI is the ratio of the supply-side spending to total 
education spending (supply plus demand-side spending). In the analyses presented 
throughout the dissertation, one of the central underlying assumptions is that the 
resources that schools provide, along with financial aid to families, will ultimately 
advance the development of human capital. This is important because research has 
shown that such gains can have a positive impact on a country’s level of economic 
growth. At least one major study has claimed that raising all students’ scores to a 
minimal level of proficiency on international exams of skills and knowledge (the PISA 
exam) would “imply aggregate GDP increases of close to USD 200 trillion according to 
historical growth relationships” (OECD 2010a, 6). Though I do not test this connection 
between human capital development and growth directly, the connection is recognized in 
the model presented in Figure I-1.  
In Chapter III I explore why countries have the EPI scores they do and find that 
government electoral systems (specifically those elected by proportional representation, 
or PR systems) allocate more money to demand-side expenditures than countries that use 
majoritarian or mixed electoral systems. PR systems also appear to give unions more 
influence over how much spending will be allocated to demand-side priorities. 
Regardless of how they are elected, left-leaning governments play a significant role and 
push spending towards family benefits, both means-tested and non-means-tested, relative 
to school spending.   
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Chapter IV focuses on the impact of spending allocations on student outcomes 
such as enrollment rates, considered an indirect measure of human capital, and 
assessment scores, considered a direct indicator of human capital development. As 
mentioned above, demand-side expenditures in the aggregate (means tested and non-
means-tested) have a positive impact on enrollment rates, which is mostly driven by the 
allocation of cash benefits and benefits in kind to families and students. Measures of 
cognitive skill and knowledge, results on PISA exams, indicate that supply-side 
spending (spending targeting schools and teachers) has a positive impact on student 
performance. Though increasing the size of the student population does not improve 
overall assessment scores, there is a positive correlation between student resilience on 
PISA scores and school spending. Thus, school investment can act as an equalizer for 
some of the most disadvantaged students (Downey, et al. 2004; Condron 2011).  
Chapter V takes the analysis down to the individual level through surveys of 
graduating middle and high school students in the rural municipality of Calnali, Hidalgo, 
Mexico where only about 3% of the population older than 18 has a professional degree 
of any kind (INEGI 2010). This fine-scale study allows me to examine how government 
spending on education has an impact on students beyond their enrollment numbers and 
performance on standardized test scores. By asking those students who have benefitted 
from family cash benefits throughout their years of schooling about their academic and 
career expectations, the survey explores students’ social capital gains that have the 
potential to develop into human capital. When students who would otherwise skip school 
altogether show up and participate in school events, and when they indicate that coming 
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to school has influenced their thinking about their futures, there is a clear connection 
between enrollment and expectations. Moreover, when students indicate that coming to 
school has a social component that they value, and students have shared expectations, an 
“institutionalization of group relations” is taking place, and this is at the heart of social 
capital formation (Portes 1998, 3). The role of social capital in influencing students’ 
futures can be significant when going to school and pursuing advanced degrees or 
education-dependent professions becomes the norm.   
This analysis thus allows for a more nuanced assessment of human capital 
development. Graduating middle and high school students already knew their academic 
plans when they were surveyed in the summer of 2012. While we do not know if the 
high school students will ever attain their education or career goals, such plans are 
helpful for gauging what the students think is possible, which I argue constitutes an 
indirect measure for the construction of human capital.2  
Chapter VI concludes the dissertation, providing a summary of the findings and 
offering suggestions for future research. Foremost among the research priorities is to 
extend the dataset in Chapters III and IV to encompass less developed countries where 
more of the population is living in poverty, and where inequality is of even greater 
concern. Applying this approach to poorer countries could expose more of the politics 
behind governments’ spending decisions. Moreover, an expanded study would add 
                                                 
2 Chapter IV provides a discussion of the theory of human capital relative to social and cultural capital. In 
many ways the concepts are interrelated and social capital in particular can play a role in the development 
of human capital (Coleman 1988).  
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greater variation and provide more insight into the impacts of family and student benefits 
spending on both social and human capital development. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to expand the definition of education spending 
so that it includes benefits that target families who are actively participating in the 
education system as well as the schools. The simultaneous funding of schools and of 
families who need extra fiscal support, I argue, contributes to the development of a 
country’s human capital – both directly and indirectly. This dissertation confirms that 
wealth yields substantial advantages for building human capital, but it also shows that 
economic assistance targeted to needy families can make a major difference in 
improving educational outcomes for less-advantaged children. 
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CHAPTER II  
INTRODUCING THE EDUCATION POLICY INDEX (EPI) 
 
 
The bottom line: Money alone can’t buy a good education system. Strong performers in 
PISA [The Program for International Student Assessment] are those countries and 
economies that believe - and act on the belief - that all children can succeed in school … 
When it comes to money and education, the question isn’t how much? but rather for 
what?      
 - Guillermo Montt, PISA in Focus, February 2012  
 
 
In Chapter I of this dissertation I introduce the importance of money in 
education. I also address the varying impact of a family’s socioeconomic status (SES) on 
student outcomes in school and career, essentially showing that spending on education 
matters for student outcomes. In this chapter I explore how money matters in greater 
detail and introduce the Education Policy Index (EPI), a new measure that indicates a 
country’s balance of spending on school quality versus school access.    
The EPI accounts for what countries at all levels of government (national, sub-
national, and local) spend on different education policies. The EPI also considers some 
programs funded all or in part by external sources such as the World and Inter-American 
Development Banks. These institutions make some expenditures possible, and may be 
indicative of the level of a government’s commitment to the programs under discussion 
since such funding must be repaid.  
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What makes the EPI unique among measures of education spending is that it 
incorporates more than just school budgets. In addition to the money directed explicitly 
to schools, teachers, and infrastructure, the EPI captures government spending on 
families that enables their school-aged children to get to school and to stay there until 
they complete a middle school or secondary level of education (high school). By 
incorporating both school quality and school access spending into one measure, the EPI 
indicates where a country’s priorities are – is it to equalize opportunities for all students, 
take care of wealthier students, or to balance both? 
Section 2.1 of this chapter introduces the EPI and explains why it is useful for 
education policy analysis. Section 2.2 of the chapter models the EPI, explains the 
spending policies included in its construction, and describes in detail what the index 
measures. Section 2.3 of this chapter presents the EPI of 33 countries and describes how 
the index represents a government’s spending decisions.3 Finally, Section 2.4 provides 
some preliminary analysis on what the EPI can tell us about countries’ spending patterns 
and how this impacts students from poorer households in particular.  
Analyses indicate that students from poorer backgrounds are able to do well on 
international reading exams when countries spend more on schools, specifically teachers 
and infrastructure. These preliminary findings show that the EPI could be a useful tool 
for evaluating spending efficiencies if a country’s goal is to help the most disadvantaged 
achieve academically. Chapter III of this dissertation will delve into why the countries 
have the index score they do by examining each country’s institutions, politics, and 
                                                 
3 The countries in this dissertation are high middle income or high-income countries due to data 
availability. The EPI may prove even more useful in less developed, less wealthy countries.  
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economies, and Chapter IV incorporates the EPI into models examining student 
performance outcomes.  
 
Section 2.1. How Does the Education Policy Index Contribute to the Literature? 
Usually in studies looking at education policy and spending, the current costs of 
education are considered to be how much money is spent to run a school – primarily the 
salaries of teachers, but also auxiliary staff, learning/instructional technology, and 
transportation as well as operation and maintenance costs (Hanushek 1997;  Holmlund, 
et al. 2010). The current costs are added together and divided by the number of students 
the schools serve to determine per-pupil spending. The overall spending per-pupil 
estimates are often used in research to assess school quality along with pupil-teacher 
ratios, teacher salary and education level, available teaching resources, and student 
assessment results (Lee and Barro 2001). Such spending is key to school quality because 
top teachers will be drawn to good salaries and can make the most of school resources. 
Further, well-maintained buildings and the infrastructure create an atmosphere 
conducive to student learning.  
As discussed in Chapter I, education is tied to human capital development – 
students who are more educated are qualified for higher paying jobs and this in turn 
helps a country’s economy grow. As more members of a population gain cognitive 
skills, more innovation is expected and this leads to new occupations and economic 
growth for the larger community (OECD 2010a; Romer 1990, 1986).  To boost all 
students to a skill level that will bolster the economy requires a commitment to students, 
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especially those who are least likely to stay in school due to either their poor economic 
circumstances or a lack of commitment to their education (often due to their family’s 
finances). Making quality schools accessible to these students is key for governments 
interested in helping its poorest students improve their economic prospects as well as 
their countries’.  Education is often considered the equalizer of opportunity – giving 
students, regardless of their background, the chance to prove their capabilities and 
succeed (Downey, et al. 2004). Policies that enable poor students to get to school are 
therefore a critical component of education spending. Moreover, social policies that 
support all families economically help to create a societal environment geared toward 
keeping students in school since it keeps families out of economic straits.  
Spending on family-oriented social policies is considered redistributive and helps 
alleviate poverty and ultimately reduce inequality. Recent research has shown that such 
policies do not just help the poor over time or make life easier for middle-class families 
that may be otherwise struggling. Rather, studies show that by reducing inequality 
within a country, the country as a whole prospers economically and that too much 
inequality can actually impedes a country’s economic growth (Breen 1997).  The impact 
education can have in a country when there is less inequality is significant. “Less 
egalitarian societies have lower average achievement, lower percentages of very highly 
skilled students, and higher percentages of very low-skilled students. In direct contrast, 
egalitarian societies have higher average achievement, higher percentages of very highly 
skilled students, and lower percentages of very low-skilled students” (Condron 2011, 
53). Condron (2011) concludes that though causation between inequality and 
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achievement is not absolute, “at the very least it is quite evident that egalitarianism and 
educational excellence are compatible goals for affluent societies” (53). 
The Education Policy Index (EPI) as presented and applied in this dissertation 
builds on this research and is designed to capture social spending, along with the 
traditional education expenditures, to better estimate the type of investments countries 
need to make to develop human capital. Schools alone are not the solution to the 
education challenges countries face in a global economy. Establishing generations of 
skilled thinkers requires a societal context in which education is a priority that starts 
within families and extends to schools and beyond. The EPI recognizes this complexity 
and identifies a country’s balance between providing access to education for all students, 
especially the country’s poorest, and providing a quality education for all students.  
 
Section 2.2. What Does the Education Policy Index Actually Measure? 
The Education Policy Index (EPI) is designed to help analysts understand a 
government’s overall commitment to school quality relative to school access. By 
dividing the spending decisions first into two broad spending categories of supply 
(school quality) and demand (school access), the EPI provides a lens into how 
committed a country is to equalizing education opportunities for its population.  
The EPI score is determined by the total amount of a country’s supply-side 
expenditures (S) divided by a country’s total supply- and demand-side or total education 
expenditures. Accordingly, the more supply-oriented a country’s policies are, the closer 
the EPI is to one and the more demand-side oriented (D) a country’s policies are, the 
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closer the EPI is to zero. When a country is evenly spending between supply- and 
demand-side policies, its EPI score is .5.  
 
EPI = S/(S +D)   eq. 2.1 
 
Theoretically, if governments are prioritizing equity yet still want to maintain 
quality schools, their EPI score should be at least a .5. This point indicates that a 
government is showing as much of a commitment to students (who equally need access 
to a quality learning environent) as to families who need varying degrees of financial 
support to send their children to school. This may not optimize student outcomes in 
terms of high test scores since more inclusion would likely bring assessment scores 
lower, at least at first, but it would help the country expand its base of skilled labor.  
Each country will have a different optimal spending point on supply and demand 
programs depending on the country’s level of development and equity. What the EPI 
provides is a gauge for where resources are going and serves as an indicator of a 
government’s policy priorities. For education analysts, the EPI can be used in models of 
education spending and can help address questions around equity and outcomes. For 
political scientists, it could prove useful in studies investigating how well politicians 
deliver on particular campaign promises or how spending reflects the government in 
charge as is presented in Chapter III.  
Before discussing how the supply and demand-side policies are calculated, it is 
first necessary to consider which schools benefit from the spending the EPI measures 
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and are thus included in the index. Internationally there are three broad categories of 
elementary, middle, and high school institutions: public, government-dependent private, 
and independent private. Public schools are fully funded by the government and 
independent private institutions are more than 50% funded by non-government, private 
sources. Then there are private schools that are run independently of a public agency but 
are considered government-dependent because they rely on government agencies for 
50% or more of their core funding and/or have their teaching personnel paid by a 
government agency. Spending by the government on these government-dependent 
private institutions is considered a public subsidy and is therefore included in education 
spending in the EPI calculations (Busemeyer 2007;  Grubb 2009). Table II-1 profiles the 
2006 enrollment of primary and secondary students by school type for countries 
included in this dissertation. This distinction of the schools is especially important in 
countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Chile, and Australia where over 25% of the 
schools are government-dependent private institutions. 
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Table II–1. Percent of Primary and Secondary School Students Enrolled in Different Institution Types, 2006 
  Country Public Schools 
Government-Dependent 
Private Schools 
Independent 
Private 
Schools 
%Private Money funding 
Government-Dependent 
Private Schools* 
1 Australia 72% 28% 0% 43% 
2 Austria 92% 8% 0% 100% 
3 Belgium 44% 56% 0% 6% 
4 Brazil 89% 0% 11% N/A 
5 Canada 94% 0% 6% 56% 
6 Chile 47% 47% 6% 18% 
7 Czech Republic 94% 6% 0% 33% 
8 Denmark 87% 12% 0% 19% 
9 Estonia 98% 0% 2% N/A 
10 Finland 93% 7% 0% 5% 
11 France 79% 21% 1% 22% 
12 Germany 93% 7% 0% 12% 
13 Hungary 89% 11% 0% 0% 
14 Iceland 96% 4% 0% 0% 
15 Ireland 99% 0% 1% N/A 
16 Israel 100% 0% 0% 18% 
17 Italy 94% 0% 5% 0% 
18 Japan 90% 0% 10% N/A 
19 Rep. of Korea 83% 16% 1% 36% 
20 Mexico 89% 0% 11% N/A 
21 Netherlands** 30% 70% 0% 0% 
22 New Zealand 82% 14% 4% 44% 
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Table II–1, continued 
  Country Public Schools 
Government-Dependent 
Private Schools 
Independent 
Private 
Schools 
%Private Money funding 
Government-Dependent 
Private Schools* 
23 Norway 96% 4% 0% 0% 
24 Poland 96% 1% 4% 0% 
25 Portugal 87% 4% 9% 0% 
26 Slovak Republic 92% 8% 0% 23% 
27 Slovenia 98% 1% 0% 32% 
28 Spain 70% 25% 5% 0% 
29 Sweden 92% 8% 0% 1% 
30 Switzerland 94% 2% 4% 0% 
31 Turkey 98% 0% 2% N/A 
32 United Kingdom 80% 15% 6% 63% 
33 United States 91% 0% 9% N/A 
 
*The private money for government-dependent public schools is included in the total expenditures so that all spending on these schools are 
accounted for in the supply-side spending allocations.  
**The Netherlands listed 100% of students in public schools even though about 70% of students go to government-dependent private schools and 
the remaining 30% are in public schools (Patrinos 2011). 
SOURCE: OECD Education Database, dataset: students enrolled by type of institutions and OECD Education Database, dataset: expenditure by 
funding source (OECD 2012a) 
  
 
20
 
The EPI looks at education spending proportionally between how much money is 
focusing on supply- versus demand-side policies in both public and government-
dependent private schools. Supply-side policies are those that fund the quality of the 
primary and secondary schools once students walk through the front door. These include 
salaries and professional development funds for teachers and all auxiliary staff that keep 
a school running (administrators, support staff, teacher aides, etc.). It also includes 
capital expenses – school maintenance, renovation, and expansion – and transportations 
costs that bring students to the school. 
Demand-side policies are those that help primary and secondary school students 
get to the front door of their school so that they can access whatever educational 
opportunities are available. Policies that help families meet their day-to-day expenses 
and parental demands are considered demand-side policies. These policies help families 
provide a nurturing home, nutritious food, and basic material goods to their children. 
The next two sections explain in greater detail the different types of spending policies 
and Table II-2 outlines the three supply-side categories and the three demand-side 
categories. 
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Table II–2. Supply and Demand Expenditure Categories  
Supply-Side Expenditures
Compensation of 
Education Personnel  
 
Includes salaries, retirement spending, and other non-
salary compensation such as healthcare for teachers as 
well as administrative and professional support 
personnel. 
School Services 
(Support services, 
education materials, and 
ancillary services) 
Support services include maintenance of school 
buildings, education materials include books and lab 
equipment, and ancillary services are services that are 
peripheral to the main educational mission. The two 
main components of ancillary services are student 
services (unsubsidized meals, school health services, 
and transportation to and from school) and services for 
the general public. All of these services benefit all 
students, regardless of their background.   
Capital Expenses Capital expenditure is expenditure on assets that last 
longer than one year. It includes spending on 
construction, renovation and major repair of buildings 
and expenditure on new or replacement equipment. 
 
Demand-Side Expenditures 
Education Financial Aid These are funds given to primary and middle school 
students in the form of scholarships, grants to 
students/households, and loans (this does not include 
vouchers that allow students to go to private schools)  
Family-Targeted Cash 
Benefits (Means-tested 
and non-means tested) 
These include family allowances (payments to 
families usually based on the age of a child), 
additional family payments stemming from a child’s 
special needs or family situation, benefits paid to 
families  
Family-Targeted 
Benefits in Kind (Means 
tested and non-means 
tested) 
 
Miscellaneous goods and services provided to families 
including reductions in prices, tariffs, fares, etc. 
 
 
SOURCES: For Supply-Side Expenditures: OECD 2011b “Education at a Glance”, 274-275 and for 
Demand-Side Expenditures: Eurostat ESSPROS Manual 2008, 54-55 and OECD 2011c “Doing Better 
For Families,” Annex 2.A3 
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Supply-side Policies Unpacked 
Since governments vary considerably in the way they interpret spending 
classifications, much of the research on school expenditures looks to per pupil spending 
as a shortcut for understanding a country’s commitment to its students. The National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES) provides data on schools, students, teachers, etc., 
and is used extensively in education research on the United States. The NCES bases their 
calculation for per pupil spending on current expenditures by all government agencies – 
not just the Department of Education – on regular school programs, capital outlays, and 
interest on debt. There are seven subsections of current expenditures: 1) Instruction, 2) 
Administration, 3) Student and staff support, 4) Operation and maintenance, 5) 
Transportation, 6) Food services, and, 7) Enterprise operations (Aud, et al. 2012, 309-
10). Usually these data are aggregated to account for current education expenditures for 
a school, district, state, or the nation as a whole. Discerning where the money actually 
goes and who benefits directly from the spending (teachers, staff, students, and/or 
suppliers) is a challenge for analyzing the impact of education spending.  
In cross-national studies, spending on education usually comes from a handful of 
sources: The OECD’s Education Database and Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) Database, The World Bank’s Databank of Education Statistics, the 
International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics, the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics’ 
Education Database, and the Eurostat Education Database. The OECD’s Education 
Database (2012a) is especially useful for researchers because it combines data from 
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UNESCO, the OECD, and Eurostat together and is referred to as the 
UNESCO/OECD/Eurostat (UOE) database. This database, the UOE, is the main driver 
for the categories used for the EPI’s supply-side spending categories. 
Supply-side policies are those that fund the quality of the primary and secondary 
schools so that all students who arrive at the school will benefit from these investments 
to some extent.4 Attracting highly qualified teachers with good salaries, retirement and 
healthcare packages, and other benefits are important for guaranteeing that a school has 
quality professionals who will care about and educate the students. Accordingly, salaries 
for teachers and all auxiliary staff that keep a school running (administrators, support 
staff, teacher aides, etc.) is the largest and perhaps most important supply-side category. 
The other two categories of supply-side spending policies are non-compensation school 
spending and capital expenditures. Non-compensation school spending is a broad 
category that includes textbooks, equipment, and other school supplies, as well as 
building maintenance and ancillary services.  
The capital expenditures are included because these reflect an investment in 
renovating, maintaining, or building new schools that should shorten transportation time, 
decrease travel expenses for school attendees (especially rural students), and avoid (or 
reduce) school crowding – all of which would increase school quality for students and 
families. Transportation to the school, if it is offered, is available to all students 
regardless of their SES and so it is included as a supply-side expenditure. These 
                                                 
4 Within schools, there are differences in how students benefit from expenditures. Some schools offer 
Advanced Placement and some offer remedial support for students with special needs. At the school level 
these differences are worth exploring and some of these differences are addressed in Chapter V.  
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spending categories are intentionally broad due to the organizational differences between 
countries and the way they allocate funds to different types of schools. The OECD 
determined that these categories are the best for cross-national comparability and has 
data for these categories that date back to the mid-1980’s. 
Education data for the UOE are collected from administrators in contributing 
countries’ Ministries of Education or National Statistical Offices, and compiled by 
country experts into these datasets. The data are organized into approximately ten sub 
databases that enable researchers to compare countries’ expenditures by funding 
resource or transaction type, by nature and resource category, by educational personnel, 
etc. The expenditures by funding resource or transaction type enables researchers to see 
which levels of government are spending the most on education and how much comes 
from private or international sources. Navigating the data to assure an accurate 
representation of government spending has its own set of challenges since all of these 
categories have been interpreted by each country; some categories are left blank in one 
database because the spending is accounted for in another and these are often not cross-
referenced. Using the OECD’s comprehensive Education Database as a guide, then, the 
categories for tracking school quality are kept broad as shown in Table II-2 and 
discussed above. The advantage of broadly aggregating spending is that expenditures are 
less likely to be omitted, but the disadvantage is that the detail as to how the money is 
being spent gets lost. This is especially true around curriculum spending which is part of 
the “non-compensation spending” category so it is not clear how the money is going to 
improve the classroom resources, equipment, or facilities. Yet, given that the non-
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compensation spending category includes all of these, it is possible to get some idea of 
how prioritized this aspect of spending is relative to all the other investments.  
  
Demand-Side Spending Unpacked 
In all countries, a student’s SES has a significant impact on learning outcomes, 
and wealthier students have clear academic advantages that often translate into 
professional and economic benefits (OECD 2010b). As discussed earlier, research has 
shown that reducing inequality lends itself to a better economic outcome for individuals 
and countries in general. Nations that want to make sure all its citizens have a basic level 
of education, and that seek to equalize opportunities so that capable and motivated 
students, regardless of their background, have a chance to prove themselves, will invest 
in families and make it easy for students to access a good school. Social welfare 
spending, especially spending targeting poorer students and their families, should 
therefore be considered part of a country’s total education spending. Since these are the 
investments that drive the demand for schools, this spending is considered demand-side 
spending.  
The OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) compiles five types of family-
directed benefits (OECD 2012b). Three are cash benefits: 1) family allowances or 
payments for children, 2) maternity and paternity leave, and 3) other cash benefits such 
as sole parenting benefits or monies from conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs.5 
                                                 
5 Conditional Cash Transfers and their impact on students are discussed in detail in Chapter V. These types 
of cash benefits are paid to poor families in countries with high poverty rates such as Mexico, Chile, 
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Each of these benefits gives parents at all income levels extra financial support that, for 
the poorest families, can amount to a significant subsidy. In Latin America “cash 
transfers and other public welfare transfers represent an average of 10.3% of the per 
capita income of recipient households” (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011, 118). The other 
two family benefits are types of benefits-in-kind and these take the form of 1) day 
care/home help services, or 2) kindergarten or other child-oriented program. Studies 
have shown that these benefits have a significant impact on reducing child poverty for 
the poorest families (Förster and Verbist 2012).  
The OECD Education Database also provides data on government financial aid 
to students in primary or secondary school. This spending comprises of student loans as 
well as “government scholarships and other government grants to students or 
households. These include, in addition to scholarships and similar grants (fellowships, 
awards, bursaries, etc.), the following items: the value of special subsidies provided to 
students, either in cash or in kind, such as free or reduced-price travel on public transport 
systems; and family allowances or child allowances that are contingent on student 
status” (OECD Education Dataset: Expenditure by Funding Source and Transaction 
Type). Some countries include CCTs in this “financial aid” category (e.g., Turkey) 
whereas other countries include CCTs in the family cash benefits category (e.g., 
Mexico), so both are necessary to assure more accurate spending estimates.6  
                                                                                                                                                
Brazil, and Turkey. Payments are based on family need and are conditional on activities such as parents 
taking students to a set number of medical check-ups and students attending school 80% of the time. 
6 Each country’s data was carefully reviewed to assure that spending allocations for cash benefits and 
financial aid were not duplicated when calculating country EPI scores.     
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Social welfare spending directed to families in the form of financial aid, cash 
benefits, or benefits-in-kind varies considerably across countries; some of the benefits 
are means-tested and some are not. In developing countries, cash benefits that reward 
families financially for sending their children to school are particularly helpful since the 
income working children can generate is often critical for an impoverished family to 
provide food and shelter. Cash benefits in the form of CCTs have had a positive impact 
on school enrollment rates by incentivizing families to send their students to school 
instead of having them work during the day; students may still work after school but at 
least they are now also spending time in the classroom (Attanasio, et al. 2011; Coady 
and Parker 2004; Ravallion and Wodon 2000). Additional cash also helps alleviate some 
of the expense of sending a child to school (uniforms and supplies still cost families 
money even if there are no tuition fees). Benefits-in-kind, such as government assistance 
with paying for home help, are also important for families who may require at-home care 
for elderly family members or infants; middle- and high-school aged children are 
sometimes kept home to help care for these family members while the income-earning 
adults are at work (de Janvry, et al. 2006). Countries at all levels of development that 
offer care for the very young or the elderly are therefore providing families with 
additional support they need to keep sending their children to school.  
Some of the broader family policies, such as child care facilities or maternity 
leave, benefit all families regardless of their wealth while other programs, such as lunch 
subsidies or means-tested home help benefits, are directed only to poor families. 
Government expenditures that benefit all families regardless of their income may help 
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the poor significantly, but it is not clear that such spending is critical for financially 
stable families to keep their children in school, especially in wealthier countries where 
truancy laws are enforced. To capture these distinctions, there are two types of family 
investments that qualify as demand-side spending in this research.  The first type of 
spending includes social welfare programs designed for all families regardless of income 
(EPI-A), and the other is means-tested, or targeted to the neediest families (EPI-M).  
The EPI-A measure represents a universal policy approach and is constructed 
using all governmental spending on families (family cash benefits and benefits in kind, 
as well as government sponsored financial aid). Castles (2009) shows that “cross-
national differences in poverty and inequality among advanced nations are to a very 
large degree a function of the extent of cash spending on programs catering to the 
welfare needs of those of working age” (45). Welfare spending in Castles’ research is 
spending geared to families regardless of their needs and he shows that such investments 
help reduce inequality (as measured by the country’s GINI coefficient, a measure of a 
society’s inequality), and poverty. Different types of welfare spending, however, impact 
different segments of a population. In his seminal book The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism, Esping-Andersen (1990) shows that some types of social spending helps the 
wealthy rather than the poor, some helps working families more, and some does help the 
poor even though means-tested spending is “mean to everyone” meaning it keeps the 
poor poor relative to the rest of the society (Castles 2009, 46). To assess how well the 
poor specifically are being supported by social welfare policies, the EPI-M includes only 
those programs that are means-tested and target poor families, or those families that 
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might consider not sending their students to school because of their impoverished living 
conditions. Both EPI measures are tested throughout this dissertation and a list of 
programs incorporated in each type of EPI for the countries analyzed are listed in 
Appendix A. 
 
Section 2.3. Country EPI Scores Unpacked 
Countries that are more supply-side focused are those that spend more on schools 
and infrastructure relative to what they spend on families’ social welfare. Given a 
country’s GINI coefficient, this may (or may not) imply that there is a lack of focus on 
helping families gain access to quality education. Rudra (2004) shows that in wealthier 
countries, broad social investments (i.e., education, health, and social security and 
welfare) are able to reduce inequality whereas only spending on education has a 
significant impact on poverty in less developed countries. Figure II-1 shows the 
relationship between the EPI-A (2006) and the 2010 GINI coefficient for the countries 
included in this dissertation. These are significantly and positively correlated (p=.04) and 
shows simply that the countries in this dataset that spend more on supply relative to 
demand have higher inequality.7 The level of a country’s wealth in all regression 
analyses show that wealthier countries in the dataset have a slightly lower GINI 
coefficient but this is due to the large number of European democracies included in the 
sample. 
                                                 
7 There is not a causal relationship between the balance of supply-side and demand-side spending in 2006 
for countries in this dataset and the countries’ 2010 GINI coefficient. 
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Figure II–1. EPI-A and GINI Coefficient 
 
 
 
Tables II-3 and II-4 show the 33 countries that are included in the analyses 
throughout Chapters II, III and IV of this dissertation. The countries’ EPI-A and EPI-M 
scores for 2006 are presented along with a breakdown of the EPI’s spending categories. 
There is some variation in the EPI-M scores but overall they are highly skewed to the 
supply-side range of the index because so many countries included in this analysis are 
wealthy and target their benefits to the broader population. The demand- and supply-side 
spending percentages represent the percent of total EPI-A or EPI-M spending that is 
allocated to each category. In Chapter III the political and economic reasons for these 
country’s EPI-A and EPI-M scores will be examined in greater detail.
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Table II–3. Country EPI-A Scores, 2006 
% Supply Spending, EPI-A % Demand Spending, EPI-A* 
Country EPI-A, 2006 
% of EPI-A Benefits 
are Means-tested Compensation 
School 
Services 
Capital 
expenditures 
Cash 
Benefits 
Benefits in 
Kind 
Financial 
Aid 
Australia 0.57 19% 40% 11% 6% 32% 10% 2% 
Austria 0.57 4% 43% 13% 2% 35% 7% 0% 
Belgium 0.60 4% 52% 7% 2% 24% 14% 1% 
Brazil 0.59 100% 41% 15% 3% 6% 35% 0% 
Canada 0.76 16% 56% 16% 4% 21% 3% 0% 
Chile 0.80 23% 80% 11% 9% 0% 
Czech 
Republic 0.62 33% 35% 22% 6% 24% 12% 3% 
Denmark 0.52 13% 38% 11% 3% 18% 24% 6% 
Estonia 0.93 69% 93% 3% 1% 3% 
Finland 0.56 7% 33% 17% 5% 23% 20% 2% 
France 0.55 25% 41% 10% 5% 20% 24% 2% 
Germany 0.57 14% 45% 8% 4% 24% 17% 2% 
Hungary 0.48 6% 48% 32% 18% 2% 
Iceland 0.63 28% 44% 12% 7% 14% 22% 1% 
Ireland 0.52 11% 39% 8% 5% 36% 9% 3% 
Israel 0.66 14% 47% 15% 4% 16% 17% 1% 
Italy 0.70 32% 56% 11% 3% 13% 16% 1% 
Japan 0.76 38% 60% 8% 7% 12% 12% 0% 
Korea 0.86 17% 56% 21% 9% 0% 12% 1% 
Mexico 0.73 55% 66% 5% 2% 7% 15% 4% 
Netherlands 0.61 12% 44% 9% 9% 11% 23% 5% 
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Table II-3, continued 
  % Supply Spending, EPI-A % Demand Spending, EPI-A* 
Country EPI-A, 2006 
% of EPI-A Benefits 
are Means-tested Compensation 
School 
Services
Capital 
expenditures 
Cash 
Benefits 
Benefits 
in Kind 
Financial 
Aid 
New Zealand 0.56 53% 56% 32% 10% 3% 
Norway 0.54 25% 37% 10% 7% 21% 20% 5% 
Poland 0.71 22% 58% 7% 6% 20% 7% 2% 
Portugal 0.74 42% 68% 4% 1% 16% 9% 1% 
Slovak 
Republic 0.95 53% 62% 29% 4% 2% 0% 2% 
Slovenia 0.43 66% 31% 8% 4% 14% 6% 37% 
Spain 0.65 32% 48% 11% 6% 13% 20% 1% 
Sweden 0.52 13% 34% 14% 4% 20% 24% 3% 
Switzerland 0.71 18% 55% 10% 6% 21% 7% 1% 
Turkey 0.97 85% 79% 12% 6% 2% 0% 2% 
UK 0.53 15% 37% 10% 5% 31% 16% 1% 
USA 0.84 94% 60% 15% 10% 3% 13% 0% 
* For some countries, even if the country allocates some monies to a supply-side category, it appears as 0% due to rounding. For example, Korea does 
spend some money on Cash Benefits for families, but it is a significantly small amount relative to the spending allocated to the other categories.  
SOURCES: OECD SOCX Database (2012b) and OECD Education Database (2012a). In addition, the following sources are used: 
a) For Brazil: Data for the Conditional Cash Transfer program, Bolsa Familia, as well as social assistance spending (the Social Assistance Reference 
Centres or CRAS and the Comprehensive Famiy Care Programme or PAIF) were available from Soares 2012, Soares et al. 2010, and Lindert et al. 
2007. Social assistance estimates are calculated as 1.4% GDP (2005) or US$1.7 trillion.  
b) For Chile: Guardia et al. 2011, Fiszbein and Schady 2009, and OECD 2011d 
c) For Turkey: Sources confirming OECD financial aid spending (the country's spending on its Conditional Cash Transfer program) include: Şener 2012 
and Rawlings and Rubio 2005, 35 (Table 2) 
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Table II–4. Country EPI-M Scores, 2006 
 
% Supply Spending (EPI-M) % Demand Spending, EPI-M* 
Country EPI-A 2006 
EPI-M, 
2006 Compensation 
School 
Services 
Capital 
expenditures 
Cash 
Benefits 
Benefits in 
Kind 
Financial 
Aid 
Australia 0.57 0.87 62% 17% 9% 0% 10% 3% 
Austria 0.57 0.97 72% 22% 3% 0% 2% 1% 
Belgium 0.60 0.98 84% 11% 3% 0% 0% 2% 
Brazil 0.59 0.59 41% 15% 3% 6% 35% 0% 
Canada 0.76 0.94 69% 20% 5% 0 6% 0 
Chile 0.80 0.94 94% 5% 0% 1% 
Czech Republic 0.62 0.83 46% 29% 7% 14% 0 3% 
Denmark 0.52 0.89 65% 19% 6% 0% 0 10% 
Estonia 0.93 0.95 95% 1% 0 3% 
Finland 0.56 0.95 57% 29% 9% 1% 1% 3% 
France 0.55 0.83 62% 14% 7% 1% 12% 3% 
Germany 0.57 0.91 71% 13% 6% 5% 0% 4% 
Hungary 0.48 0.94 93% 2% 0% 4% 
Iceland 0.63 0.86 60% 16% 10% 9% 4% 1% 
Ireland 0.52 0.91 68% 14% 9% 4% 0 5% 
Israel 0.66 0.93 67% 21% 6% 1% 5% 1% 
Italy 0.70 0.88 70% 14% 4% 9% 2% 1% 
Japan 0.76 0.89 71% 10% 8% 0 11% 0% 
Korea 0.86 0.97 64% 23% 10% 0 1% 1% 
Mexico 0.73 0.83 75% 6% 2% 8% 4% 5% 
Netherlands 0.61 0.93 66% 14% 13% 0 0 7% 
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Table II-4, continued 
% Supply Spending (EPI-M) % Demand Spending, EPI-M* 
Country EPI-A 2006 
EPI-M, 
2006 Compensation 
School 
Services 
Capital 
expenditures 
Cash 
Benefits 
Benefits in 
Kind 
Financial 
Aid 
New Zealand 0.56 0.70 70% 18% 8% 4% 
Norway 0.54 0.83 57% 15% 10% 0 10% 7% 
Poland 0.71 0.92 74% 9% 8% 6% 0 2% 
Portugal 0.74 0.87 81% 5% 1% 10% 2% 1% 
Slovak 
Republic 0.95 0.98 63% 30% 4% 0% 0% 2% 
Slovenia 0.43 0.54 39% 10% 5% 0% 0% 46% 
Spain 0.65 0.85 63% 14% 8% 4% 8% 2% 
Sweden 0.52 0.90 59% 24% 6% 0% 5% 6% 
Switzerland 0.71 0.93 72% 13% 8% 1% 5% 1% 
Turkey 0.97 0.98 80% 12% 6% 0% 0% 2% 
UK 0.53 0.88 62% 17% 9% 0% 10% 2% 
USA 0.84 0.85 61% 15% 10% 3% 12% 0 
* For some countries, even if the country allocates some monies to a supply-side category, it appears as 0% due to rounding. For example, Korea does 
spend some money on Cash Benefits for families, but it is a significantly small amount relative to the spending allocated to the other categories.  
SOURCES: OECD Education Database (OECD 2012a) and OECD SOCX Database (OECD 2012b). In addition, the following sources are used: 
a) For Brazil: Data for the Conditional Cash Transfer program, Bolsa Familia, as well as social assistance spending (the Social Assistance Reference 
Centres or CRAS and the Comprehensive Famiy Care Programme or PAIF) were available from Soares 2012, Soares et al. 2010, and Lindert et al. 
2007. Social assistance estimates are calculated as 1.4% GDP (2005) or US$1.7 trillion.  
b) For Chile: Guardia et al. 2011, Fiszbein and Schady 2009, and OECD 2011d 
c) For Turkey: Sources confirming OECD financial aid spending (the country's spending on its Conditional Cash Transfer program) include: Şener 2012 
and Rawlings and Rubio 2005, 35 (Table 2)
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The countries presented in Tables II-3 and II-4 were selected because they 
participated in the 2009 PISA exams and because their spending data are available in the 
UNESCO/OECD /Eurostat (UOE) and OECD Social Expenditures (SOCX) databases. 
Furthermore, there is a strong literature about these country’s education systems on 
which this study can build. For three countries, though, data beyond the databases have 
been needed. Brazil, Chile, and Turkey are upper middle income countries according to 
the World Bank and additional budget information had to be added to reflect the impact 
of conditional cash transfer programs and other spending initiatives not accounted for in 
the databases. These countries receive international monies to help their social and 
education programs and accounting for their expenditures is consequently more 
complicated.  
Most of the countries in the sample (20) are considered high income and the 
remaining 13 countries are considered upper-middle income countries.8 Table II-5 shows 
the GDP and GNI per capita for each participating country as well as the per-pupil 
spending estimates based on supply-side spending (the traditional per pupil estimates), 
EPI-A spending, and EPI-M spending.  
 
  
                                                 
8 “High income for nonOECD” is defined by the World Bank (World Development Indicators, 2009) as 
having a 2006 GDP per capita greater than $21,009 or a 2006 GNI per capita greater than $30,846.  
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Table II–5. GDP and GNI Per Capita (2006) and Per-Pupil Spending for Primary 
and Secondary Public and Government-Dependent Private Schools, 2006 
Country 
GDP per 
capita 
(2006) 
GNI per capita (2006) 
Spending Per Pupil (2006) 
Supply-Side Only EPI-A EPI-M 
Norway*  $72,960   $53,330   $14,562   $26,885   $17,637 
Iceland  $54,814   $33,780   $13,023   $20,822   $15,181 
Switzerland  $54,140   $42,510   $12,167   $17,142   $13,073 
Ireland  $52,501   $37,270   $9,318   $17,885   $10,288 
Denmark  $50,462   $36,700   $13,310   $25,563   $14,912 
United States  $44,623   $45,640   $10,540   $12,499   $12,374 
Sweden  $43,949   $36,140   $9,677   $18,487   $10,810 
Netherlands  $41,459   $39,070   $8,440   $13,738   $9,072  
United Kingdom  $40,481   $35,150   $8,992   $17,040   $10,232 
Finland  $39,487   $33,430   $8,617   $15,514   $9,085  
Austria  $39,300   $36,110   $10,389   $18,179   $10,701 
Canada  $39,250   $36,410   $8,600   $11,314   $9,140  
Belgium  $37,919   $34,490   $8,313   $13,755   $8,518  
Australia  $35,986   $33,010   $6,512   $11,446   $7,451  
France  $35,457   $31,950   $8,727   $15,786   $10,473 
Germany  $35,238   $34,210   $6,422   $11,177   $7,096  
Japan  $34,102   $32,770   $8,224   $10,846   $9,214  
Italy  $31,777   $30,170   $8,865   $12,700   $10,090 
Spain  $28,025   $29,810   $5,257   $8,086   $6,153  
New Zealand  $26,173   $25,230   $5,184   $9,324   $7,392  
Israel  $20,625   $24,840   $4,393   $6,621   $4,708  
Korea, Rep.  $19,676   $24,320   $4,851   $5,621   $4,983  
Slovenia  $19,406   $25,140   $5,704   $13,190   $10,632 
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Table II-5, continued 
Country GDP per capita (2006) 
GNI per capita 
(2006) 
Spending Per Pupil (2006) 
Supply-Side 
Only
Count
ry 
GDP per capita 
(2006)
Portugal $19,065 $22,180 $5,189 $7,052 $5,967 
Czech 
Republic $14,446 $21,230 $2,890 $4,683 $3,484 
Slovak 
Republic $12,799 $17,800 $1,723 $1,805 $1,766 
Estonia $12,503 $18,150 $2,659 $2,848 $2,790 
Hungary $11,174 $17,300 $2,567 $5,344 $2,739 
Chile $9,376 $11,380 $1,182 $1,481 $1,252 
Poland $8,958 $14,680 $1,689 $2,366 $1,838 
Mexico $8,831 $13,070 $1,356 $1,853 $1,628 
Turkey $7,687 $12,790 $754 $773 $770 
Brazil $5,793 $8,810 $940 $1,587 $1,587 
 
*Countries are listed in order of wealth based on GDP per capita (2006). 
SOURCES: World Bank’s World DataBank World Development Indicators (WDI) and calculations based 
on EPI spending allocations. Enrollment numbers are based on those used in Table 1 from the OECD 
Education Database, dataset: students enrolled by type of institutions.     
 
 
The traditional per pupil estimates do not include demand-side cash benefits or 
benefits in-kind though they may include financial aid; for primary and secondary school 
students, however, financial aid is minimal.9 The cash benefits that would be included in 
some country’s educational spending stem from conditional cash transfer programs that 
have become popular in developing countries. Mexico, Chile, Turkey, and Brazil each 
have a form of this program that essentially pays families to send their students to 
school. In Chapter III these countries’ decisions to pursue these programs will be 
detailed but it is worth noting here that these spending decisions are mostly due to the 
                                                 
9 Data for spending per pupil is often separated by school level because upper secondary school spending 
per pupil is greater than lower secondary school spending per pupil that is in turn greater than primary 
school spending per pupil. Since overall education expenditures are being evaluated in this analysis for 
students through the secondary school level, this spending is aggregated. Future analysis could look at 
spending disaggregated by school level. 
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priority poverty reduction is for the party in power and the level of poverty each country 
is trying to alleviate.   
 
Section 2.4. Using the EPI as a Spending Indicator 
The Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) has developed an 
index for capturing the socio-economic status (SES) of students taking the PISA exams. 
The PISA Index of Economic, Social, and Cultural Status (ESCS) is a “comprehensive 
measure of student socio-economic background. This index was derived from 
information comprising the highest educational level of parents, the highest occupational 
status of parents, and possessions in the home” (OECD 2009a). Each country has a mean 
ESCS score that shows the average SES of the students who took the 2009 PISA exam 
relative to the average OECD student’s SES; the mean ESCS for each country used in 
this dissertation is listed in Table II-6. The PISA coordinators make it a point to test a 
representative group of students from each participating country’s population and the 
ESCS scores reflect the GDP per capita very closely.  
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Table II–6. Average Economic, Social, and Cultural Status (ESCS) Index Mean by 
Country, 2006 
Country ESCS Mean 
Australia 0.34 
Austria 0.06 
Belgium 0.2 
Brazil -1.16 
Canada 0.5 
Chile -0.57 
Czech Republic -0.09 
Denmark 0.3 
Estonia 0.15 
Finland 0.37 
France -0.13 
Germany 0.18 
Hungary -0.2 
Iceland 0.72 
Ireland 0.05 
Israel -0.02 
Italy -0.12 
Japan -0.01 
Korea -0.15 
Mexico -1.22 
Netherlands 0.27 
New Zealand 0.09 
Norway 0.47 
Poland -0.28 
Portugal -0.32 
Slovak Republic -0.09 
Slovenia 0.07 
Spain -0.31 
Sweden 0.33 
Switzerland 0.08 
Turkey -1.16 
United Kingdom 0.2 
United States 0.17 
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To examine more closely how school and family spending impact a population of 
students, the EPI-A can quickly show how countries with poorer (or wealthier) students 
are spending their resources. Figure II-2 is a scatterplot that shows the 2006 EPI-A score 
of each country relative to the mean 2009 ESCS index score of the students in each 
country.10 
 
Figure II–2. EPI-A Scores and Mean Student ESCS Scores by Country 
 
 
Pairwise Correlation is negative and significant (p<.05) 
SOURCE: 2009 PISA  
 
                                                 
10 A three year lag is used throughout this dissertation between government expenditures (2006) and 
student outcomes such as assessment results and resilience scores (2009). The lag is to account for the 
time it takes for spending to have an impact on students. In all but a handful of countries there is not a 
great deal of variance in spending between 2006 and 2009. Those countries that have significant 
expenditure variation will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III.  
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The pairwise correlation between the EPI-A and the ESCS is negative and 
significant (p<.05), and the pairwise correlation between the EPI-M and the ESCS is 
insignificant, indicating then when only means-tested demand-side spending is 
considered, there is no relationship between the average wealth of the students and the 
balance of supply- and demand-side spending. The EPI-A result indicates that when a 
country’s average student is poorer relative to the average OECD student, the country 
spends more proportionally on school quality than on school access. The correlation also 
implies that when students are wealthier (come from wealthier countries) they spend 
more on demand-side or access policies. This may reflect the influence of the European 
country’s relatively generous social polices.  
What would be interesting to explore is what the ESCS is of each country’s 
school-aged population (not just those taking the PISA exam) and to see if more poor 
students are making their way into the school system given the country’s EPI-A score. If 
a country is investing in demand-side policies and there are more poor students in 
school, especially in countries where truancy laws are not strongly enforced, this would 
indicate that the demand-side spending is achieving its goal of getting students to school. 
The increased spending on schools when the students are less wealthy may be 
reflecting an increased commitment to the students who are already there or to programs 
designated for struggling students. One approach to further understand spending relative 
to student wealth is to unpack the EPI-A.  
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EPIAc = 0+ ESCSc1 +    eq. 2.2a 
EPIMc = 0+ ESCSc1 +    eq. 2.2b 
 
 
In the model above, EPIAc and EPIMc represents the six different EPI categories 
for each country, and ESCSc is the mean ESCS score for each country.11 The GDP per 
capita for each country is not used in the analysis because the ESCS scores already 
capture the general wealth of the country.12 Results are shown in Table II-7 and show 
that in the 33 countries studied, when the average student is wealthier, spending on 
teacher compensation is proportionately less than spending on the other education 
categories, and proportionately more is spent on cash benefits; accordingly, when 
students are not as wealthy, countries are spending proportionately more on teacher 
compensation and less on cash benefits. When only means-tested demand-side policies 
are included in the analysis, the two spending categories of significance are school 
services and capital expenditures – as the average family wealth of the students increase, 
so do investments in these areas. The results indicate that when demand-side spending 
targets only poorer students and their families, and when the average student in a country 
comes from a less wealthy family, proportionately less money is actually going to the 
school and infrastructure. 
                                                 
11 In Equation 2.2a, EPIAc represents the six categories of the EPI based on total demand- and supply-side 
spending estimates: the percent teacher compensation - A, percent school services-A, percent capital 
expenses-A, percent cash benefits-A, percent benefits in kind-A, and percent financial aid-A. In Equation 
2.2b, the EPIMc represents the six categories based on total means-tested demand-side spending only plus 
supply-side spending estimates: the percent teacher compensation - M, percent school services-M, percent 
capital expenses-M, percent cash benefits-M, percent benefits in kind-M, and percent financial aid-M.   
12 Because they did not disaggregate their spending data in the OECD database, Chile, Hungary, New 
Zealand, and the Slovak Republic are excluded in this analysis so N=29.  
  
 
43
 
Table II-7. Relationship Between Student Wealth and Expenditures 
Dependent 
Variables 
Correlation of percent EPIAc 
categories with Mean ESCS 
Correlation of percent EPIMc 
categories with Mean ESCS 
Supply-Side Spending 
Percent 
Teacher 
Compensation 
-.134 *** (.04) -.003 (.04) 
Percent School 
Services  .010 (.02) .054* (.02) 
Percent Capital 
Expenditures .011 (.01) .03** (.01) 
Demand-Side Spending 
Percent Cash 
Benefits .095** (.04) -.021 (.02) 
 Percent 
Benefits in 
Kind 
 
.005 (.03) 
 
-.035 (.03) 
Percent 
Financial Aid .009 (.03) .017 (.03) 
N=29, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p=.01 
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Since most of the wealthier countries in this analysis have generous social 
spending policies, this drives the results for the proportionately higher cash benefit 
spending. The higher percentage of money going to teacher compensation when the 
average wealth of students is lower could reflect a stronger commitment to the most 
needy students. Such spending could reflect the hiring of more teachers, an increase in 
teacher pay, or both, and any of these options could help students, so long as they were 
getting to school in the first place. With a lower percentage of education monies going to 
cash benefits, though, this may not be the case. Indeed, since we know the proportion of 
spending on teachers is higher than the proportion of cash benefit allocations when the 
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average student is less wealthy, it is more likely that poorer students are not benefitting. 
This suggests that money going to the schools is helping the students already there rather 
than helping the students in need when the students come from families with income 
below the OECD average.  
If this is true, then are students who come from less wealthy families, benefitting 
from school spending? Based on the 2009 PISA exam results in reading, the OECD was 
able to determine how resilient students are in each country taking the exam. “A student 
is classified as resilient if he or she is in the bottom quarter of the PISA index of 
economic, social and cultural status (ESCS) in the country of assessment and performs 
in the top quarter across students [in reading] from all countries after accounting for 
socio-economic background” (OECD 2010b, 63). Table II-8 shows the resilience of 
students from each country on the reading exam, listing the most resilient countries first. 
Korea, Finland, Japan, and Turkey, in that order, have the most resilient students.  
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Table II–6. Student Resilience on the 2009 PISA Exams 
Country % Resilient students from the country's poorest 
Korea 56% 
Finland 46% 
Japan 42% 
Turkey 42% 
Canada 39% 
Portugal 39% 
Poland 37% 
New Zealand 37% 
Spain 36% 
Estonia 34% 
Netherlands 32% 
Italy 32% 
Switzerland 32% 
Australia 31% 
France 30% 
Belgium 30% 
Ireland 30% 
Iceland 29% 
Mexico 29% 
United States 29% 
Norway 26% 
Hungary 26% 
Sweden 25% 
Slovenia 25% 
Chile 24% 
Denmark 24% 
Israel 24% 
United Kingdom 24% 
Germany 23% 
Brazil 22% 
Czech Republic 21% 
Slovak Republic 21% 
Austria 20% 
SOURCE: PISA 2009 Database (OECD 2010c)  
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To begin to understand the role spending has had on student resilience, Figure II-
3 shows the EPI-A score of each country and the resilience of the students in that 
country.  A simple correlation between the EPI-A and student resilience is positive and 
significant (p=.03) indicating that as countries invest proportionally more in schools, 
they are improving the scores of at least some of the neediest students in reading.   
 
Figure II–3. EPI-A Scores and Student Resilience  
 
 
 
NOTE: Percent of Resilient Students are the percent of students from the bottom quartile on the PISA 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Status (ECSC) index who were top performers on the 2009 PISA Reading 
exam. 
SOURCE: Education at a Glance 2011a (OECD) 
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Given these results, school spending does appear to be helping the poor students 
rather than just the wealthy students who are already at school. Even if countries are 
spending less on family cash benefits, when the students do get to the school, it appears 
that they are making some gains thanks to the supply-side investments countries are 
making.  
 
Section 2.5. Conclusion 
The all-encompassing Education Policy Index (EPI-A) has been carefully 
constructed to include all the spending countries designate for public and government-
dependent private schools, as well as to families. Since the EPI-M only considers means-
tested programs, rather than more broadly oriented family programs, it could prove more 
useful for analyzing less-developed countries or countries that have more means-tested 
programs.  
In addition to the overall EPI-A and EPI-M country scores, it is useful to know 
the proportion of spending going to each of the six EPI categories in the same year. The 
breakdown of each category makes it possible to analyze the broader, relative impacts of 
spending allocation decisions. Policies do not happen in isolation and this breakdown 
gives analysts the chance to consider what is simultaneously happening 
programmatically for students at home and at school. For example, we saw that 
proportionately more monies are going to compensate teachers than to giving families 
cash benefits when countries have less wealthy students and that, based on student 
resilience on the 2009 PISA reading exam, this spending appears to have a positive 
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impact on student outcomes. This strongly implies that spending on schools does make a 
difference for students – money matters.   
The utility of the country-level EPI-A and EPI-M scores will be explored 
throughout the dissertation. EPI scores at state or regional levels, or even across schools 
and districts, could also be conceived given the right dataset. When analyzing how 
spending impacts individual students going to the same school, the EPI would not be 
appropriate as there is no variation in the supply-side spending unless data are available 
for spending allocations to different classrooms. In Chapter V of this dissertation, how 
the benefits of particular social policies impact students from the same school is 
addressed.  
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CHAPTER III  
WHAT DO COUNTRY POLITICS TELL US ABOUT EDUCATION POLICY 
INDEX SCORES? 
 
 
Chapter II introduced the Education Policy Index (EPI) and the supply- and 
demand-side spending that determines countries’ EPI-A and EPI-M scores. This chapter 
explores countries’ political and economic conditions and evaluates how they impact 
governments’ education and family-oriented policy and spending decisions. Wealthier 
countries spend more on education overall as well as proportionally than less developed 
countries (LDCs), with the United States being one of the few and notable exceptions. 
Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc) explains 16% of overall spending on 
education and family-benefit policies, 15% of supply-side or education spending 
policies, and 27% of all demand-side or family benefit policies; means-tested demand-
side policies are not explained by a country’s wealth.13  
Wealth explains 14% of the EPI-A or the balance of all demand-side and supply-
side spending, but none of the EPI-M. These findings imply two things. First, means-
tested policies, or policies that target only the poorest based on their income, are not 
determined based on the wealth of the country – they appear to be politically driven 
                                                 
13 Calculations are based on the adjusted R-square of four simple linear regression models with the 
independent variable being each country’s GDP per capita and the dependent variable being each 
country’s percent of GDP allocated (in turn) to supply and demand-side spending, supply-side spending 
only, demand-side spending only, and means-tested demand-side spending only. 
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Theories of redistribution built around government ideology, countries’ electoral 
systems, and the strength of unions as well as countries’ commitment to civil liberties 
and political rights, are explored in the analysis presented in this chapter. Left leaning 
parties, proportionally representative election systems (PR), and the strength of unions 
explain a great deal of the variation in the way countries spend on education and family 
benefits. The findings show that more left leaning systems and governments that have 
both a PR system and strong unions, will provide more benefits to families. Moreover, as 
will be discussed in Chapter IV, these policies in turn impact a country’s level of social 
and human capital that ultimately impedes or supports a country’s economic growth. 
Section 3.1 discusses the political science and sociology literature that addresses 
government redistribution policies and how they relate to education and family-benefit 
expenditures. Section 3.2 puts the policy expenditures into a budgetary context, and 
Section 3.3 addresses how the institutional factors influence the level of country 
expenditures on such policies. A model for testing the theoretical factors is presented 
and analyzed in Section 3.4. 
 
Section 3.1. The Redistributive Nature of Education and Family-Benefit Policies 
Both education and family-benefit policies are social in nature because they 
“address social problems and/or provide employment supports” (Adema 2006, 14). In 
the literature on welfare and social spending, however, education is not always included. 
Iversen and Stephens (2008) argue that this is a mistake. “Skills and education are at the 
core of the welfare state. Incentives to acquire particular types of skills are closely 
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related to both social protection and economic performance, and educational spending is 
not only a partisan issue but also one with profound implications for the distribution of 
income” (Iversen and Stephens 2008, 602). As a social policy, education does provide a 
universal good that any family, regardless of their income level, can use. As a 
universally provided good, however, it is not necessarily redistributive.  
Ansell (2010) has argued that education spending is redistributive only in so far 
as “who actually receives that education” (3). University spending he explains can be 
regressive since the wealthy more often take advantage of public higher education. In 
primary and secondary schools, it is a bit more complicated when non-government 
supported or managed private schools are taken into account. If wealthier families opt 
out of public schools altogether then the redistributive nature of school spending would 
be quite high. However, most countries’ primary and secondary public and government-
dependent private schools serve 90% or more of the school-aged population, so both rich 
and poor are accessing this publically provided good at least to some extent (OECD 
2012c, Table C1.4, 333). Iversen and Soskice (2009) claim definitively that spending on 
primary and secondary schools “benefits low-income groups more than high-income 
groups,” but this is not a certainty (454). Jensen (2011), who looks at overall education 
spending at all grade levels, argues that so long as taxation is progressive, public 
education will be redistributive but that spending on education is among the least 
redistributive programs in which governments can invest. “It is even the case that high-
income groups use publicly provided education more than low-income groups because 
full usage is conditioned on high levels of cultural capital, something that all else equal 
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favors high-income groups” (Jensen 2011, 413).14 Supply-side spending, spending on 
education, therefore, is redistributive to some extent, but how redistributive is it relative 
to demand-side spending or family benefit programs and financial aid?  
Financial aid at the primary and secondary school level is means-tested and 
targets children who come from families who are struggling economically. Means-tested 
family benefits are policies designed to target only the poor as well; beneficiaries are 
determined based on their economic need. These types of policies in the welfare capital 
literature are considered “liberal” because they typify a laissez-faire approach to 
governance – they minimize government involvement in marketplace outcomes; the 
United States is often used as the prototype of this category. In this approach, the 
government only steps in to assure a basic standard of living but keeps beneficiaries tied 
to their market conditions – in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) terms, this keeps beneficiaries 
commodified. A country’s welfare system in this literature is evaluated based on “the 
degree to which a (social) service is rendered as a matter of right, and the degree to 
which a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market” (Arts and 
Gelissen 2002, 141). 
In his seminal work, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Gøsta Esping-
Andersen (1990) introduces the three types of welfare capitalism: liberal, conservative, 
and social-democratic. These categories are based on countries’ healthcare, 
unemployment, sick leave, and poor relief policies, as well as pension schemes (Table 
3.1, 70-1). The liberal regime’s approach to welfare is described above. The 
                                                 
14 Cultural capital here refers to the societal norms and knowledge children inherit from their parents or 
families; this includes going to school and pursuing higher education. 
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conservative welfare system is one that moderately tries to decommodify policy 
beneficiaries but does so based on occupational groupings so that social benefits depend 
on previous contributions. Countries such as Germany, Austria, France, Italy, and 
Belgium most strongly fall into this category with their legacy of guilds and preferential 
benefits to civil servants.  
Social-democratic countries are those that offer policies that try to minimize the 
commodification of its citizens. Mostly Scandinavian, the countries in this category 
consider benefits to be a social right and provide universal benefits. Table III-1 lists 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) categories of countries and where they fall in this scheme.  
Each country’s score in the capital welfare typology is based on a variety of 
stratification indices. If a country has more than two pension schemes that are 
occupationally based, for example, and if civil servants receive special consideration, 
these countries receive a higher score on the conservative index; the conservative scale 
also considers the percentage of pensions that are based on private funds. The liberal 
scale is based on the percentage of all social benefits that are means-tested, and for the 
social-democratic scale, scores are based on the percentage of the population that 
benefits from a set of programs. When more than 86% of a population benefits from 
social programs, the country scores high on the social-democratic scale, if less than 60% 
of the population benefits, it scores low. The other consideration for the social-
democratic category is the average difference between the basic and maximum benefit 
payouts for sickness, unemployment, and pensions.  
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Table III–1. Country Welfare Capital Scores 
  
Degree of 
Conservatism 
Degree of 
Liberalism 
Degree of 
Socialism 
Australia Weak (0) Strong (10) Medium (4) 
Austria Strong (8) Weak (4) Weak (2) 
Belgium Strong (8) Weak (4) Medium (4) 
Brazil N/A N/A N/A 
Canada Weak (2) Strong (12) Medium (4) 
Chile N/A N/A N/A 
Czech Republic N/A N/A N/A 
Denmark Weak (2) Medium (6) Strong (8) 
Estonia N/A N/A N/A 
Finland Medium (6) Weak (4) Strong (6) 
France Strong (8) Medium (8) Weak (2) 
Germany Strong (8) Medium (6) Medium (4) 
Hungary N/A N/A N/A 
Iceland N/A N/A N/A 
Ireland Medium (4) Weak (2) Weak (2) 
Israel N/A N/A N/A 
Italy Strong (8) Medium (6) Weak (0) 
Japan Medium (4) Strong (10) Weak (2) 
Korea (South) N/A N/A N/A 
Mexico N/A N/A N/A 
Netherlands Medium (4) Medium (8) Strong (6) 
New Zealand Weak (2) Weak (2) Medium (4) 
Norway Medium (4) Weak (0) Strong (8) 
Poland N/A N/A N/A 
Portugal N/A N/A N/A 
Slovak Republic N/A N/A N/A 
Slovenia N/A N/A N/A 
Spain N/A N/A N/A 
Sweden Weak (0) Weak (0) Strong (8) 
Switzerland Weak (0) Strong (12) Medium (4) 
Turkey N/A N/A N/A 
UK Weak (0) Medium (6) Medium (4) 
United States Weak (0) Strong (12) Weak (0) 
*Adapted from Table 3.3 in Esping-Andersen (1990), 74 
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These categories have maintained a fair amount of traction in the twenty years 
they have been applied and scrutinized in social science research (Arts and Gelissen 
2002). Family benefits, however, are not explicitly included in the typology and this has 
met with a variety of challenges (Sainsbury 1994).15 Some researchers have argued that 
beyond the state and the market, the family has played a significant role in providing 
welfare benefits such as caring for the elderly and the young, and taking care of the 
women who are usually charged with such responsibilities (Bryson, et al. 1994). As 
women have challenged traditional gender roles and have become incorporated into the 
formal labor market, as they have become more commodified, their role in society has 
changed. Accordingly more benefits are needed to assist women who now need to take 
time away from work to give birth, as well as care for young children or elderly family 
members (Siaroff 1994, Trifiletti 1999). Men also need to receive such benefits as they 
are now expected to share in parenting and care-taking obligations, thus these benefits 
are considered family benefits.    
Trifiletti (1999, 54) argues that depending on how a system integrates women 
into the workforce and provides for their families, there are actually four types of 
welfare regimes: 1) liberal and 2) universalist (these minimize gender discrimination and 
consider women part of the workforce), and 3) breadwinner and 4) Mediterranean (these 
maximize gender discrimination and reinforce women’s roles as wives and mothers 
rather than as part of the workforce). Liberal and Mediterranean regimes are seen to 
                                                 
15 Neyer and Andersson (2008) argue that the Esping-Andersen (1990) typology does not work when 
evaluating “the effect of family policies on fertility and childbearing behavior” (706). Since this 
dissertation and this chapter in particular is concerned with spending and not reproductive decisions, 
Neyer and Andersson’s concerns are not addressed. 
  
 
57
leave women unprotected from the market whereas breadwinner policies such as those in 
Germany and Ireland, and universalist policies such as those in Sweden, protect women 
from market forces.  
The breadwinner regimes, according to Trifiletti, include those countries in 
which women receive benefits through their husbands and mostly work part-time. Since 
they are protected as wives and mothers in these countries, Trifiletti argues that women 
are subsequently protected from the market. She is incorrect on two fronts. First, married 
women are tied to the market through their husbands. Second, for women who are not 
married and work full time, their social benefits are tied to their income, so they also do 
not escape the market. This makes those countries in the breadwinner category very 
similar to those in the Mediterranean one since the market plays a significant role in 
determining the level of women’s benefits. Moreover, the women in breadwinner and 
Mediterranean countries are generally expected to fulfill the child and elder care 
responsibilities of the extended family. Thus, in both categories women’s benefits are 
determined more from their role as daughters, sisters, wives, or mothers than they are by 
the labor market. Trifiletti’s distinction between breadwinner and Mediterranean regimes 
then, appears to be a false dichotomy and countries in these categories could better be 
understood using Esping-Andersen’s market-based conservative typology that also takes 
into consideration how women’s roles are understood by society.  
As described earlier, conservatism is tied to how much countries differentiate 
non-means-tested payments between beneficiaries. Applying Trifiletti’s typology to 
Esping-Anderson’s three worlds of welfare capitalism means considering not just the 
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market and payment differentials, but also how women are treated by social policies. 
Countries that consider women to be workers who are tied to the market (just as men 
are) would be considered liberal or universal, and those that consider women based on 
their family roles are conservative. Since the benefits discussed in this dissertation center 
around the family, how these specific benefits fit into Esping-Andersen’s scheme merits 
further discussion.  
 
Table III–2. Family Benefits Up Close and Personal 
Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Family or child tax benefits  
Parenting payment (Single and Partnered) 
Single Income Family Bonus 
Back to School Bonus 
Family support (egalitarian benefits) 
Conditional Cash transfer benefits 
Maternity and parental leave 
  Maternity/parental leave benefit 
Income maintenance benefit in the event of 
childbirth 
Parental leave benefits 
Other cash benefits 
  Partner allowance 
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Home help 
Child day care 
Other benefits in kind 
  Services for families with children 
Family and child welfare  
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Table III-2 profiles the family benefits considered part of the demand-side 
spending that is central to the EPI-A and EPI-M. The benefits listed are a broad 
summary of those offered in the 33 countries included in the dataset used throughout this 
dissertation; the second level categories come from the sub-categories used in the 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Social Expenditure 
Database (SOCX). Cash Benefits/family allowances are designed to keep families out of 
dire straits when they grow and usually increase depending on the number of children 
that are part of the legally recognized family unit; in some countries (e.g., Australia and 
South Korea) there are additional monies for families that are single income. Income 
maintenance is the priority of maternity/parental benefits. These exist for families in 
which the mother and/or father has been working and is often not available unless the 
parent has been working for a minimal period of time. Family Benefits in Kind are tied 
to day care and home help in the case of caring for the elderly.  
These benefits are highly variable across countries. For those benefits that are 
mean-tested, they can be categorized as liberal since they are always market-based, treat 
men and women as workers, and are as minimal as possible for families in need – they 
are not designed to secure a middle class level of income for recipients. Family benefits 
that would be considered conservative are market-driven in so far as they are determined 
by past income and do not guarantee a family wage. Further, they primarily consider 
women in their gendered roles rather than as equal members of the labor force. Lastly, 
the Scandinavian or universalist (social-democratic) regimes treat women as workers 
and protect them from the market as much as they would their male counterparts.    
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To summarize, for the purposes of this dissertation, countries that are considered 
universalist are likely to invest more heavily in family or demand-side benefits than in 
education to decommodify its population. Liberal regimes with their market-driven 
approach to welfare, will invest more in education, and conservative regimes will be a 
bit more generous to family and students than liberal regimes but would be expected to 
invest more heavily in education (supply-side policies).  
Hypothesis 3.1: Countries that are considered liberal welfare regimes will 
allocate more resources to schools (supply-side policies) than to family or 
student benefits (demand-side policies); conservative regimes will allocate funds 
a bit more evenly whereas universalist regimes will devote more resources to 
demand-side policies. 
 
Liberal and conservative regimes do not guarantee that the level of family 
benefits they provide will keep children from poverty; reliance on the market to 
determine payments keeps a portion of the population poor. When family benefits are 
paid in these regimes then, since they are means-tested, they should be considered highly 
redistributive since they are explicitly targeting a country’s most needy families. Family 
benefits in universalist regimes would appear to be more redistributive than those in the 
conservative or liberal regimes since the benefit amounts are intended to minimize 
inequalities and keep everyone at a middle or higher income level. However, these 
countries tend to be wealthier to start with and have less overall poverty. Consequently 
these payments are not as redistributive as those in conservative and liberal regimes. In 
the aggregate though, family benefits are considered more redistributive given their 
family-orientation and poverty targeting than education or supply-side spending. 
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Therefore, throughout this dissertation, countries that spend more on family benefits than 
education will be considered to have more redistributive policies.  
 
Section 3.2. How Much of the Budget Are We Talking About? Nations’ Education 
and Demand-Side Policy Choices 
Figure III-2 shows countries’ supply-side spending, expenditures on primary and 
secondary schools, as a percentage of GDP relative to each country’s means-tested and 
universal demand-side (family benefits and financial aid) spending. The country with the 
most generous education spending for primary and secondary schools in this sample, at 
4% of GDP, is Denmark, followed by Israel, Slovenia, Sweden, Belgium, Australia, and 
New Zealand. All of these countries except for Israel are more evenly balanced in their 
supply and demand-side spending proportions and have an EPI-A of .60 or less (Israel 
has an EPI-A of .66). Slovenia (10%), Denmark (9%), Iceland (8%) and Sweden (8%) 
have the highest overall spending on education and family-oriented social programs as a 
percent of GDP – indicative of their egalitarian, universal policy orientation.  
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Slovenia, formerly Yugoslavia, is noteworthy as a former Communist country in 
that its transition to democracy and capitalism was introduced slowly and was less 
disruptive than it was in most other post-socialist countries (Kolarič, et al. 2011). In 
general Slovenia has low poverty and income inequality and has enjoyed economic 
success. To live a comfortable middle class lifestyle, though, families require two full-
time working parents and the available family benefits reflect a commitment to working 
women who have a long history of full-time employment in Slovenia (Stropnik and 
Šircelj 2008). In terms of overall expenditures, Slovenia is the most balanced in its 
supply- and demand-side spending priorities of all the countries in the dataset whether 
looking at its EPI-A (.43) or EPI-M (.53) scores. This implies that most demand-side 
spending is means-tested and it is based on the large amount of financial aid provided to 
primary and secondary students; the family benefits portion of the demand-side 
spending, however, is primarily universal.  
While family benefits have been an important part of Slovenia’s expenditures 
since before the transition to democracy, education reform and spending did not become 
a high priority until the early 1990’s after Slovenia became independent. Starting in 
1991 with the Law on Organization and Financing of Education, Slovenia reorganized 
the education system and determined new rules for financing, increased spending, and 
improved their enrollment numbers (Plut-Pregelj 2001). The spending on education 
continued to increase as the country prepared to enter the European Union (EU) and 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004 and the balance between the two 
types of spending in 2006 reflects these pattern. Hungary is similar to Slovenia in that its 
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spending between supply- and demand- is very balanced based on the EPI-A score, 
however, most benefits in Hungary are universal so its EPI-M score is .93 or very 
skewed to education spending.  
Other countries in the dataset that had experience with Communism vary 
considerably from Slovenia and Hungary. Formerly Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia today have two very different approaches to spending on education and 
demand-side spending. The Czech Republic has an EPI- A score of .62 and an EPI-M 
score of .83 indicating that most of the demand spending is universal (38% of demand-
spending is actually means tested) and that education spending is a comparable priority 
to family-oriented social benefits. Slovakia on the other hand has the most supply-side 
oriented EPI in the dataset with an EPI-A score of .95 and EPI-M score of .98. Here the 
spending on means-tested student financial aid reflects 53% of the demand-side benefits 
whereas the cash benefits and benefits in kind are primarily universal. This indicates that 
education has been the priority for Slovakia, along with direct aid to students who are 
going to school, and family benefits are designed to help everyone regardless of income. 
Figures III-3 and III-4 show the EPI-A and EPI-M scores for all of the countries in the 
dataset and indicate the median score (See also Tables II-3 and II-4 in Chapter II to see 
how the scores break down along the spending categories).  
  
Figure III–3
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The median EPI-A score for all countries in the dataset is .60 whereas the median 
EPI-M score is .89. This disparity indicates that most countries in the sample provide 
benefits that are more universally oriented and are not means-based. The countries with 
the most 2006 means-tested demand-side policies are Brazil (100%), the United States 
(94%), and Turkey (85%). The OECD shows that these countries’ 2010 Gini index or 
inequality scores vary considerably: Brazil has a .55 Gini index score, Turkey an index 
score of .41, and the U.S. a Gini index score of .38.16 While Brazil has a poverty rate of 
21%, Turkey and the U.S. are not far behind with each having a 17% poverty rate. Table 
III-3 shows the poverty rates and GINI scores for each country in the dataset. The only 
countries with comparable poverty rates are Mexico (21%), Israel (20%), and Chile 
(18%).17  
 
 
 
                                                 
16 With the exception of Brazil, the 2010 Gini index scores are from the OECD Country Statistical Profiles 
database; Brazil’s 2009 score comes from the World Bank (2009) database of World Development 
Indicators. The World Bank database defines the Gini index as “the extent to which the distribution of 
income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy 
deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total 
income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or 
household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute 
equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of 0 represents 
perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality” (World Bank “World Development 
Indicators - Aggregated Database”  2009, OECD “Country Statistical Profiles Database”  2011e).  
17 The poverty rates listed here are from the OECD “Country Statistical Profiles Database” 2011e and 
represent the poverty ratio from the late 2000’s. The poverty ratio is defined by the OECD 2010 Factbook 
as “The ratio of the number of people who fall below the poverty line and the total population; the poverty 
line is here taken as half the median household income. However, two countries with the same poverty 
rates may differ in terms of the income-level of the poor” (OECD 2010d, 236). 
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Table III–3. Country Poverty and GINI Scores 
Country GINI Score Poverty Rate 
Brazil 0.55 21% 
Chile 0.49 18% 
Mexico 0.48 21% 
Turkey 0.41 17% 
USA 0.38 17% 
Israel 0.37 20% 
Portugal 0.35 12% 
UK 0.34 11% 
Italy 0.34 11% 
Australia 0.34 15% 
New Zealand 0.33 11% 
Japan 0.33 16% 
Canada 0.32 12% 
Spain 0.32 14% 
Estonia 0.32 12% 
Korea 0.32 15% 
Poland 0.31 10% 
Switzerland 0.30 9% 
Iceland 0.30 6% 
Germany 0.30 9% 
Netherlands 0.29 7% 
Ireland 0.29 9% 
France 0.29 7% 
Hungary 0.27 6% 
Austria 0.26 8% 
Finland 0.26 8% 
Sweden 0.26 8% 
Belgium 0.26 9% 
Slovak Republic 0.26 7% 
Czech Republic 0.26 5% 
Norway 0.25 8% 
Denmark 0.25 6% 
Slovenia 0.24 8% 
 
NOTE: Countries with a poverty rate of 15% or greater are in bold. 
SOURCE: OECD “Country Statistical Profiles Database” 2011e 
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A closer look at how poverty rates are impacted by supply-side, means-tested, 
and non-means-tested demand-side expenditures reveals that poverty is lower for the 
countries in this dataset that spend more on non-means-tested demand-side policies.18 In 
Chapter IV these decisions’ impact on educational outcomes will be addressed but first it 
is important to identify which institutional factors influence the type of spending 
countries prioritize. Accordingly, the next section addresses the key aspects of countries’ 
political institutions that help explain their EPI-A and EPI-M scores.  
  
Section 3.3. Which Political and Ideological Factors Matter? 
 
Democratic Political Institutions 
Under democracies, governments provide more public goods and are more 
redistributive than under authoritarian regimes (Przeworski, et al. 1999, Kaufman and 
Segura-Ubiergo 2001, Lake and Baum 2001, Brown and Hunter 2004, Avelino, et al. 
2005). Electoral systems in particular influence how generous governments will be once 
they take control of a country’s budget. Democracies that elect their leaders via 
proportional representation (PR) systems tend to be more redistributive than majoritarian 
systems (Iversen and Soskice 2006, 2009). According to Iversen and Soskice (2006), the 
reason for this leftist tendency in PR systems is that the middle class/centrist party can 
ally with left-leaning parties and influence policy differently than in majoritarian 
                                                 
18 A linear regression model (with p =.002) was run with countries’ poverty rate as the dependent variable 
and the percent of spending on supply-, means-tested demand- and non-means-tested demand-side 
spending as the independent variables of interest. The only variable that was having an impact on reducing 
poverty was non-means-tested demand-side spending at p=.001. None of the other variables were 
significant including the GDP per capita control variable. 
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systems. In a PR system, the middle class can benefit more from taxation on the 
wealthiest whereas in majoritarian systems the middle class will be included in higher 
taxes if the left is in control of policy (166). Accordingly we would expect to see PR 
systems spend more heavily on demand-side policies that are more redistributive than 
education spending.  
Hypothesis 3.2: Proportionally Representative (PR) Systems will spend relatively 
more than majoritarian systems on demand-side policies that are student and 
family-oriented than on supply-side policies that target schools and teacher 
wages. 
 
 
 The level of a country’s democratization is another component of how much a 
country redistributes its wealth (Iversen and Soskice 2006, Iversen and Stephens 2008, 
Iversen and Soskice 2009). Democratic countries that value citizens’ political rights and 
civil liberties, would be expected to spend a great deal on education to assure an 
electorate that can make rational voting decisions. Accordingly they will want to reach 
as many constituents as possible and education is a way to reach families and garner 
political support. David S. Brown and Wendy Hunter (2004) argue that “democratically 
elected politicians would be especially likely to direct resources to the primary 
[education] level, because such an approach would benefit the largest number of 
potential voters” (845). In his analysis of democracies and their levels of education 
spending, Ansell (2008) confirms that democratization increases primary education 
spending.  
Highly democratic countries are also expected to provide a safety net for its 
population so that poorer citizens are not living in poverty and will support the 
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government (and vote for incumbents). Yet, redistributive spending should be geared 
toward educating the populace for three reasons. First, as mentioned above, politicians 
want to reach as many potential voters as possible and education is an easy way to do 
that (family benefits primarily benefit the poor). Second, the work force needs to be 
educated to provide a skill level that benefits the economy and third, an educated 
electorate will be able to capably participate in the workings of government (Castelló-
Climent 2008; Iversen and Stephens 2008; Brady et al., 1995).   
Hypothesis 3.3: More democratic countries will invest more in education 
(supply-side policies) than in family and student benefits (demand-side policies) 
to assure that citizens are able to participate in the economy as well as the 
running and monitoring of government.  
 
 
Partisan Ideology, Labor Unions and Redistribution 
Left-leaning governments have been found to be more distributive and 
redistributive than those that are more conservative (Bardhan 2002). The ideological 
position of the government can change each election and, provided the legislature and 
the executive pass new laws, the policies they pass should reflect their ideological 
preferences (Cusack 1997). The challenge with capturing such policies’ effectiveness, 
however, is twofold. First, if the policy itself is meant to be more of a symbolic policy 
than an implemented one, it may not get funding; budget allocation therefore is a key 
part of this analysis. A second reason to include funding is that if a new administration 
with a distinctly different ideological position from their predecessor is elected, the new 
administration might increase or decrease the program’s budget. A new administration 
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might also reprioritize the bureaucratic effort by limiting funds to certain programs, 
implementing a previously symbolic program, or overturning a policy altogether before 
the policy’s impact can be measured. Partisan theory claims that “parties in power have 
an impact on policy output … [and] government parties of the left and of the right 
behave differently in government and pursue different policy programmes” (Imbeau, et 
al. 2001). This is why the budgets are the key to understanding what is actually 
happening in the lives of students and their families. The EPI-A and EPI-M provides a 
lens for seeing what investments are being made and can be evaluated based on the 
government’s ideology.  
Another complexity around spending and ideology stems from politicians’ 
intention – what are they trying to signal and to whom? Hibbs (1992) argues that 
spending reflects a commitment to voting constituencies. Between 1990 and 2006, 
Potrafke (2011) claims that “education has become an important expenditure category 
for leftist parties to signal their political visions to voters belonging to all societal 
groups” (101). Research into education spending allocations by social democrats (left-
leaning parties) has made a distinction between higher education spending and primary 
and secondary school investments. Both types of institutions benefit fiscally from left-
leaning government leadership, but higher education institutions may benefit even more 
to expand the core constituency to include higher middle class voters (Boix 1997, 
Busemeyer 2009). The remarkable finding by Busemeyer (2008, 118) for the purposes 
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of this dissertation is that spending on all education increases by as much as 10% when 
left-leaning parties have more legislative power.19     
When considering supply-side, education benefits relative to family and student 
benefit spending, however, elected official who are members of left-learning parties will 
need to signal that they are taking care of their core constituency. The immediate benefit 
to constituents would be in the form of family benefits rather than education since such 
spending impacts more constituents and is more redistributive. Thus, while both policy 
types are important to left learning political leaders, families will benefit more. 
Hypothesis 3.4: Left-learning governments will spend more on demand-side 
policies that are student and family-oriented than on supply-side policies that 
target schools and teacher wages. 
 
Power Resource Theory (PRT) helps to put the ideological leaning of 
government in an institutional context – institutions can limit how much power political 
groups such as parties and unions can have over policies and expenditures. Research has 
shown that the organizational strength of the working class and the historical strength of 
the political left will influence how redistributive a government will be (Hicks and 
Swank 1984, Murillo 1999, Grindle 2004, Iversen and Soskice 2009). Spending on 
welfare policies will therefore be expected to increase when left-leaning (social 
democrat) parties and labor unions have political power. Moreover, when labor unions 
are strong within a proportionally representative system, where parliamentary 
                                                 
19 Busemeyer (2008) shows that higher education spending increases by 23% versus 17% for 
primary/secondary/non-tertiary when leftist parties are controlling the government (118). 
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committees provide special interest groups with access to legislation, family benefits 
would be expected to be high (Korpi 2006, Iversen and Soskice 2009).  
Hypothesis 3.5: When a country has strong unions and a PR (proportionally 
representative) electoral system, spending on supply-side expenses (schools and 
wages) would be expected to be lower relative to demand-side spending 
(expenditures that go directly to students and families). 
 
One contention with this hypothesis might be that unions are primarily expected 
to advocate for wages or supply-side spending, but unions do both – they promote higher 
wages and more benefits. This is especially true for primary and secondary teachers who 
generally have low salaries, and who are usually women. In fact, over 65% of primary 
and secondary school teachers worldwide are women and research has shown that when 
a higher percentage of teachers are women, teacher salaries are lower (Dolton and 
Marcenaro-Gutierrez 2011). Benefits may be the one area where teachers and their 
unions are able to compensate for their lower salaries – especially family benefits.  
Since teacher unions vary considerably in their strength across countries, 
assessing their institutional impact on spending needs to be considered in the context of 
the overall strength of unions within each country. Moreover, since all unions are 
expected to advocate for better family benefits in addition to better wages for their 
particular members, when unions have power, family benefits would be expected to be 
higher as indicated with Hypothesis 3.5. The level of teacher union influence over 
decision-making and in enacting policies can ultimately impact human capital outcomes 
– especially if unions’ efforts result in higher teacher pay and job security at the expense 
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of teacher quality or student resources (Jafarey and Lahiri 2005). This will be further 
discussed in Chapter IV when the factors that impact student outcomes are evaluated.  
 
Section 3.4. Measuring Political Institutions and Government Ideology Impact On 
Country EPI Scores – Data and Methods 
Appendix B summarizes the hypotheses presented in the previous sections and 
outlines how these variables will be measured along with their expected relationship to 
the EPI-A and EPI-M. In Section 3.2 Hypothesis 3.1 was presented as a way to show 
how welfare-spending regimes differ in their impacts on the EPI-A and EPI-M. Liberal 
regimes, with their reliance on market forces, are expected to spend more on education 
(supply-side policies) regardless of whether or not it is EPI-A or EPI-M as the dependent 
variable. Conservative regimes are also expected to favor education over family and 
student benefits whereas Social regimes will be expected to favor demand-side policies 
(family and student benefits) over education or supply-side spending.  
To test these assertions a linear regression model was run with the EPI-A and 
EPI-M as the dependent variables, and the countries’ regime types (listed in Table III-1) 
as the independent variables. The degree of liberal policy orientation for each country is 
indicated with Lc, Conservative orientation with Cc, and Social orientations is indicated 
with Sc. The countries’ Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc) is used to control 
for the wealth of the countries.  
EPIAc = 0+ Lc1 + Cc2 + Sc3 + GDPpcc4 +   eq. 3.1a 
EPIMc = 0+ Lc1 + Cc2 + Sc3 + GDPpcc4 +   eq. 3.1b 
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While the model with the EPI-M as the dependent variable is not significant, the 
EPI-A model is significant at p<.01 and has an adjusted R2 of .53. Since Esping- 
Andersen is the data source for the regime types, there are only 18 countries evaluated 
and the results are shown in Table III-4. 
 
Table III–4. Regime Type and Balance of Supply- and Demand-Side Spending 
Independent Variables EPI-A EPI-M 
Liberal Regime .02 (.01)*  .01 (.00) 
Conservative Regime -.00  .01 (.01) 
Universalist Regime  -.01 (.01) .01 (.01) 
GDPpC  .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
Model p-value .01 .36 
NOTES: N=18, Standard errors are in parentheses, *p=.01 
 
The results indicate that of these countries, liberal regimes invest significantly 
more in education than in family and students (demand-side benefits). So the more 
economically liberal (the more market oriented) the country, the more education 
spending is prioritized over family benefits. Moreover, though the countries with a 
higher degree of socialism, those countries that have a larger social score, do not have 
significance (p=.11), the coefficient is negative indicating that these countries have a 
tendency to spend more on family benefits. As mentioned earlier, the EPI-M model 
(equation 3b) is not significant but the conservative regimes’ spending is significant at 
p<.10 and is in the expected direction implying a larger focus on supply-spending over 
family and student benefits.  
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As discussed in the previous section, countries’ leadership ideology, electoral 
system, prioritization of civil liberties and political rights, and its wealth will affect the 
balance of supply- and demand-side spending. Further, the ability of the working 
population to organize and negotiate their wages, along with the depth of individuals’ 
political rights and civil liberties should have an impact on how countries choose to 
spend their resources.  
To test these hypotheses, the following equations are used:  
 
 
 
EPIAc = 0+ Ic1 + PRc2 + UPc3 + PRUPc4 +  
FHc5 + PCc6 +GDPpcc7 +  
eq. 3.2a 
 
 
 
EPIMc = 0+ Ic1 + PRc2 + UPc3 + PRUPc4 +  
FHc5 + PCc6 +GDPpcc7 +  
eq. 3.2b 
 
  
 
 
In equation 3.2a, the dependent variable is EPIAc, the Education Policy Index for 
each country that includes all demand-side spending estimates (means-tested and non-
means-tested family and student benefits). In equation 3.2b, the dependent variable is 
EPIMc, the Education Policy Index for each country that includes only means-tested 
family and student benefits in the demand-side spending estimates. The independent 
variables in the equations are the same. Ic is the ideology of the country’s government 
between left and right, PRc is whether or not the government is elected via a proportional 
representative system or not, UPc is the strength of the union’s power, PRUPc is the 
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interaction between the electoral system and the union’s strength, FHc is the country’s 
Freedom House score, PCc is the level of the country’s political constraint, and GDPpcc 
is the country’s wealth per capita.   
The country’s ideology score is based on the World Bank’s Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI). The DPI codes a government’s executive based on his or her party 
affiliation and codes the legislature’s ideology based on the party that has the most 
votes; party orientation is determined based on the party in charge’s platform with 
respect to economic policy.20 Parties are coded as “right” if they self identify as 
conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing. Left parties are defined as communist, 
socialist, social democratic, or left-wing, and parties are considered centrist if they 
define themselves as such or “when party position can best be described as centrist” 
(Keefer 2010). Given that six countries in the dataset have presidential systems (Brazil, 
Chile, South Korea, the Netherlands, Poland and the United States), the executive’s 
ideological orientation is especially relevant. Of the 28 countries for which there is 
available data, the ideological orientation of the executive, however, is nearly 100% 
correlated with the ideological orientation of the largest party in the legislature; In 2006 
only Iceland had an executive with a different ideology than the largest party in 
government. Subsequently, either the executive or legislative ideology could be used in 
the model.  Given the presidential orientation of several countries in the sample, the 
executive ideology variable is used but the results from running the models with the 
                                                 
20 The World Banks’s Database of Political Institutions codebook states that, “if there was evidence that 
the executive deviated considerably from the party orientation (e.g. austerity policy of a socialist / social 
democratic party) the executive’s orientation is recorded in the database, not the party’s. In addition, if 
executive is independent, the executive’s orientation is recorded” (World Bank 2012b).  
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legislative ideology variable are presented in Appendix D and the results are the same. 
The Quality of Government (QOG) Dataset compiled by the QOG Institute 
located at the University of Gothenburg categorizes countries’ electoral systems in three 
ways: (1) Majoritarian, (2) Mixed, or (3) Proportional (PR). Majoritarian systems elect 
their leaders based on a majority of the votes whereas PR systems elect leaders based on 
the proportion of the vote received by each party, and Mixed combines these two 
methods in some way. The executive office of the countries in the dataset are classified 
as Parliamentary Monarchy (e.g., Belgium, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom), 
Presidential Republic (e.g., Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and the United States), or Mixed 
executive (e.g., Austria, Italy, S. Korea, and Turkey) with the exception of Switzerland. 
Switzerland poses a unique categorical challenge because it is ruled by a seven-member 
Federal Council that is supposed to be an apolitical council of experts that essentially 
represents four political parties from across the ideological spectrum. Since it is not 
ideologically distinguishable, Switzerland is excluded from the analysis in this chapter.  
 A multitude of institutional factors are known to constrain policymakers. In 
2000, Witold Henisz introduced a measure designed to capture the feasibility of policy 
changes given a country’s political institutions and associated constraints (Henisz 2000). 
This measure, referred to as political constraints (PC) in equations 1 and 2 above, is an 
index that ranges from 0 to 1 and relies on three data points: the number of institutional 
players with veto power over policy changes, partisan alignments (including coalitions) 
across institutions, and the legislature’s party composition (Henisz 2000, 27). More 
constraint comes from a large number of veto players in the system, a lack of party 
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alignment across branches of government, and a lack of party alignment within 
branches. 
In one study the PC index shows that political constraints can impact a country’s 
infrastructure investments – the more political factors constrain political actors, the more 
likely there will be economic growth since policies, once made, are less likely to be 
changed (Henisz 2002, 362). For the research presented here, the PC index is used as a 
control for the ideological differences and structural challenges politicians have to 
overcome to implement or change policies.  
Figure III-5 shows the PC scores for the countries in the dataset. The higher the 
score, the closer it is to 1, the more politically constrained the actors are to change 
policies. For the countries used in this chapter, Belgium has the highest PC score of .69. 
Chile and the Netherlands follow with a PC score of .65. On the other end of the scale, 
the countries with the lowest institutional constraints are Italy (.34), Turkey (.31), and 
Mexico (.29). 
  
Figure III–5
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The power of unions (UP) is understood as their ability to form, negotiate for 
their members with employers, and have a say in business activities.21 Based on these 
criteria, the QOG database compiles an index for each country in the dataset  (Teorell, et 
al. 2012). Unions are constrained by institutions that can limit or enhance their ability to 
impact policies. In their discussion of coordinated and liberal market economies, Iversen 
and Soskice (2009) show that the type of electoral system matters for the level of welfare 
countries provide. Coordinated market economies are economies in which the 
government plays a strong role in providing social welfare benefits whereas liberal 
market economies provide relatively few.22 According to their research, “coordinated 
market economies cluster with strong welfare states and consensus political systems; and 
liberal market economies cluster with weak welfare states and majoritarian political 
systems” (Iversen and Soskice 2009, 478). In PR systems, unions have been shown to 
have more access to legislative committees where they can have an impact on policy 
(Iversen and Soskice 2009). Accordingly, the model in this chapter includes an 
interaction between the type of electoral system (majoritarian, mixed, or proportional 
representative) and union power. A significant interaction will indicate that PR electoral 
systems and powerful unions affect governments’ redistributive spending decisions.   
                                                 
21 The measure specifically “Measures the statutory protection and power of unions as the average of the 
following seven dummy variables which equal one: (1) if employees have the right to unionize; (2) if 
employees have the right to collective bargaining; (3) if employees have the legal duty to bargain with 
unions; (4) if collective contracts are extended to third parties by law; (5) if the law allows closed shops; 
(6) if workers, or unions, or both have a right to appoint members to the Boards of Directors; and (7) if 
workers’ councils are mandated by law” (Teorell, et al. 2012, Codebook page 29). 
22 Korpi (2006) argues that countries developed coordinated market economies as opposed to liberal 
market economies because of employer strategies relative to each countries’ left-oriented parties and 
unions given political constraints and opportunities. Specifically, when left-oriented parties and unions are 
strong and PR electoral systems are in place, coordinated markets evolved.  
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The Freedom House Index provides a convenient way to assess a country’s 
tolerance for civil liberties and political rights that will play into how open a country 
may be in any given year to helping those in the population that are most in need. This 
measure is preferable to Polity since only democratic countries are included in this 
analysis. Freedom House is also better because countries that value civil liberties and 
political rights would be expected to spend more on education; an educated populace 
should understand more about the political system to monitor the government effectively 
to avoid tyranny of the majority or manipulation of the masses by a minority. Finally, to 
control for the wealth and level of economic development of each country in the study, 
the country’s Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc) is included in the model.  
All data used are from 2006 and are presented in Table III-5. This year was 
selected because it represents a three-year lag from the 2009 education outcome data that 
are applied in Chapter IV. Since budgets take time to be implemented, a lag of a few 
years gives investments time to have an impact on outcomes and this will be further 
explored in the next chapter.23  
 
                                                 
23 Education is a cumulative investment and by the time students complete secondary school they have had 
up to 13 years of schooling. Spending on schools and families is thus a long-term investment and does 
change from year to year – especially after 2008 when the worldwide recession hit. Future analysis should 
incorporate more years of data to establish how elections and different government composition impact 
spending decisions.    
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Table III–5. Independent Variables Unpacked 
Country Executive Ideology (I)1
Largest 
Party 
Ideology1 
Electoral 
System 
(PR)2 
Political 
Constraint 
(PC)3 
Union 
Power 
(UP)4 
Freedom 
House 
(FH)5 
GDPpc 
(US$)6 
Australia 1 1 2 0.50 0.29 1  35,986 
Austria 1 1 3 0.53 0.43 1  39,300 
Belgium 1 1 3 0.69 0.43 1  37,919 
Brazil 3 3 3 0.42 0.38 2  5,793  
Canada 3 3 1 0.46 0.14 1  39,250 
Chile 1 1 3 0.65 0.43 1  9,376  
Czech Republic 3 3 3 0.39 0.43 1  14,446 
Denmark 1 1 3 0.53 0.71 1  50,462 
Estonia . 2 3 0.53 . 1  12,503 
Finland 2 2 3 0.53 0.43 1  39,487 
France 1 1 1 0.54 0.67 1  35,457 
Germany 1 1 2 0.47 0.71 1  35,238 
Hungary 3 3 2 0.36 0.71 1  11,174 
Iceland 2 1 3 0.49 . 1  54,814 
Ireland 2 2 3 0.47 0.43 1  52,501 
Israel 1 1 3 0.56 0.29 1.5  20,625 
Italy 1 1 2 0.34 0.43 1  31,777 
Japan 1 1 2 0.50 0.71 1.5  34,102 
S. Korea 2 2 2 0.38 0.71 1.5  19,676 
Mexico 2 2 2 0.29 0.57 2  8,831  
Netherlands 1 1 3 0.65 0.43 1  41,459 
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Table III-5, continued 
Country Executive Ideology (I)1 
Largest 
Party 
Ideology1 
Electoral 
System 
(PR)2 
Political 
Constraint 
(PC)3 
Union 
Power 
(UP)4 
Freedom 
House 
(FH)5 
GDPpc 
(US$)6 
New Zealand 1 1 2 0.45 . 1  26,173 
Norway 3 3 3 0.52 0.71 1  72,960 
Poland 1 1 3 0.56 0.71 1  8,958  
Portugal 3 3 3 0.41 0.71 1  19,065 
Slovak Republic . . 3 0.56 0.57 1  12,799 
Slovenia 2 2 3 0.54 0.43 1  19,406 
Spain 3 3 3 0.39 0.71 1  28,025 
Sweden 3 3 3 0.51 0.62 1  43,949 
Switzerland . . 3 0.42 0.33 1  54,140 
Turkey . . 3 0.31 0.57 3  7,687  
UK 3 3 1 0.40 . 1  40,481 
United States 1 1 1 0.40 0.14 1  44,623 
1 Right = 1, Centrist = 2, Left = 3; SOURCE: World Bank's Database of Political Institutions 
2 Majoritarian=1, Mixed=2, Proportional Representation=3; SOURCE: World Bank's Database of Political Institutions 
3 The index scores are derived from a simple spatial model and ranges from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating more political constraint and thus 
less feasibility of policy change. “The index is composed from the following information: the number of independent branches of government with 
veto power over policy change, counting the executive and the presence of an effective lower and upper house in the legislature (more branches 
leading to more constraint); the extent of party alignment across branches of government, measured as the extent to which the same party or 
coalition of parties control each branch (decreasing the level of constraint); and the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative 
branch, measured as legislative fractionalization in the relevant house (increasing constraint for aligned executives, decreasing it for opposed 
executives)” (Teorell, et al. 2012, 108). Note that the coding reflects information as of January 1, 2006. SOURCE: QOG Database 
4 Labor Union Power Index –“The average of the following seven dummy variables which equal one: (1) if employees have the right to unionize; 
(2) if employees have the right to collective bargaining; (3) if employees have the legal duty to bargain with unions; (4) if collective contracts are 
extended to third parties by law; (5) if the law allows closed shops; (6) if workers, or unions, or both have a right to appoint members to the Boards 
of Directors; and (7) if workers’ councils are mandated by law” (Teorell, et al. 2012, 29). SOURCE: QOG Database 
5Most free = 1, least free = 7; SOURCE: Freedom House 
6 SOURCE: OECD Country Data
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What the 2006 data show in this chapter are the spending priorities of the 
officials who held office that year – the EPI-A and EPI-M reflect the government’s 
expenditures under their tenure. Electoral cycles are not directly addressed in the models 
though the PC measure does address party conflict for the given year. For the countries 
included in the analysis, 12 had legislative and 4 had executive elections in 2006 
whereas 9 had legislative elections and 3 had executive elections in 2005. These 
elections are listed in Appendix C. Although these events may have impacted 2006 
spending priorities, the impact of the elections themselves are beyond the scope of this 
analysis, rather this analysis addresses how party ideology and institutional constraints 
impact the decisions political actors make once in office. Table III-7 presents the 
regression analysis results. 
 
Table III–6. Institutional and Ideological Impacts on Spending Decisions 
Independent Variables EPI-A  EPI-M 
Executive Ideology -.05 (.03)* -.03 (.03) 
Electoral System -.24 (.07)** -.04 (.08) 
Union Power -.94 (.29)** -.04 (.35) 
Electoral System*Union Power .42 (.13)** .06 (.15) 
Freedom Index .12 (.07) -.07 (.09) 
Political Constraint .01 (.27) .06 (.32) 
GDPpc -.00 (.00)* .00 (.00) 
Model p-value .03 .71 
 
NOTES: N=26, Standard errors are in parentheses; Countries omitted due to lack of data are Estonia, 
Slovak Republic, Switzerland, and Turkey (no data for executive ideology) and Iceland, New Zealand, and 
the U.K. (no data for union power). 
*p<.10, ** p<.01 
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The EPI-A model has an overall p-value of .03 and an adjusted R2 of .36. As 
mentioned above, Appendix B provides on overview of the expected sign directions 
given the hypotheses begin tested. In summary, negative coefficients indicate a demand-
side policy orientation while positive coefficients indicate a supply-side policy 
orientation. Of the significant independent variables the most remarkable is the type of 
electoral system – having a government that is proportionally representative will likely 
lead to more demand-side spending by as much as .25 on the EPI scale. Powerful unions 
will also significantly push the EPI-A measure towards the demand-side of the scale. 
The coefficient of the interaction of union power and electoral system cannot be directly 
interpreted. Figure III-6 presents the marginal effect of powerful unions given a PR 
system for electing officials and shows that as the electoral system moves from 
majoritarian to mixed to proportionally representative, the power of unions has an 
increasing impact on the balance of supply- and demand-side spending. This support for 
Hypothesis 3.5 is significant in that it confirms the importance of unions and electoral 
systems for budget allocations. This significance, however, is interactive and one 
without the other will likely have a different outcome for beneficiaries.  
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Figure III–6. Marginal Effects of Union Power Conditional on the Electoral System 
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Section 3. 5. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that political institutions and the ideology of decision 
makers have an impact on governments’ spending priorities between supply-side 
(education) and demand-side (family and student benefits) policies. Namely, the type of 
electoral system will have an impact on whether or not families, regardless of their 
income level, will benefit from fiscally redistributive policies as much as or more than 
schools will. Based on the analysis presented here, those countries that elect their 
representatives via a PR system are going to be more redistributive and assure families a 
higher level of benefits than governments that are elected via a majoritarian or mixed 
system. Further, the electoral system will affect how much unions can influence 
spending, and PR systems, as theory suggests, appear to give unions more leverage on 
such decisions than majoritarian systems do. Left-leaning governments also play a 
significant role regardless of how they are elected, and will push spending towards 
family benefits, both means-tested and non-means-tested, over schools.  
At the sub-national level, these institutional and political factors are also at play, 
influencing state and local governments in their choice of which education policies they 
pass and implement. Future research should look at the impact of these factors and their 
effects on spending in greater detail. This dissertation does not completely ignore the 
sub-national differences between countries, however. In Chapter IV the percent of 
national, state, or local level fiscal and management decision-making related to schools 
is incorporated into models analyzing how spending impacts student outcomes. 
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Another area for future research is the impact of international investments on 
spending decisions. Most of the countries in this dataset are wealthy and only four, 
Turkey, Mexico, Chile, and Brazil, have significant loans from the World Bank, other 
countries, or other international monetary funding sources. Such outside monies are 
known to impact policies. Chapter V in this dissertation provides a more details look via 
a case study into how Mexico’s policies, funded in large part by the World Bank, have 
had an impact on student outcomes.  
The next chapter of this dissertation, Chapter IV, explores how spending between 
supply- and demand-side policies impact student outcomes measured via a test of 
cognitive skill. Such tests are irrelevant, though, if students are absent from school or if 
students show up with an empty stomach, are sick, or do not live in a home where basic 
needs are met. Research shows that when family benefits do not protect children from 
poverty, they suffer cognitively and educationally (N. Ozawa 2004). All countries have 
committed some level of their budgets to families regardless of the country’s level of 
economic development. This chapter has shown that the variation in how much spending 
goes to demand-side spending is greatly dependent on a country’s political system and 
leadership ideology. The next chapter will show how these spending decisions have an 
impact on countries’ human capital development.      
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CHAPTER IV  
SPENDING AND HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
In the last chapter we saw how government institutions and leaders’ political 
ideology at the national level have an impact on countries’ spending policies. In this 
chapter we explore how these policies on education spending impact the development of 
students’ marketable skills and knowledge, their human capital. As described in Chapter 
II, the Education Policy Index (EPI) is designed to capture the balance of a country’s 
supply-side spending, spending that targets schools and teachers, with the country’s 
demand-side spending, spending that is geared to families and individual students. As I 
have argued throughout this dissertation, both types of spending are necessary to help all 
students succeed academically, but their impacts on students will be different.  
Supply-side expenditures are expected to affect student learning and cognitive 
development whereas demand-side spending is expected to increase or maintain 
enrollment numbers – in some cases helping students who, due to financial 
circumstances, might choose to forego their education altogether. While these two 
outcomes are highly related (students can’t benefit from schools unless they are in 
attendance), they need to be assessed differently. To test the success of school 
investments (supply-side spending) across countries it is useful to look at student 
performance on a common test of skills and knowledge such as the Programme for 
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International Student Assessment (PISA) exams, whereas to evaluate the success of 
demand-side spending, school enrollment rates are the more useful measure.  
Recall from Chapter II that the spending estimates used to create the Education 
Policy Index for all types of demand-side spending (EPI-A), as well as the Education 
Policy Index for means-tested demand-side spending (EPI-M), reflect expenditures from 
all levels of government – not just spending from the federal level. While I was not able 
to evaluate the subnational institutional and ideological influences on the spending 
allocation decisions themselves, I can explore whether or not the source of funds impacts 
the effectiveness of schools for purposes of human capital development, as well as 
whether or not the level of government making education policy decisions impacts 
student performance.24  
The findings presented in this chapter indicate that demand-side expenditures in 
the aggregate (means tested and non-means-tested) do have a positive impact on 
enrollment rates and that this is mostly driven by the allocation of cash benefits and 
benefits in kind to families and students (not financial aid). Measures of cognitive skill 
and knowledge, results on the PISA exams, indicate that supply-side spending (spending 
targeting schools and teachers) has a positive impact on student performance when 
demand-side spending targets the most needy students. In analyses of institutional 
decentralization and how management decision making affects human capital 
development, local autonomy shows positive effects.  
                                                 
24 As discussed in Chapter III, evaluating subnational institutional and political differences between each 
country in the dataset is an area for further research. Ten of the countries in the dataset (Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Mexico, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States) are considered 
federal and would provide interesting case studies in later analyses. 
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In Section 4.1 the concept of human capital is introduced and discussed in terms 
of enrollment rates and examination scores. The impact of EPI-A and EPI-M spending 
on enrollment rates and examination scores are evaluated with regression models in 
Section 4.2. The variation between countries’ national, regional, and local education 
expenditures is explored in Section 4.3 along with differences in how schools within 
countries are managed. Regression models from Section 4.2 are expanded to include 
fiscal and management decentralization variables and the findings are presented.  
 
Section 4.1. What Is Human Capital? 
In the political science literature, when nations spend money on education 
(schools and teachers), the expenditure is often considered a proxy for a country’s 
investment in human capital (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001, Avelino, et al. 2005, 
Rudra 2005, Magnuson 2007). In the economics literature, human capital is understood 
to be an individual’s accumulation of experience and personal attributes, as well as skills 
and knowledge (Becker and Tomes 1986, Kan and Gershuny 2006). Education systems, 
in addition to family and community influence, play a key role in the development of 
human capital as it is the main venue for teaching skills and knowledge.  
In Gary Becker's seminal 1964 book, Human Capital: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education, he explains that “education and 
training are the most important investments in human capital” (Becker 1962, 17). Becker 
goes on to discuss credentialism as an alternative to human capital analysis in which 
schooling is not the main contributor to one’s productivity, rather one’s level of 
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education is indicative of one’s abilities, persistence, and other characteristics (19). 
These are not mutually exclusive conceptualizations, however. If one’s credentials are 
indicative of how skilled and able one is to work, then educational attainment may serve 
as a strong proxy for one’s level of human capital. Based on this logic, graduation or 
even enrollment rates could reasonably be used to measure a country’s level of human 
capital. Indeed, enrollment rates can be very useful for showing how much of country’s 
population is participating in the education system that should, depending on the quality 
of the school system, be enabling students to become employable members of the 
society.    
Secondary School Enrollment and Human Capital Development  
Wealthier countries tend to have high primary and secondary school enrollment 
rates. As shown in Figure IV-1, the countries in this dataset all have gross secondary 
school enrollment rates of more than 75%. The secondary gross enrollment ratio 
presented in Figure IV- is defined by the World Bank as the ratio of the total student 
enrollment in secondary school, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that 
officially should be enrolled in secondary school (World Development Indicators - 
Aggregated Database 2009). The secondary gross enrollment rate is a useful measure for 
assessing primary schools’ effectiveness at retaining students since students cannot be in 
secondary school without first successfully completing the previous grades.  
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Figure IV–1. Secondary School Gross Enrollment Rates, 2009* 
 
 
*Due to missing 2009 data, the enrollment estimates for Brazil and Canada are from 2008 
SOURCE: World Bank, UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “World Development Indicators”  
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The majority of the countries on this list have gross secondary enrollment ratios 
of around 100%, with only Turkey, Mexico, Chile, and the Slovak Republic with ratios 
under 90%.25 Students are dropping out after middle school in these countries, if not 
before, and the potential human capital gains from supply-side education spending are 
consequentially lost on them. Countries that have a ratio over 100 appear to be dealing 
with higher rates of grade repeaters, younger students entering grades, older students 
returning to high school, or an immigrant population.  
Policies that target the poor or that alleviate the costs of sending students to 
school in the first place are advantageous for keeping the school-aged population in 
classrooms. For the wealthy countries in the dataset used in this dissertation, demand-
side spending would be expected to maintain the high enrollment ratios these countries 
report. For the countries that are struggling to keep their students in school, more 
demand-side spending would be expected to help raise enrollment levels so that students 
have the potential to develop the skills they will need to be economically competitive.26 
 
                                                 
25 The World Bank (2009) reports that the average enrollment ratio for the world’s countries in 2009 is 
68% with a low of 12% in Niger. Less developed, highly illiterate countries offer interesting opportunities 
for exploring the impact demand-side spending can have on enrollment ratios over time, but detailed data 
are not currently available for these countries. In Chapter V of this dissertation, students from three rural 
Mexican schools provide evidence that demand-side spending can be influential for attendance decisions 
in places where enrollment is more of a challenge. 
26 The percent change in gross secondary enrollment rates between 2006 and 2009 in the aggregate is less 
than 3% with some notable exceptions – Australia (-13%), Portugal (10%), and Turkey (-9%). The causes 
for enrollment changes are not always related to school expenditures. Australia and Portugal were still in 
the 100% or higher range so changes may be due to fewer older or younger students being enrolled. 
Turkey’s decline (from 85% to 78%) may be due to the worldwide recession but a country-specific 
analysis would be needed to discern the causes for this change. While demand-side spending may have 
played a role in moderating these changes the other factors that may be contributing to the change cannot 
be accounted for at this level of analysis. Accordingly, to avoid these exogenous factors, the 2009 gross 
enrollment rate is used.      
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Hypothesis 4.1: Demand-side spending should have a positive impact on 
countries’ student enrollment rates. 
 
  The sociology literature considers human capital to be one of three types of 
attributes an individual may possess. In agreement with economists, sociologists 
consider human capital to be the skills, knowledge, and educational attainment of 
individuals that is considered of value for employment purposes. Social and cultural 
capital, however, are also part of an individual’s assets. Sometimes they are integrated 
and together form an individual’s capital, and in other studies one type of capital may 
influence another (Kan and Gershuny 2006; Coleman 1988). For example, Coleman 
(1988) argues that social capital, the connections people have with each other in a 
society, can be understood to build human capital by its influence on keeping students in 
school; his study focuses on high school. This approach is in line with economists in that 
education attainment is a key determinant of human capital. The third type of personal 
capital found in the sociology literature is cultural capital or “specific knowledge related 
to the participation in, and enjoyment of, the various forms of consumption in the 
society” (Kan and Gershuny 2006, 2). The literature indicates that these distinct types of 
capital, cultural, social, and human, together are critical for understanding the 
capabilities of individuals in a population.  
Usually the economists’ approach is found in the political science literature. 
Hershberg (1996), in his evaluation of the challenges facing America, defines human 
capital as “the education, skill level, and problem-solving abilities that will enable an 
individual to be a productive worker in the global economy of the twenty-first century” 
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(44). Given the similarities in how economists, sociologists, and political scientists 
define “human capital,” for purposes of the dissertation, the definition of human capital 
will be those skills and abilities of the working population that have economic value.27  
What determines, however, which skills and abilities actually have a market 
value? Moreover, how much of these skills and abilities can be attributable to what 
happens in schools? Some students have the will, financial resources, and ability to 
pursue general, higher-level degrees after secondary school while others choose a 
vocational school or directly enter the labor market. The variation in skills and 
occupations is vast. There is a literature that explores the connection between jobs and 
skills and their relationship to education (Hartog 2000b, Hartog 2000a, Webbink and 
Hartog 2004, Hartog and Vijverberg 2007). Webbink and Hartog (2004) go so far as to 
claim that “expectations of earnings lies at the heart of the ‘human capital’ model. The 
model states that students, in deciding on the amount of education, compare the 
outcomes of the different options and choose the option with the highest return” (103). 
This study found that in the Netherlands, students’ expectations (both at the individual 
and group level) were realistic – and the underlying premise was that more education 
would yield higher earnings. For some jobs, workers may be over or under educated and 
the right mix of skills may be difficult to ascertain. Studies have looked at how to 
resolve this via better curricula (Hartog and Vijverberg 2007). 
                                                 
27 Economic value in this definition implies an open-market value. Yet, academic knowledge, for example, 
does not necessarily have a general application that would make it marketable; however, the accumulation 
of knowledge is generally considered an important societal benefit. The employment of professors does 
indirectly imply a value for such activity so the value of knowledge would be included. The other concern 
with this definition is that it implies that monetary value is the only value that matters in a society. Cultural 
or social capital is also valuable, but unfortunately more difficult to measure since they are less tangible 
than employment.   
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The studies that look at human capital development over time can best identify 
the causal mechanisms at work from school to family to community (Goldstein 2004). 
While the most comprehensive (and expensive) studies would be able to trace causality 
by evaluating, over time, the ways education or schools impact students’ human capital 
development (and control for the social and cultural capital a student has access to 
through their families and their communities), this is not always feasible or realistic; 
following students throughout their academic and professional careers takes generations 
of researchers and time. To begin to tap into what is going on in schools, however, I do 
survey graduating middle school and high school students in Chapter V. In these 
surveys, students are asked to articulate their academic and professional expectations 
and assess how successful their school has been for them given their family and 
economic circumstances. By looking to their assessment of how much school has helped 
them develop their human capital, the impact of school and the resources they have 
benefitted from can be understood at a more individual level. For cross-country analysis, 
though, such an analysis is not feasible. Rather, at this level, an analysis of human 
capital that uses a consistent and reliable multiple country assessment of cognitive skills 
is more appropriate.  
According to Hanushek and Woessmann (2011) there are many advantages to 
this approach: “First, it captures variations in the knowledge and ability that schools 
strive to produce and thus relates the putative outputs of schooling to subsequent 
economic success; Second, by emphasizing total outcomes of education, it incorporates 
skills from any source – families, schools and ability; Third, by allowing for differences 
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in performance among students with differing quality of schooling (but possibly the 
same quantity of schooling), it opens the investigation of the importance of different 
policies designed to affect the quality aspects of schools” (433-34). 
 
The Programme for International Student Assessment and Human Capital Development 
The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an assessment 
that has been administered by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) to 15-year-olds in over 40 countries every three years since 2000. 
The PISA method is designed to measure a yield of student learning at age 15, so the 
results should indicate how well students are able to apply their knowledge and skills in 
mathematics, science, and reading to real-world problems. PISA features an “innovative 
concept of ‘literacy’, which refers both to students’ capacity to apply knowledge and 
skills in key subject areas and to their ability to analyze, reason and communicate 
effectively as they pose, interpret and solve problems in a variety of situations” (OECD 
2010e, 17). Given the learning tested by this assessment, and the contribution to learning 
schools are expected to contribute to students’ development, supply-side spending, 
spending going directly to teachers and schools, would be expected to positively 
contribute to student performance.  
 
Hypothesis 4.2: Supply-side spending will have a positive impact on PISA scores 
in all subject areas  
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The OECD has done a careful job to construct and translate their test items as 
well as implement the exams along with surveys that were administered to principals, 
students, and students’ families (OECD 2012d). For example, each item has two 
different source languages (English and French) and each of these versions are translated 
twice into the participating country’s language. A third person then reconciles the 
translations. This double translation approach provides multiple opportunities to resolve 
any semantic differences that would make the questions incomparable between countries 
or misunderstood within the testing country.  
While PISA resources are not limitless, test questions are developed with 
considerable care and review. Input from participating countries is part of the item 
development process and questions are extensively pilot-tested. In every country where 
the PISA exam is implemented, there is a National Project Manager whose 
responsibilities include coordinating exam question proposals and the review of all test 
items, as well as test and survey implementation. To guarantee a representative sample 
of a country’s schools and population demographics (the target population), the National 
Project Managers establish a profile of the country’s education system and set the 
appropriate criteria for the categories of schools. A minimum of 150 schools has to be 
included in the implementation of the exam, and at least 35 students at each school are 
randomly selected to avoid selection bias (each country has to have at least 4,500 
students participating). The PISA Consortium that oversees the PISA exam 
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implementation makes the final school selections (not the National Project Managers) to 
assure that random selections are made.28   
Some have argued that even with the care taken to create the PISA exam, it is 
still a test that only assesses how well students can take the PISA exam. “PISA gives a 
relatively reliable assessment of ‘knowledge and skills for PISA’, that is, of how well 
students exercise competence within the PISA focus areas in one—and only one—‘real 
life’ situation, the PISA test situation” (Dohn 2007, 14). Standardized tests in general 
have come under a great deal of criticism for decades.29 In the United States, Peter Sacks 
wrote in his book Standardized Minds: The High Price of America’s Testing Culture and 
What We Can Do to Change It (1999) that “standardized test scores tend to be highly 
correlated with socioeconomic class … and standardized tests reward passive, superficial 
learning, drive instruction in undesirable directions, and thwart meaningful educational 
reform” (8). As discussed in Chapter II, the first criticism has validity – wealthier 
students tend to do better on these assessments, including the PISA exam. However, this 
does not negate the utility of using standardized assessment to gauge student learning. 
By looking at how disadvantaged students perform given a set of criteria that can help 
them do better and overcome obstacles, it is possible to innovate new reforms and 
interventions, such as more demand-side expenditures or better supply-side targeting. 
                                                 
28 Japan is the only country whose National Project Manager oversaw the school selection because of 
“reasons of confidentiality” but there was careful oversight to assure that there was not bias in which 
schools were chosen (OECD 2012e, 71). 
29 Universal tests of mental intelligence are sometimes traced back to the early 1900’s with the work of 
Frenchman Alfred Binet and his Binet-Simon scale (the precursor of the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale 
or what we call today the IQ test). In the over 100 years since these tests were created they have been 
highly criticized for their cultural and social biases, and many of these same critiques have been applied to 
modern standardized tests of knowledge. 
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This argument accepts that scoring well on tests such as the PISA exam is the desirable 
end-goal for systems of education. Given the economic advantages higher scores yield, it 
does seem that scoring better on the PISA assessment helps advance the development of 
human capital as defined in this dissertation (the possession of marketable skills and 
knowledge), making this objective a worthwhile one (Woessmann and Hanushek 2012).  
Though PISA is in the end just a test, it is the leading tool to assess cross-
nationally how well students “can use their knowledge and skills to solve real world 
problems rather than a test of whether they remember specific points of grammar or a 
formula to solve a physics problem” (Sahlberg 2006, 282). As such PISA developers 
claim that they avoid testing any one curriculum, rather, they argue it is a “forward-
looking” exam that asks students to show “what [they] can do with what they learn at 
school” (OECD 2012e, 22).   
In 2009, PISA was administered in 34 OECD countries and 41 partner countries 
and economies. Table IV-1 lists the countries included in this dissertation along with 
their 2009 PISA scores in reading, math and science. Unfortunately, PISA does not 
distinguish between government-dependent private schools and regular private schools 
so scores are only reported for private and public schools.30  
                                                 
30 The principals of all schools that participate in the PISA exam are surveyed and asked to identify if their 
school is considered a “private” or a “public” school. Sometimes a principal’s classification will put a 
government-dependent private school in the public school category, and sometimes it will go in the private 
school category. Based on these responses, and the scores of the students associated with these schools, a 
score for each school type is established. There is an “other” school category but these do not include 
government-dependent private schools and, if it is not zero, is a very marginal percent of the country’s 
tally. See Appendix A for these details. 
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Table IV–1. Country PISA Scores 
2009 PISA Scores** 
Country % Public  
% Government- 
Dependent 
Private 
% Public and 
Government- 
Dependent 
Schools 
% Private 
Schools* 
PISA Scores 
Source  Reading Math Science 
Netherlands 30% 70% 100% 0% All Schools 508 526 522 
Belgium 44% 56% 100% 0% All Schools 506 515 507 
Hungary 89% 11% 100% 0% All Schools 494 490 503 
Austria 92% 8% 100% 0% All Schools 470 496 494 
Slovakia 92% 8% 100% 0% All Schools 477 497 490 
Sweden 92% 8% 100% 0% All Schools 497 494 495 
Germany 93% 7% 100% 0% All Schools 497 513 520 
Finland 93% 7% 100% 0% All Schools 536 541 554 
Czech 
Republic 94% 6% 100% 0% All Schools 478 493 500 
Norway 96% 4% 100% 0% All Schools 503 498 500 
Israel 100% 0% 100% 0% All Schools 474 447 455 
Australia 72% 28% 100% 0% All Schools 515 514 527 
Denmark 87% 12% 100% 0% All Schools 495 503 499 
Slovenia 98% 1% 100% 0% All Schools 483 501 512 
Iceland 96% 4% 100% 0% All Schools 500 507 496 
France 79% 21% 99% 1% All Schools 496 497 498 
Korea 83% 16% 99% 1% All Schools 539 546 538 
New 
Zealand 82% 14% 96% 4% All Schools 521 519 532 
Spain 70% 25% 95% 5% All Schools 481 483 488 
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Table IV-I, continued 
2009 PISA Scores** 
Country % Public  
% Government- 
Dependent 
Private 
% Public and 
Government- 
Dependent 
Schools 
% Private 
Schools* 
PISA Scores 
Source  Reading Math Science 
U.K. 80% 15% 94% 6% All Schools 494 492 514 
Chile 47% 47% 94% 6% All Schools 449 421 447 
Ireland 99% 0% 99% 1% Public Schools 474 472 489 
Turkey 98% 0% 98% 2% Public Schools 464 444 453 
Estonia 98% 0% 98% 2% Public Schools 501 512 528 
Switzerland 94% 2% 96% 4% Public Schools 500 534 516 
Poland 96% 1% 96% 4% Public Schools 499 493 507 
Italy 94% 0% 95% 5% Public Schools 489 486 492 
Canada 94% 0% 94% 6% Public Schools 521 522 526 
Portugal 87% 4% 91% 9% Public Schools 485 482 489 
U.S.A. 91% 0% 91% 9% Public Schools 494 482 496 
Japan 90% 0% 90% 10% Public Schools 522 531 542 
Brazil 89% 0% 89% 11% Public Schools 398 373 393 
Mexico 89% 0% 89% 11% Public Schools 420 414 411 
NOTES: Table II-1 also shows the percentage of public, government-dependent private schools, and private schools for each country. PISA scores are 
only published based on private or public schools so there is no distinction made for government-dependent private schools. The percentages of school 
types data are repeated here to better explain why PISA scores are based on all schools (public and private) or only public schools in the analysis in 
Chapter IV. 
*Private schools exist in these countries even when 0% is listed but the number is negligible in the aggregate count of school types. 
**A weighted mean is used to determine a combined score for all types of schools within a country. (The scores of all private school students are averaged 
together and then multiplied by the percent of private schools that took the PISA exam in the country. The scores of all public school students are also 
averaged together and then multiplied by the percent of public schools that took the PISA exam in the country. These two numbers are added together to 
determine the country's PISA score). 
SOURCES: OECD Education Database, dataset: students enrolled by type of institutions and OECD Education Statistics Database (PISA Results 2009)
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As discussed in Chapter II, about a third of the countries in this study have a 
significant number of government-dependent private schools (over 10%) as reported by 
the OECD. Accordingly, if only public school PISA scores are used, it would 
misrepresent the skills gained by students who are benefitting from government funding. 
To show how country PISA scores are determined, the percentage of public, 
government-dependent private schools, and private schools for each country is listed 
(this information is also included in Table II-1 in Chapter II). 
The “PISA Score Source” column indicates if the scores used for purposes of 
analysis in this chapter reflects the work of students from both private and public schools 
or just public schools.  If 100% of the schools in a country are public and government-
dependent private schools, then the total country scores are used (all scores from public 
and private school students). If there are no government-dependent private schools in the 
country, then the public school scores are used. The trickiest countries are those that 
have a large number of government-dependent private schools and a fair number of 
private schools. In Chile, for example, 47% of the schools are public and 47% of the 
schools are government-dependent, leaving 6% of the population in private school. To 
not include the government-dependent private school score altogether would ignore 47% 
of the students who are benefitting from government funding. Accordingly, the overall 
country score is used so the 6% of schools that are private have their students included in 
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the PISA score used for analysis. Appendix E lists the public and private school scores 
for the students who completed the PISA exam.31 
The difference in private and public school scores is reported in Table IV-2. 
According to the OECD, “In PISA 2009, one school year’s progress corresponds to an 
average of 39 score points on the PISA reading scale” (OECD 2012c, 95).32 In the 
aggregate, the difference between public and private school students’ performance on 
the PISA exams averages less than one year of schooling, yet in some cases there can be 
as much as three years of difference in student performance. In Brazil, Slovenia, and 
Turkey, public schools make up respectively 89%, 98%, and 98% of the schools, and 
they have the largest disparities between public and private school student performance. 
Based on the scores, there is a two to three-year gap between private school and public 
school students’ abilities in these countries. Moreover, in these three cases as well as in 
nearly all the countries in the analysis, private school students perform better on the 
PISA exam. Much of the disparity has been attributed to the demographic differences in 
students who attend public versus private schools – private school students are usually 
more advantaged economically (OECD 2009a). In studies however, once the 
socioeconomic status (SES) of students is controlled for, the gap in public and private 
school students’ scores becomes unremarkable (OECD 2010e).  
 
                                                 
31 While PISA administrators try to pick a representative sample of school types to participate in the PISA 
exam, they cannot always exactly match the distribution.  
32 The 39 points was calculated by subtracting the scores of students of the same age who were enrolled in 
at least two different grade levels.  
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Table IV–2. Gap in the PISA Score Between Public and Private Schools 
 Difference between Private and Public School Scores 
Country Reading Math Science 
Australia 45 38 41 
Austria 32 12 18 
Belgium 45 46 45 
Brazil 118 112 112 
Canada 45 60 41 
Chile -26 -23 -22 
Czech Republic 32 21 37 
Denmark 17 14 20 
Estonia 9 -10 1 
Finland 6 -6 10 
France a a A 
Germany 16 21 17 
Hungary 15 19 14 
Iceland a a A 
Ireland 35 25 31 
Israel -4 -4 -4 
Italy -41 -40 -37 
Japan -8 -6 -9 
Korea 16 12 9 
Mexico 48 43 45 
Netherlands -11 -8 -6 
New Zealand 69 64 59 
Norway -38 -44 -44 
Poland 55 64 56 
Portugal 31 32 27 
Slovak Republic 24 17 16 
Slovenia 80 97 89 
Spain 36 31 31 
Sweden 35 30 29 
Switzerland 18 7 13 
Turkey 82 127 92 
UK 61 56 73 
USA 71 61 68 
Average 29 28 28 
NOTES: a = not applicable (France did not categorize schools and Iceland did not report private school 
scores). The largest differences are in bold.  
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Despite the limitations of standardized tests discussed above, they do provide a 
consistent cross-national measure with which to compare students (McBee 2002, Altinok 
2008). In 2009, the central focus of the PISA exam was reading, though students were 
also tested in mathematics and science. OECD analyses indicate that “across OECD 
countries, overall performance in mathematics remained unchanged between 2003 and 
2009, as did performance in science between 2006 and 2009” (OECD 2010f, 14). 
Reading, however, did show mixed results – some countries improved while others did 
not. In the aggregate, however, changes in scores between 2006 and 2009 were not 
substantial enough for purposes of the analysis presented here and thus only the 2009 
scores are used as the dependent variable in this study. In the next section, analyses 
exploring how governments’ spending decisions impact enrollment rates and student 
performance on the PISA tests of skill and cognition are presented.  
 
Section 4.2. Human Capital and Education Investments 
To begin the analysis I first want to test Hypothesis 4.1 that claims demand-side 
spending will have a positive impact on enrollment rates. The gross enrollment rate of 
each country is the outcome of interest (the dependent variable) and lower EPI scores, 
scores that are closer to .5 and are more demand-oriented, would be expected to have a 
larger impact on enrollment rates than EPI scores that are more supply-side oriented. 
Thus, if demand-side spending is having the expected effect, if it is helping students get 
to school and stay there, then as the EPI gets lower, enrollment rates should increase 
making this relationship a negative one. While all of the countries in this dataset are 
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wealthy by international standards, five of them have a 2006 Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita of less than $10,000 (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Poland, and Turkey).33 
Controlling for wealth with GDP per capita in the model is a way to account for the 
societal advantages wealthier countries have for students that I am not capturing in the 
EPI-A and EPI-M measures.34    
Equations 4.1a and 4.2a look at the overall balance of demand- and supply-side 
spending while Equations 4.1b and 4.2b split apart the EPI scores to isolate the demand-
side spending that is expected to influence the gross secondary enrollment rates.  
 
gEnrollmentct = 0+ EPIAct-31 + GDPpcct-32 +  eq. 4.1a 
gEnrollmentct = 0+ PCashBenefitsA ct-31 +  
PBenefitsInKindA ct-32 + PFinancialAidA ct-33 + GDPpcct-34 + 

eq. 4.1b 
 
gEnrollmentct = 0+ EPIMct-31 + GDPpcct-32 +  
 
eq. 4.2a 
gEnrollmentct = 0+ PCashBenefitsM ct-31 +  
PBenefitsInKindM ct-32 + PFinancialAidM ct-33 + GDPpcct-34 + 

eq. 4.2b 
      
 
                                                 
33 See Table II-5 in Chapter II for each country’s GDP per capita  
34 Previous versions of this model used per pupil spending based on the overall EPI expenditures and 
enrollment rates as the control variable for wealth. Scatterplots reveal that this measure, though highly 
correlated with GDP per capita, misrepresents the advantages students coming from wealthier countries 
might have over students from less wealthy countries. For example, students in Slovenia appear to be 
benefitting more than students in Japan from education spending though Japanese students are 
considerably wealthier and have advantages the model would not otherwise be taking into account.  
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In Equations 4.1a through 4.2b, gEnrollmentct is the gross secondary enrollment 
ratio for each country (c) at time (t), which is 2009.35 The EPIAct-3 in Equation 4.1a is 
the 2006 Education Policy Index for which the supply-side spending includes all monies 
allocated to public and government-dependent private schools in each country, and the 
demand-side spending is both means-tested and non-means-tested. The EPIM ct-3 in 
Equation 4.1b is the Education Policy Index for which the supply-side spending is all 
monies allocated to schools and the demand-side spending includes only means-tested 
benefits (see Chapter II for details on how the EPI-A and EPI-M variables are 
constructed).  
In Equations 4.1b and 4.2b, demand-side spending is split apart into its 
components: cash benefits, benefits in kind, and student financial aid. Chapter II 
explains how these categories are derived. The EPI-A categories for Equation 4.1b are 
based on the percent of overall EPI-A spending (supply-side plus demand-side spending) 
for each country (c) at time (t-3) or 2006 allocated to cash benefits (PCashBenefitsA ct-3), 
benefits in kind (PBenefitsInKindA ct-3), and student financial aid (PFinancialAidA ct-3). 
The EPI-M categories for Equation 4.2b are based on percent of overall EPI-M spending 
(supply-side plus means-tested demand side spending) for each country (c) at time (t-3) 
or 2006 allocated to cash benefits (PCashBenefitsM ct-3), benefits in kind 
(PBenefitsInKindM ct-3), and student financial aid (PFinancialAidM ct-3).  
                                                 
35 Canada and Brazil reported gross enrollment ratios for 2008 rather than 2009. The gross enrollment ratio 
represents the overall enrollment for the entire country – public and all types of private schools. The 
source population data that counts the number of secondary-school aged citizens is not easily accessed 
making it difficult to determine the percent of this population subset that is going to public and 
government-dependent private schools. Regardless, the country’s gross enrollment rate should be 
sufficient for analysis as it is representative of the level of the education system’s hegemony. 
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Table IV–3. Spending and Gross Secondary Enrollment Rates 
  Equation 4.1a*** Equation 4.1b*** Equation 4.2a*** Equation 4.2b** 
Dependent Variable Gross Secondary 
Enrollment 
Gross Secondary 
Enrollment 
Gross Secondary 
Enrollment 
Gross Secondary 
Enrollment 
EPI-A, 2006 -31.9** (14.9)       
Percent cash benefits-A   38.6** (17.7)     
Percent benefits in kind-A   37.0* (21.8)     
Percent financial aid-A   6.7 (26.7)     
GDP per capita, 2006 0.0002** (.0001) 0.0002* (.0001) 0.0004*** (.0001) 0.0004*** (.0001) 
EPI-M, 2006     -23.2 (17.6)   
Percent cash benefits-M       44.6 (42) 
Percent benefits in kind-M       27.9 (26.7) 
Percent financial aid-M       12.8 (23.3) 
Constant 118*** (10.3) 85.5*** (4.64) 113*** (15.5) 89.0*** (4.74) 
          
Observations 33 33 33 33 
R-squared 0.372 0.397 0.283 0.298 
 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table IV-3 shows the results from Equations 4.1a through 4.2b. The outcomes 
indicate that when countries spend more on supply-side expenditures (when the EPI-A 
increases), enrollment estimates fall. This implies that if countries allocate more money 
to demand-side expenditures (means and non-means-tested policies) relative to supply, 
enrollment numbers increase. When the demand-side expenditures are only targeting the 
most needy students (when they are means-tested), however, spending allocations, 
regardless of what they are targeting, are not having as much of an impact on enrollment 
numbers.   
The results show that when the EPI-A categories are split apart into the demand-
side spending categories, the percent of cash benefits as well as family benefits in kind 
has an impact on enrollment and this appears to be driving the significance of the EPI-A 
in Equation 4.1a (when the overall EPI-A is the independent variable of interest). Based 
on the adjusted R-square, we can say that nearly 40% of the variation in the enrollments 
in Equation 4.1b can be explained by the cash benefits and family benefits in kind 
expenditures.  
There are no statistically significant findings for the EPI-M categories implying 
that when benefits are generous to everyone, there is more general support for students 
to go to school, and they go. Since GDP per capita is significant in all of the equations, 
the enrollment numbers may also be a reflection of the fact that in wealthier countries 
going to school is the norm and not going is the exception.  
The point of school, however, is not just to show up. School is supposed to teach 
students new knowledge and then how to apply that knowledge. As students work their 
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way from primary through to secondary school, their knowledge and skills should be 
developing. By the time students are in secondary school, their cumulative knowledge 
becomes the younger population’s human capital, and in this study this capital is 
measured by student performance on the 2009 reading, math, and science PISA exams. 
Hypothesis 4.2 asserts that supply-side spending in particular will positively impact 
student performance on the PISA exam in all subject areas (reading, math, and science). 
To begin to test this assertion, countries’ 2006 EPI-A and EPI-M scores, the balance of 
supply- and demand-side spending, are the independent variables of interest. Since the 
PISA exams are administered every three years, I applied a three-year lag to gauge the 
success of policies implemented at the time of the last exam (2006) that may have an 
impact on current (2009) scores. Students in secondary school in 2009 would have been 
in school in 2006 so they would have had three years to benefit from advances in school 
quality or from access incentives policies provide.  
Unfortunately, the issue of school quality is not captured in the EPI – spending 
on teachers does not mean that the teachers are effective at teaching, nor does spending 
on materials or capital expenditures guarantee that anything meaningful is being 
transferred to students. The PISA scores themselves, however, may be indicative of the 
quality of the schools – if students are able to perform well on these tests they must be 
prepared and the expectation is that the school contributed to this outcome in some 
way.36 Gross enrollment ratios for each country are used as a control for the level of 
                                                 
36 As mentioned in Chapter III, teacher unions could be protecting teachers at the expense of quality 
learning, keeping bad teachers employed who are not helping students gain useful knowledge or skills. 
However, the “power of unions” variable used in Chapter III, when incorporated into models of human 
capital development, did not add any significance and proved to be an extraneous variable. Tapping into 
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student participation in the country’s school system (how popular going to school is for 
the general population) and GDP per capita is used to control for the country’s wealth 
and all of the advantages that wealth brings to human capital.  
 
Human Capitalcts = 0+ EPIA ct-31 + GDPpcct-3 2 +  
gEnrollmentct3 +   
eq. 4.3a 
Human Capitalcts= 0+ EPIM ct-31 + GDPpcct-3 2 +  
gEnrollmentct3 +  
 
 
eq. 4.3b 
 
In Equations 4.3a and 4.3b, Human Capitalcts is the public and government-
dependent private school students’ scores on the PISA exams for each country (c) at 
time (t), 2009, in subject (s) – reading, math, or science. The control variables are the 
per-pupil spending and enrollment variables from Equations 4.1 and 4.2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                
the impact of teacher unions on human capital development is an interesting question and future research 
should address this topic more intensely, however, it is currently outside the scope of this dissertation.   
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Table IV–4. Spending and Student Performance on the PISA Exam  
  
Equation 
4.3a** 
Equation 
4.3a** 
Equation 
4.3a** 
Equation 
4.3b*** 
Equation 
4.3b*** 
Equation 
4.3b*** 
Dependent 
Variable 
Reading 
Scores 
Math 
Scores 
Science 
Scores 
Reading 
Scores 
Math 
Scores 
Science 
Scores 
EPI-A, 2006 60.7 (38) 
60.5 
(49.9) 45 (47.7)       
GDP per 
capita, 2006 
0.0007** 
(.0003) 
0.001** 
(.000) 
0.001 
(.000) 
0.0004 
(.0003) 
0.0007* 
(.0003) 
0.0004 
(.0004) 
Gross 
enrollment 
2009 
0.96* 
(.49) 0.91 (.65) 1.03 (.62)
0.88* 
(.44) 0.86 (.58) 1.02*(.56)
EPI-M, 2006       
105** 
(43.7) 
118** 
(57.6) 
97.9* 
(55.4) 
Constant 
331*** 
(64.6) 
329*** 
(84.6) 
342*** 
(80.9) 
295***(6
2.5) 
278*** 
(82.4) 
293*** 
(79.3) 
        
Observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 
R-squared 0.32 0.30 0.25 0.37 0.34 0.29 
 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The results in Table IV-4 indicate that when countries spend more on supply-side 
policies, students have higher PISA scores – when the demand-side policies are means-
tested. When spending includes all types of demand-side spending (EPI-A), the model is 
significant (p<.05) for each subject but GDP per capita or enrollment are the variables 
that are explaining about 30% of the variation in students’ reading and math scores.  
According to the OECD, “GDP per capita influences educational success, but this only 
explains 6% of the differences in average student performance. The other 94% reflect 
the potential for public policy to make a difference” (OECD 2010b, 3). This average 
finding understates the impact of wealth in the countries included in this dataset. 
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When spending includes only means-tested demand-side spending (EPI-M), the 
model is even more significant (p<.001) for reading and math outcomes, and supply-side 
spending increases positively correlate with all subjects tested on the PISA exam. This is 
remarkable since these EPI-M policies are targeting the most needy students and their 
families and their inclusion in school is not lowering country PISA scores, rather they 
seem to be positively influencing the overall scores. This could imply that the demand-
side spending has been incentivizing less advantaged students to go to school and to 
prioritize their education, and that the supply-side spending may be effectively helping 
students succeed academically. This could also imply that fewer disadvantaged students 
are getting benefits and going to school in the first place so they are not having a 
negative impact on PISA scores. In countries where enrollment rates are low this 
concern warrants further investigation. However, in this dataset the enrollment rates are 
high implying that most students are attending schools and participating in the system.    
The impact on test scores based on the EPI-M balance of spending shows that by 
increasing supply-side spending, students can gain three years of academic benefits in 
math (118 points), and over two years of academic benefits in reading and science if a 
year is equivalent to 39 points (See Table IV-4). A scatterplot of PISA 2009 Reading 
scores to EPI-M (Figure IV-2) show that the spending balances of some countries such 
as Turkey, Belgium, and S. Korea have comparable EPI-M scores but S. Korea has 
significantly better scores on the PISA Reading exam.   
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Figure IV–2. EPI-M Scores to PISA Reading Scores 
 
 
A scatterplot of PISA 2009 Reading scores to EPI-A (Figure IV-3) shows a 
similar pattern – that countries with highly skewed supply-side spending do not 
necessarily yield impressive test results.  
  
  119
Figure IV–3. EPI-A Scores to PISA Reading Scores 
 
 
 
One underlying question is where is the supply-side spending going that is 
having the impact on the scores? Equations 4.4a and 4.4b split apart the supply-side EPI-
A and EPI-M scores into their components to better understand which specific types of 
supply-side spending are impacting student performance levels.  
 
Human Capitalcts= 0+ PCompensationA ct-31 + 
PNonCompensationA ct-32 + PCapExpAct-33 + GDPpcct-3 
2 + gEnrollmentct3 +  
 
eq. 4.4a 
Human Capitalcts= 0+ PCompensationM ct-31 + 
PNonCompensationMct-32 + PCapExpMct-33 + GDPpcct-3 
2 + gEnrollmentct3 +  
eq. 4.4b 
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 In Equation 4.4a, the supply-side spending components are the percent of overall 
EPI-A spending (supply plus demand-side expenditures) allocated to teacher 
compensation (PCompensationA) for each country (c) at time t-3 or 2006, the percent of 
overall EPI-A spending allocated to non-compensation benefits (PNonCompensationA), 
and the percent of overall EPI-A spending allocated to capital expenditures 
(PNonCompensationA). In Equation 4.4b, the supply-side subcategories are the same 
compensation, non-compensation, and capital expenditures, but the percentages are 
based on the EPI-M (supply plus means-tested demand-side spending). The results of 
these equations are presented in Table IV-5.37 
                                                 
37 Chapter II explains how these components are calculated.  
  121
Table IV–5. Supply-Side Spending and Student Performance on the PISA Exam 
Equation 
4.4a** 
Equation 
4.4a* 
Equation 
4.4a* 
Equation 
4.4b*** 
Equation 
4.4b*** 
Equation 
4.4b*** 
Dependent 
Variable 
Reading 
Scores Math Scores 
Science 
Scores 
Reading 
Scores Math Scores 
Science 
Scores 
% Teacher 
compensation - A 43.1 (49.6) 30.0 (65.7) -2.05 (62.2)    
% School 
Services - A 100 (102) 132 (135) 81.8 (128)    
% Capital 
expenditures - A 403 (238) 356 (315) 444 (298)    
GDP per capita 
2006 
0.0007* 
(0.0004) 
0.001* 
(0.0005) 
0.001 
(0.0005) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0006 
(0.0004) 
0.0001 
(0.0004) 
Gross enrollment 
2009 0.69 (0.58) 0.53 (0.76) 0.56 (0.72) 0.36 (0.47) 0.27 (0.63) 0.42 (0.60) 
% Teacher 
compensation - 
M    
108** (45.7) 119* (61.4) 87.7 (58.9) 
% School 
Services– M    141* (73.2) 182* (98.4) 149 (94.4) 
% Capital 
expenditures –M    462** (178) 451* (240) 483** (230) 
Constant 
343*** 
(77.0) 358*** (102) 
387*** 
(96.5) 318*** (60.8) 309*** (81.8) 328*** (78.4) 
Observations 291 291 291 291 291 291 
R-squared 0.40 0.34 0.32 0.51 0.44 0.41 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses  
1 The omitted countries due to missing data are: Chile, Estonia, Hungary, and New Zealand (unlike their demand-side data, these countries do not 
disaggregate their supply-side data) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Since the EPI-A in Equation 4.3a did not yield any significant results we would 
not expect any of the EPI-A supply-side spending categories to have an impact on 
student outcomes. Accordingly, only GDP per capita has significance when Equation 
4.4a is tested. Equation 4.4b uses means-tested demand-side policies only and the results 
show that Capital Expenditures-M is the most significant supply-side spending category 
across all subjects. Science appears to benefit the most from these expenditures though it 
is not clear that laboratories or other facilities that might impact these scores are being 
built with these funds. With more detailed data showing where the capital expenditures 
are in fact going, it would be possible to better explain why the spending is having 
positive impacts on each of the subject areas.  
One question to consider from this analysis is what does means-tested demand-
side spending by itself tell us? To really assess the effectiveness of means-tested 
demand-side spending, as opposed to all demand-side spending, I looked at the 
proportion of demand-side spending that is means-tested.38 Figure IV-4 shows student 
PISA reading scores (2006) and the proportion of demand-side spending that is means-
tested. Means-tested spending as a percent of all demand-side spending is not in fact 
helping student scores, though, as we saw in Chapter I, it does help get students to 
school. This finding indicates that attracting students to school who would otherwise not 
be there is not, on its own, going to help student test scores. Rather, the experiences 
students have at school are going to be more of the driving factors for improving test 
                                                 
38 This proportion is calculated by dividing the total means-tested demand-side spending by total demand-
side spending. 
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scores. As discussed in Chapter I, school investments do positively correlate with how 
resilient the poorest students are in each country that participated in the PISA exams.  
 
Figure IV–4. Proportion of Means-Tested Demand-Side Spending and PISA Scores 
 
 
Figure IV-5 shows that, when considering education spending to be money spent 
on schools and means-tested demand-side policies, no country spends more than 15% of 
their education expenditures on infrastructure (capital expenditures) and the Netherlands, 
Norway, and South Korea are leading the countries in the dataset by spending over 10% 
on these types of expenses. The level of investment by these countries raises questions 
around what is being purchased with this money that is so significantly impacting 
student outcomes.  
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Figure IV–5. Percent Capital Expenditures - M and 2009 Science PISA Scores 
 
 
The percent of teacher compensation based on the EPI-M expenditures is another area of 
spending that benefits student scores in reading and math. This result confirms the 
importance of teachers, especially when the most disadvantaged students are benefitting 
from policies that are encouraging them to come to school. Though it is not possible to 
determine if this spending is for more teachers or paying teachers more (or something 
else) it does encourage a closer look at how teachers are being compensated and which 
practices are producing this effect. Non-compensation spending is also significantly 
correlated with higher PISA scores in reading and math. As the demand-side spending 
becomes more targeted, students appear to be benefitting more, indicating that helping 
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the most disadvantaged families does have an impact on education spending 
effectiveness overall.   
 
Section 4.3. Expenditure Sources and Decision Making In Education Spending – Do 
They Impact Human Capital? 
 
Research has shown that institutional elements such as decentralization and 
school autonomy incentivize schools and teachers, and this leads to higher student 
achievement (Woessmann and Hanushek 2012, 432).  To this end, perhaps where the 
money is coming from – which level of government is funding education – and where 
school management decisions are being made will make a difference for student 
performance on tests of knowledge and skill. 
The funding sources for the supply-side spending portion of the EPI-A are highly 
variable across countries. The UNESCO-OECD-Eurostat (UOE) data compiled from 
reporting countries’ ministries of education or national statistical offices are shown in 
Figure IV-6 and includes monies transferred between levels of government.  
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Some countries, like New Zealand, Portugal, and Italy, rely primarily on their 
central government for their education monies. Countries like Australia, Belgium and 
Mexico, however, rely more heavily on regional governments (though the central 
government may still be directing much of the budget allocations, as in Mexico) and 
finally, countries such as Finland, Poland, and the United Kingdom mainly rely on local 
government revenues.39 
To see how much the level of government expenditures impacts student 
performance on the PISA exams, the percent of local government spending was added as 
an independent variable to Equations 4.3a and 4.3b. These regression models (not 
shown) were significant but the local spending variable was not significant, and the 
results from the earlier regression analysis held even with fewer degrees of freedom. 
This outcome reconfirms that supply-side spending relative to means-tested demand-side 
spending significantly impact student test scores regardless of the source of the money.40     
 
Does Decision-making Decentralization Matter for Human Capital Development? 
Finland, a country with the highest science 2009 PISA score in the dataset, and 
the second highest math and reading scores after South Korea, has had its students place 
in the top five on the PISA exams in all subjects since the test was first implemented in 
2000. Finland has a strong commitment to equitable education opportunities and its EPI-
                                                 
39 This dissertation does not address taxation issues associated with education and social expenditures, nor 
does it address how much private investment goes into public and government-dependent private schools. 
While these factors are germane to the discussion, only actual government expenditures and their 
institutional source is under analysis in this dissertation. 
40 The percent of central spending expenditures was also used as an independent variable and the scenarios 
were consistent – where supply-side monies were coming from was insignificant whereas the amount of 
supply-side spending was significant, especially when the EPI-M measure was applied.   
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A score of .56 reflects its welfare state status. Fairly balanced between supply- and 
demand-side spending, Finland spends 55% of its budget on schools and 45% of its 
budget on individual students and families. Most of Finland’s spending, 33%, goes to 
personnel expenditures and its next biggest expenses are cash benefits (23%) and then 
benefits in kind (20%). Only 5% of Finland’s supply-side spending goes towards capital 
expenditures (see Table II-2 in Chapter II for the EPI-A category details).  
Finland is committed to providing students with access to its schools and has 
done a good job providing quality schools once all students are there. Primarily locally 
funded, 93% of Finland’s schools are public and the remaining 7% are government-
dependent private schools (the private schools were so heavily subsidized that they 
eventually became part of the public school system). These schools, called peruskoulu, 
are comprehensive schools for students in grades 1 to 9. They provide a common 
curriculum, health and dental services, hot meals, and mental health services to all 
students regardless of need. There is also ongoing assessment of students that are used 
formatively – to mark where teachers need to target lessons. Once students complete this 
level of education they go onto high schools that select students based on their academic 
performance. 
With its success, the Finnish school system has become a model for countries 
around the world and the autonomy Finland gives its schools has been of great interest to 
those advocating decentralized school management. In fact, there has been a substantial 
move to empower schools through what is called Schools-Based Management (SBM) 
because “most countries whose students perform well in international student 
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achievement tests give their local authorities and schools substantial autonomy over 
adapting and implementing educational content, allocating and managing resources, or 
both” (Barrera-Osorio, et al. 2009, 6). Research based on the PISA exams and associated 
surveys suggest that budget autonomy for schools has a negative impact on student 
success but management decisions, such as the hiring of teachers, can have a positive 
impact on student cognitive skills (Woessmann, et al. 2009).   
To discern how much autonomy schools enjoy over their resources, curriculum, 
and personnel, the OECD Education group has administered a “Survey on Decision-
Making” every four years since 2003. A panel of national experts on lower secondary 
education from each participating country is created to respond to these surveys and the 
panels are designed to have representation from each of the government decision-making 
levels (the central government, middle governments, and individual schools). The group 
is supposed to form a consensus on responses to each question when they are completing 
the survey (OECD 2012c, 4-6).    
The surveys are broken up into four categories or indicators: organization of 
instruction, planning and structures, personnel management, and resource management. 
Organization of instruction questions ask panels to indicate which level of government 
makes decisions related to curricula, pedagogy, tracking (if applicable), and essentially 
anything related to teaching and learning decisions in the classroom. Planning and 
structures questions include the overall design of programs of study, credentialing, and 
school closures or openings. Personnel management includes hiring, firing, and salary 
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decisions whereas resource management involves anything related to resource allocation 
(budgeting decisions).  
To get a general understanding of which level of government makes decisions for 
each country’s education system, the four indicators are merged into an aggregated 
measure of education decision-making. The compiled measure brings all the factors 
together by making each decision-making category worth 25% of the total measure and 
weighting each question within each category accordingly. Figure IV-7 shows the 
overall trends for which level of government makes what percentage of the decisions in 
public lower secondary education in each country.41  
No country has the central government making more than 65% of the education 
decisions and only Turkey, Portugal, and Ireland have the central government making 
50% or more of the decisions. In Finland all of the decisions are made locally while in 
the United States 25% of decisions are made at the state level, 51% of decisions are 
made at the local level, and 24% are made at the school level.42  
 
                                                 
41 The original data listed five levels of government: central, state, provincial/regional, sub-regional or 
inter-municipal authorities or governments, local authorities or governments, and schools, school boards, 
or committees. The state, provincial/regional, and sub-regional (which only applies to France) categories 
were merged to represent a subnational level below the federal level but above the local and school levels.    
42  In the United States, the federal Department of Education can try to incentivize states to follow policy 
initiatives such as the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act, but it is still up to the states to decide if they want 
federal monies based on which criteria they are willing to accept. 
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To begin to see if Finland’s successful model of local school decision-making 
holds across the countries in this dataset, the original equations of human capital 
development (Equations 4.3a and 4.3b) are augmented with the percent of decisions 
made at the local level.  
 
Human Capitalcts = 0+ EPIA ct-31 + GDPpcct-3 2 +  
gEnrollmentct3 + LocalDMc4 +  
eq. 4.5a 
Human Capitalcts= 0+ EPIM ct-31 + GDPpcct-3 2 +  
gEnrollmentct3 + LocalDMc4 +  
eq. 4.5b 
 
The variable for the percent of education decision-making that happens in each country 
(c) at the local level is  “LocalDM”.43 The other variables are the same as in the earlier 
analysis and the results from the regression are listed in Table IV-6. For students’ PISA 
reading scores, the percent of local decision-making has a significant impact whether 
there is means-tested demand-side spending or not in reading and science (only 
significant for EPI-A) but not math. Further analysis into each of the four categories of 
spending (resource and personnel management, the organization of instruction, or 
planning and structures) at the local level does not yield any results at any level of 
decision-making (models not shown). The only variable that has any significance in 
these models is the gross secondary enrollment rate control variable that accounts for the 
general level of student participation in the education system.  
                                                 
43 For most countries in the dataset, the decision-making estimates come from 2007. However, as indicated 
at the bottom of Figure 4.6, some countries did not respond to the survey questions until 2011. Although 
the level of decision-making might have shifted between 2007 and 2011, any shifts would be expected to 
be small or incremental. 
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Table IV–6. Local Decision Making and Student Performance on the PISA Exam 
  
Equation 
4.5a*** 
Equation 
4.5a* 
Equation 
4.5a** 
Equation 
4.5b** 
Equation 
4.5b** 
Equation 
4.5b** 
Dependent Variable Reading Scores Math Scores 
Science 
Scores 
Reading 
Scores Math Scores 
Science 
Scores 
EPI-A, 2006 39.8 (30.9) 32.9 (43.4) 19.9 (40.1) 
GDP per capita, 2006 0.0002 (.0003) 0.0004 (.0004)
0.0001 
(.0004) 
0.0001 
(.0003) 
0.0004 
(.0004) .0000 (.0004) 
Gross enrollment 2009 1.22*** (.41) 1.10* (.57) 1.32** (.53) 1.05** (.39) 0.97* (.54) 1.22** (.5) 
Percent decision 
making – local 34.4** (16.4) 22 (23) 38.6* (21.2) 32.4* (16.9) 20.2 (23.4) 38.3* (21.6) 
EPI-M, 2006 29 (43.5) 25.7 (60.2) 2.14 (55.5) 
Constant 328***(53.2) 341***(74.6) 341*** (69.1) 349*** (57.7) 357*** (79.9) 364*** (73.7)
              
Observations 32 32 32 32 32 32 
R-squared 0.39 0.27 0.31 0.36 0.26 0.3 
 
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses, Brazil data do not exist 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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One explanation for these null findings is that there may be an interaction 
between resource and personnel management decisions at the local level but regression 
analyses exploring this possibility did not reveal that the variables of interest had any 
significance. The underlying decisions themselves that are not part of this analysis may 
better explain the impact of local decision making. Theory and previous research would 
suggest that there is more motivation for local decision makers when they have more 
autonomy coupled with more public accountability via posted student test scores or a 
final exit exam for students (Woessmann, et al. 2009). Future research should further 
explore these decisions and their impacts.  
Given the significance of local education decision-making, is there a negative 
impact when governments centralize their education systems? Equations 4.6a and 4.6b 
explore the same human capital development equations but instead of adding the percent 
of local decision making, the percent of central education policy decision-making is 
used.  
 
Human Capitalcts = 0+ EPIA ct-31 + GDPpcct-32 +  
gEnrollmentct3 + CentralDMct4 +  
eq. 4.6a 
Human Capitalcts= 0+ EPIM ct-31 + GDPpcct-32 + 
gEnrollmentct3 + CentralDMct4 +  
eq. 4.6b 
 
The results are listed in Table IV-7 and show a significant and negative 
correlation across all subject areas between central decision-making and student 
performance for both the EPI-A and EPI-M measures of spending.  
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Table IV–7. Centralization and Student Performance on the PISA Exam 
  
Equation 
4.6a*** 
Equation 
4.6a**
Equation 
4.6a***
Equation 
4.6b**
Equation 
4.6b** 
Equation 
4.6b**
Dependent 
Variable 
Reading 
Scores 
Math 
Scores 
Science 
Scores 
Reading 
Scores 
Math 
Scores 
Science 
Scores 
EPI-A, 2006 37.6 30.9 17.1    
 (30.4) (40.3) (38.0)    
GDP per capita, 
2006 
0.00027 0.00045 0.00016 0.00019 0.00039 0.00013 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Gross 
enrollment 2009 
0.91** 0.85 0.96* 0.76* 0.70 0.84* 
 (0.39) (0.52) (0.49) (0.38) (0.49) (0.46) 
Percent decision 
making – 
central 
-46.8** -61.5** -65.4** -44.9** -61.2** -67.0** 
 (20.1) (26.7) (25.1) (21.1) (27.6) (25.8) 
EPI-M, 2006    20.6 5.59 -14.0 
    (43.5) (56.9) (53.2) 
Constant 374*** 385*** 398*** 399*** 417*** 435*** 
 (51.8) (68.6) (64.7) (59.8) (78.3) (73.2) 
       
Observations 32 32 32 32 32 32 
R-squared 0.41 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.38 
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
Essentially as more decisions are centralized, students are benefitting less from 
their school experience and they are not learning as much as they would from schools 
that are operating with local oversight.44  
 
 
                                                 
44 The regressions were run with each level of government and only the local and central levels had any 
impact on student scores. State and regional, as well as school levels, produced insignificant results.  
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Section 4.4. Conclusion  
The EPI measures provide some insight into how spending is impacting student 
enrollment rates and assessment scores which are in turn indicative of students’ level of 
social and human capital development. Demand-side expenditures in the aggregate 
(means tested and non-means-tested expenditures that target families and students) do 
have a positive impact on enrollment rates. Further analysis of the demand-side spending 
shows that cash benefits and benefits in kind to families and students, rather than 
financial aid, are having the largest effects on gross secondary school enrollment. When 
countries target their demand-side spending to the most disadvantaged families and 
students and when they invest proportionally more in their schools, their students get 
better results on PISA exams. Though it is not possible to conclude that this supply-side 
spending provides students with top quality schools and the resources they need to 
succeed, it is implied.  
As current research on what makes schools successful suggests, local decision 
making on the management of schools has a positive effect on student performance on 
the PISA exams. PISA research has revealed two things about autonomy: 1) Students 
who attend schools that can decide what is taught and how students are assessed do 
better on PISA exams and 2) in countries where accountability measures are not publicly 
available, schools that have more autonomy have students who do worse on PISA exams 
(OECD 2010e).  The next step for assessing the success of local management of schools 
then, would be to explore different models of student assessment and how this impacts 
student outcomes but this is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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If a country is truly committed to improving its human capital it needs to spend 
money to help its less advantaged students get to, and stay in, school. Simultaneously, 
education spending needs to maintain and improve the quality of its public schools so 
that all students, once they get through the front doors, have the resources they need to 
learn. Where the money actually comes from does not appear to make a difference for 
human capital development – what matters is how the money is allocated.  
To further complicate research into school systems, it is clear that there are 
multiple pathways to student success. As the variation in EPI-A and EPI-M scores 
reveal, countries with very different spending priorities are each able to successfully 
educate students who can achieve high marks on the PISA exam. The three highest 
scoring countries in reading, South Korea, Finland, and Japan, have EPI-M scores of .97, 
.95, and .89 respectively, and these same countries score at the top for science as well as 
math. These differing EPI-M scores, while not as variable as these same countries’ EPI-
A scores, show that successful countries are not doing things exactly the same way. 
Capital expenditures, the most significant supply-side spending category in the analysis 
when only means-tested demand-side spending is considered, is similar between the 
countries. Both Japan and Finland spend about 9% of their resources on capital 
expenditures while South Korea spends around 10% when EPI-M supply and demand-
side spending is considered together. How these funds are being allocated would show 
how similar (or different) these expenditures are and why this spending in particular 
matters for students’ level of achieved human capital. In the next chapter, human capital 
development will be explored at the student level in three rural Mexican schools. Means-
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tested demand-side benefits are received by most of the students in the case studies and 
the impact of that spending is explored in more detail.   
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CHAPTER V  
THE IMPACT OF DEMAND-SIDE EDUCATION SPENDING IN RURAL 
MEXICO: THREE CASE STUDIES 
 
This dissertation introduced the Education Policy Index (EPI) in Chapter II and 
discussed why countries have the EPI scores they do in Chapter III. In Chapter IV, how 
the EPI impacts student success academically was evaluated. Thus far, students’ gross 
secondary enrollment rates and their scores on the Program for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) exam have served as a proxy for human capital or students’ 
marketable knowledge and skills. This chapter goes beyond these measures and 
discusses human capital indirectly by asking graduating students at two middle schools 
and one high school in rural Mexico about their social capital: their grades, school 
experience, and expectations of their future. Surveys administered at these three schools 
in the summer of 2012 asked graduating middle school and high school students to 
discuss their attitude towards school as well as their educational and professional goals – 
indicators that if achieved could forecast a country’s economic growth. Most of these 
students are extremely poor and 55% to 80% of them benefit from an established means-
tested demand-side spending program called Oportunidades.  
Since supply-side spending at the school level is constant (students in the same 
classroom experience the same teachers and infrastructure), the differences between 
students within schools stems from their academic abilities, inspirations, and socio-
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economic backgrounds. Across schools, however, it is possible to evaluate some of the 
supply-side differences and how these may impact students’ attitudes towards school, 
academic achievement, and their potential careers. Principal interviews and surveys, 
school test scores, along with some school-level budget data, provide insight into the 
quality of the education schools provide. This analysis shows that middle school and 
high school students, and girls especially, who benefit from the demand-side policy 
evaluated in this research, Oportunidades, are at least as likely as their wealthier 
classmates to have high academic aspirations. It is more difficult to determine the 
difference between students when it comes to evaluating their professional expectations, 
however. Oportunidades appears to bring students of all financial circumstances together 
and creates a more even starting point so that nearly all students, regardless of their 
circumstances, can imagine a career that will provide a comfortable standard of living. 
Nearly all students, regardless of their background, recognize the importance of school 
for their future. 
Section 5.1 introduces Oportunidades, Mexico’s demand-side policy, Section 
5.2 explains the school system in Mexico and Section 5.3 discusses how Oportunidades 
impacts Mexico’s school system. Section 5.4 presents the analysis of how students who 
benefit from Oportunidades are impacted by their school attendance, Section 5.5 
discusses the challenges schools face based on principal interviews, Section 5.6 presents 
student opinions, and Section 5.7 presents analyses of the student survey data. 
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Section 5.1. OPORTUNIDADES: Mexico’s Leading Demand-Side Policy  
Started in the late 1990’s and known as the Program for Education, Health, and 
Food or PROGRESA (Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación) until 2001, 
Opportunities or Oportunidades is Mexico’s largest anti-poverty program. Funded in 
part by the Mexican Government, in part by the World Bank, and in part by the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB), Oportunidades benefitted approximately 28 
million people in 2011 at a cost of US$4.8 billion (Braine 2006; INEGI 2010; ECLAC 
2011).45 It is a conditional cash transfer program (CCT) that pays qualifying poor 
households on average US$35-40 a month if they meet a set of educational, health, and 
nutritional requirements including regular school attendance and medical appointments 
(Parker 2003; Fernald, et al. 2008; Oportunidades 2008; Behrman, et al. 2012). The 
program is currently run by Mexico’s Ministry of Social Development or SEDESOL 
(Secretaría de Desarrollo Social) and is implemented by the National Department for 
the Oportunidades Human Development Program; since January 2012 funding for 
Oportunidades comes through the Ministry of Public Education (SEP) budget (World 
Bank 2010). 
When the CCT program was first implemented as PROGRESA in rural areas in 
1997, there was some evidence that beneficiaries were receiving the cash transfers as an 
act of patronage, though most poor rural families were in fact benefitting (Yuriko 2007; 
Yanes 2011). To reach the poorest populations, the federal government first targeted 
impoverished municipalities based on 1995 census data, then identified the poorest 
                                                 
45 This is about 25% of Mexico’s 112,336,538 people and represents 5.8 million families.   
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homes, and then went to those homes to verify the conditions and who lived in the 
households (Behrman and Skoufias 2006; Gertler, et al. 2012). Because the households 
continue to be geographically targeted via a proxy means test (i.e., indicators that 
correlate with poverty levels are used to determine family eligibility), the cash transfers 
in theory cannot be withheld or distributed with discretion (Diaz-Cayeros, et al. 2012; 
Cecchini and Madariaga 2011).  
Moreover, even before Vicente Fox became president of Mexico in 2000 and 
changed the program’s name to Oportunidades, certain mechanisms were put in to place 
to limit patronage through the program. For example, there are public information 
campaigns to directly communicate with beneficiaries, household eligibility reviews do 
not take place around election time, and the central government keeps local involvement 
over beneficiary decisions minimal – one exception being that it is the schools and 
medical professionals who confirm that families are meeting policy requirements (Parker 
2003; Levy 2006; Jara 2008; Diaz-Cayeros, et al. 2012). Even the skeptics, though, 
agree that most of the eligible poor are being identified and benefitting from the program 
(Jara 2008; Cecchini and Madariaga 2011; Gómez Hermosillo 2011).  
As of 2010, according to the World Bank, 51.3% of the Mexican population lives 
at the national poverty line and, in rural areas, this is as high as 60.8% (World Bank 
2012a).46 Oportunidades claims that these high levels are due to the 2008 global 
economic recession, and that these poverty estimates would be even worse without its 
                                                 
46 The World Bank defines the poverty rate as the “percentage of the population living below the national 
poverty line. National estimates are based on population-weighted subgroup estimates from household 
surveys” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC/countries/MX?display=graph.  
  143
conditional cash transfers (SEDESOL 2010). Independent analyses show that 
Oportunidades helps to reduce the depth of poverty of participants and also show that 
the long-term living standards of poor rural families increases when they invest their 
cash in productive assets such as chickens or other animals (Behrman and Skoufias 
2006; Gertler, et al. 2012 ). In terms of overall inequality, the program does appear to 
have an impact on Mexico’s Gini coefficient and one estimate claims that the program 
has contributed to a reduction of 2.7 points (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011, 119). 
Eligibility to receive Oportunidades cash payments for students starts in the third 
grade and goes through high school, and the amount increases every year for both boys 
and girls (See Appendix F for the 2010 payout to families).47 By some measures, 
participating families’ income can increase by 10% per capita and for the poorest, cash 
transfers may increase per capita income by as much as 50% (Fiszbein and Schady 2009, 
109-10; Cecchini and Madariaga 2011, 117-18). To incentivize girls to continue with 
their education, they are paid up to 13% more than boys starting in middle school when 
they usually drop out (SEDESOL 2010). In addition to these scholarships, students 
receive money for school supplies every 6 months. Further, students who complete high 
school before turning 22 will receive a Youth With Opportunities (Jóvenes con 
Oportunidades) bonus of nearly US$300 if they open their own savings account at a 
bank (SEDESOL 2010; Gómez Hermosillo 2011).  
                                                 
47 In third grade students are usually between 8 and 9-years-old, about the age they would often be taken 
out of school to work. The program has changed since its inception and now includes funding for children 
under the age of 9 as well as the elderly. To qualify, families must meet means-tested poverty 
requirements.   
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Studies show that students whose families benefit from Oportunidades are more 
likely than other poor students to stay in school between elementary and middle school 
(Schultz 2004). “Research reveals that PROGRESA has had the largest impact on 
children who enter secondary school and represents a percentage increase of enrollment 
of more than 20% for girls and 10% for boys” (Skoufias 2005, xii). Since 2001 high 
school students have been included in Oportunidades and longitudinal analyses reveal 
that high school enrollment numbers have increased (Behrman, et al. 2011, 116). In 
Chapter IV the receipt of demand-side benefits was shown to have a positive impact on 
enrollment levels and the evidence here confirms this assertion.  
Given how large the program has grown, Oportunidades now serves most of the 
poorest students in Mexican communities. Based on the research on Oportunidades’ 
impact on enrollment rates and the findings in Chapter IV, students who benefit from the 
means-tested program should be at least as likely as their peers who do not need to 
receive the benefit to go onto high school.48  
 
Hypothesis 5.1: Middle school students who benefit from Oportunidades are at 
least as likely as their peers who do not benefit from Oportunidades to go on to 
high school 
 
Since females get more financial aid from Oportunidades then their male 
counterparts for going to high school, and by some accounts are enrolling as much as or 
                                                 
48 All hypotheses consider students who receive benefits to be at least as or even more ambitious than their 
classmates academically and professionally. The cash incentive should be helping them reach a baseline of 
interest in their future and they may be more ambitious than their peers since they have more to overcome 
to attain the standard of living they see their peers enjoy.   
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more than males, they would be expected to want to go to high school at least as much as 
male beneficiaries (Parker 2003). Additionally, since students who benefit from 
Oportunidades are incentivized to stay in school, their academic aspirations would be 
expected to exceed their parents’ level of education that usually did not continue past 
primary school.  
 
Hypothesis 5.2: Female middle school students who benefit from Oportunidades 
are at least as likely as their male counterparts to go on to high school 
 
Hypothesis 5.3: Middle school students who benefit from Oportunidades are at 
least as likely as their peers who do not benefit from Oportunidades to want to 
attain a higher level of education than their parents 
 
Behrman, Parker and Todd (2011) also show that students benefitting from 
Oportunidades seek work and males in particular find nonagricultural jobs, implying a 
shift away from the rural environment in which they are raised. Female students, whose 
mothers receive the cash benefits of Oportunidades, see their mothers become 
empowered as they take control over a part of the family finances and become more 
informed about the health care of the family (Behrman and Skoufias 2006). Accordingly, 
high school students’ career expectations should be higher than their parents’ current 
career choices. In addition, like middle school students, high school students who are 
benefitting from education incentives would be expected to want to attain a higher level 
of education than their parents so long as education opportunities are available.  
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Hypothesis 5.4: High school students who benefit from Oportunidades are at 
least as likely as their peers who do not benefit from Oportunidades to want to 
attain a higher level of education than their parents  
 
Hypothesis 5.5: Male high school students who benefit from Oportunidades will 
be at least as likely as their peers who do not benefit from Oportunidades to seek 
nonagricultural jobs 
 
 
With respect to how well Oportunidades students do in school once they 
are there, beneficiaries can keep their funding so long as they do not fail a grade 
more than once. On the other end of the success scale, though, while students are 
staying in school longer, there is no indication that they are doing better on tests 
of skills and knowledge (Behrman, et al. 2005). This raises questions around the 
quality of the schools students are being incentivized to attend – are they able to 
handle the increased enrollment numbers and what are they offerings students 
once they get through the front door?   
 
Section 5.2. Mexico’s School System: Supply-Side Policies In Action 
The Mexican school system is mandatory for students until they have completed 
at least a lower secondary level of education (the equivalent of kindergarten through the 
ninth grade in the United States). If students want more schooling, they can go on to 
upper secondary schools or high schools, and then tertiary schools or institutions of 
higher learning (see Appendix 5B for an outline of Mexico’s public school system). 
Approximately 90% of Mexico’s students attend public schools that are largely run by 
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the federal Ministry of Public Education (SEP) in spite of attempts in the 1990’s to 
decentralize the system.  
The National Agreement for the Modernization of Basic Education or ANMEB 
(Acuerdo Nacional para la Modernización de la Educación Básica) was signed in 1992 
by Mexico’s federal and state governments, and The National Union of Education 
Workers or the SNTE (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación). ANMEB 
formed the basis for the 1993 General Education Law or LGE (Ley General de 
Educación) that has undergone revision every couple of years but remains the driver of 
Mexico’s education system (Santiago, et al. 2012, 18).49 Essentially the law transferred 
much of the administrative and operational decisions to Mexico’s states while keeping 
much of the funding control in the hands of the federal SEP and maintaining the SNTE’s 
control over labor negotiations; centralizing power and decentralizing administration 
(Ornelas 1998 as cited in Santiago et al. 2008, 18).  In effect, the federal SEP determines 
the curriculum, textbooks, most student assessments, and, with the SNTE, the hiring, 
firing, and salary schedules of most school personnel (Santibañez, et al. 2005; OECD 
2009b; Santiago, et al. 2012).  
The SNTE dates back to 1943 and until the 1990’s acted as a political wing of 
the ruling political party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party or PRI (Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional). Allegiance to the party served union members well – they 
could advance in the education ministry (the SEP) that continues to control most 
                                                 
49 Reforms were made to the law in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2009. The 2007-2012 National Development 
Plan and Education Sector Program have set policy objectives and assessment goals that have driven much 
of the system’s recent initiatives. Objectives include decreasing inequalities and promoting equality 
among students, and providing quality education to students so they can “participate productively and 
competitively in the workforce” (Santiago, et al. 2012, 41-42).    
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education policies (Murillo 1999). Once the PRI lost power, the SNTE did not lose its 
leverage thanks to the LGE that established the union as the body responsible for 
personnel appointments and continued the SNTE’s partnership with the government at 
both the federal and now state level (Ornelas 2004; Fierro, et al. 2009, 5-6). The SEP-
SNTE partnership is quite strong and they have a joint commission dedicated to 
overseeing how teacher’s careers are regulated. Since the demise of the PRI’s 
hegemony, the teacher’s union has recognized that it has to negotiate with the changing 
federal government’ leadership. Accordingly it has begun to modify some of its more 
corrupt practices and has conceded to more oversight on the profession with teacher 
assessments and evaluations becoming more frequent.    
All public school teachers of basic education (kindergarten through ninth grade) 
are required to be members of the SNTE, now Mexico’s largest union with an estimated 
1.5 million members. Thanks to its large membership the SNTE is also quite wealthy – it 
is able to garner 1% of member’s wages and, by some estimates, operates with a US$200 
million annual budget (Elizondo Mayer-Serra 2009). According to Alvarez, Moreno, and 
Patrinos (2007), 50% of Mexican states have all of their teachers hired by the SNTE, 
about 7% of states have control of more than 50% of teacher hiring and about 45% of 
states have half of their teachers hired directly by the union while the other half of their 
teachers are determined by a competitive exam (10).50  
                                                 
50 Due to rounding errors these numbers do not add to 100%. The competitive exams are only used for 
newly created teaching posts so these are not the majority of employment allocation – the SNTE is heavily 
involved in all teacher transfers and replacement/promotion post assignments (Santiago, et al. 2012).  
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With such power, the SNTE has been able to resist further decentralizing the 
education system even though research, as discussed in Chapter IV of this dissertation, 
shows such efforts could help improve student test scores (Santibañez, et al. 2005; Fuchs 
and Woessmann 2007; Woessmann 2007). Consequently, although teachers in Mexico 
benefitted most from past increases in education spending, there has been no 
simultaneous increase in meaningful accountability for student success or school quality 
(Bloom, et al. 2007). Starting in 2008, Mexico began to seriously address this issue with 
the Alliance for Quality in Education (Alianza por la Calidad de la Educación). This 
initiative was established to, among other things, modernize schools, prepare students 
for life and work, and to professionalize teachers and educational leaders (OECD 2010g, 
42-43). To this end, a national teacher’s exam has been implemented for all new teachers 
who must first be trained in an institute of higher education. Moreover, starting in 2012, 
the Universal Evaluation System (Evaluación Universal de Docentes) has been rolled 
out that ties teacher evaluation to student scores on the National Evaluation of Academic 
Achievement in Schools or ENLACE (Evaluación Nacional de Logro Académico en 
Centros Escolares) that were first implemented in 2005. The ENLACE tests are 
administered to students every year in primary and lower secondary school, as well as 
the last year of high school, and looks at students’ and schools’ progress in Spanish, 
math, and science. All results are made public and serve as a tool for families, schools, 
and the Ministry of Education to determine where help is needed most (OECD 2010g).   
In Mexico there are four types of middle or lower secondary schools: regular 
schools, community schools that serve 10% of the secondary population, technical 
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schools (secundaria técnica) that serve approximately 25% of the secondary population, 
and television or video-based schools (telesecundaria) that serve around 20% of the 
secondary population (OECD 2009b).  Community schools are designed for 
“marginalized, dispersed, and small areas … or those with important indigenous 
populations” (OECD 2010g, 47). The technical schools are vocational in nature and 
prepare middle school students for jobs in the local economy. In rural areas, for example, 
this would include milk or cheese production, farming, or clerical support.  
Telesecundaria schools have one teacher for all subjects and classes are taught 
via satellite videos that are developed and scheduled by the Ministry of Education. These 
videos show master teachers teaching and, after reviewing the videos, students complete 
relevant exercises under the guidance of their local tutor for the rest of the class session. 
These distance-learning curricula are less expensive than regular schools that have a 
more developed infrastructure and teaching staff, and have enabled rural students to 
access lower secondary schools that would otherwise be unavailable. However, scores 
on ENLACE exams are usually lower for telesecundaria students than for technical 
school students and Behrman, et al (2009) have shown that students who go to 
telesecundaria schools are half as likely as their counterparts at technical schools to stay 
in school (254-55). This leads to the sixth hypothesis:  
 
 
Hypothesis 5.6: Students who go to technical middle schools are more likely to 
plan to go on to high school than students who go to telesecundaria middle 
schools 
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As shown in detail in Appendix G, high schools in Mexico are divided into four 
types: general baccalaureate (bacchillerato general), technical baccalaureate 
(bachillerato tecnológico), technology professional (profesional técnico), and job 
training (capacitacíon para el trabajo). The general baccalaureate schools, some of 
which are run by the federal government and some by the states, are geared towards 
college preparation. There are four types of technical baccalaureate schools that each 
focus on different professional fields, and these fields vary based on the industries in the 
region where the schools are located. The four focus areas are: 1) agriculture, 2) ocean 
science and technology, 3) industrial technology, and 4) general science and technology.   
Agriculture students are prepared to work in a variety of areas including forestry, 
agribusiness, and landscape architecture. Students in schools of ocean science and 
technology study topics such as commercial fishing, marine engineering, and ship 
reconstruction or repair while industrial technology students study things like 
construction, manufacturing production, and mining. Each state’s Ministry of Education 
also runs a system of general science and technology schools called Colegio de Estudios 
Científicos y Tecnológicos or CECyTEs (Lopez-Acevedo 2003; SEP 2012a). These 
schools train students in such areas as automotive repair, nursing, and computer 
programming depending on the skills needed in the state. Upon graduation, students are 
qualified to work at mid-level careers as “professional technicians, technical 
professionals or base level technicians depending on the type of institution they attend 
and the program they undertake” (Lopez-Acevedo 2003, 2). The professional technology 
schools, called Colegio Nacional de Educación Profesional Tecnica or CONALEP are 
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different because they offer extra courses and an exam that qualifies students to receive a 
special high school degree making advancement to higher education easier (Lopez-
Acevedo 2003). Finally, the job training schools are geared towards adult education and, 
based on requests from community members such as single mothers, the homeless, or 
people with disabilities, will create an appropriate curricula to help students get available 
jobs (SEP 2012a).   
 
Section 5.3. Supply Meets Demand 
As discussed in Chapter II, Mexico’s Education Policy Index score that includes 
all types of demand-side spending, its EPI-A score, is .73; its EPI-M score that only 
accounts for means-tested demand-side spending, is .83. These scores reflect a clear bias 
towards supply- over demand-side spending. As shown in Table 2.3a in Chapter II, 
teacher compensation accounts for 65% of the EPI-A spending and 75% of the EPI-M 
spending. Large classes and higher teachers salaries, but low cumulative spending per 
student by the government on education is not a combination geared towards successful 
schools (OECD 2010e, 84-85).51 As Oportunidades drives enrollments higher, there has 
been some concern that schools will not be able to keep up with the growing demand on 
its resources. Yet, research based on interviews with school principals and teachers has 
shown there was not a significant decline in education services after the program was 
implemented; students were receiving the same level of services in infrastructure and 
other resources before and after the program began (Behrman and Skoufias 2006, 259).  
                                                 
51 The OECD baseline for low cumulative spending by education institutions per student (ages 6 to 15) is 
US$39,463 and high cumulative spending is US$81,236 (OECD 2010e, 85). 
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The level of these services, however, is underwhelming. In one 2007 report by 
the National Institute for Educational Evaluation or INEE (Instituto National para la 
Evaluación de la Educación), among other shortcomings, more than 25% of Mexico’s 
public schools have maintenance problems and only 54% of telesecundarias had library 
chairs and tables (García, et al. 2007, 59, 63). When schools do want to get additional 
funds to improve the quality of what they offer students, school principals can apply to 
approximately 200 federal and state programs. Applications to these programs, however, 
require administrative foresight and logistical skills, as well as an ability to report back 
to the government on a regular basis; these are often requirements that rural school 
principals are especially ill-equipped to meet (Hopkins, et al. 2007).52  
One consequence of schools maintaining their infrastructure and pedagogical 
status quo is that student performance on assessment exams have not improved and in 
some areas have declined since Oportunidades was implemented (Behrman, et al. 2000; 
Muñoz-Izquierdo 2007). Students who receive demand-side policies may become more 
interested in going to school if they see an opportunity for themselves, but they may not 
be the strongest students. That is, Oportunidades may be attracting students who would 
otherwise be more motivated to leave school when they do not perform well, and their 
attendance may be driving scores downward.  
As discussed in Chapter IV and shown with Equations 4.5a and b, high gross 
secondary enrollment rates were positively associated with higher scores on the PISA 
exam when there is a high level of local (not school) decision making. Mexico actually 
                                                 
52 This was confirmed in interviews with rural principals in Hidalgo, Mexico (Summer 2012).  
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reports that no school-related decisions are made at the local level. In Figure IV-6 in 
Chapter IV, the breakdown of Mexico’s education decisions show that 50% of decisions 
happen at the state level, 30% at the federal level, and 20% are happening at the school 
level. Thus, if enrollment rates are high because of demand-side policies, education 
policy decision-making is happening at ineffectual levels of government, and assessment 
scores are dropping, what are the benefits of the education students, especially those 
living in rural areas, are being encouraged to receive? While it is not possible to assess 
individual students’ level of marketable skills and knowledge for this dissertation, it is 
possible to access the results of the ENLACE exams at the school level, and to ask 
students what they think the advantages are for going to the schools that are available to 
them.  
 
Section 5.4. The Cases and the Methodology 
To assess whether or not education spending is contributing to the development 
of human capital in Mexico, and more specifically to address the hypotheses stated 
earlier in this chapter (see Appendix H for the complete list of hypotheses), the 
graduating students and principals at three rural schools in Mexico were surveyed during 
the summer of 2012.53 The selected schools are located in the municipality of Calnali, 
Hidalgo where, according to the 2010 Mexican census, 60% of the 16,962 residents are 
under the age of 15. The municipality is 82 square miles of mostly mountainous terrain 
                                                 
53 The English version of the student survey is reproduced in Appendix 5D and the English version of the 
principal survey is in Appendix 5E. The surveys were approved by the Texas A&M Internal Review 
Board (Number IRB2012-0281). 
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and most land is forest or allocated to agriculture or grazing. The reported gross revenue 
of the municipality is US$4.6 million and the main occupations are in farming and 
ranching.54  
The average education level of Calnali’s population, ages 15 or older, is 5.8 years 
or a sixth grade level but, according to the 2010 census, the literacy rate is 97%. Most of 
the population has electricity (93%) but just 50% say they have a refrigerator and only 
17% have a washing machine (INEGI 2010). Table V-1 shows how the population of 
students surveyed in the town of Calnali for this dissertation compares, based on the 
2010 Mexican census, with the general population of the municipality (also called 
Calnali) and the Mexican state where the municipality is located (Hidalgo). 
 
Table V–1. Profile of Surveyed Student Population Compared with Census Data 
 2012 Student 
Survey 
Population 
2010 Mexican Census 
– Municipality of 
Calnali* 
2010 Mexican 
Census – State of 
Hidalgo* 
Hard floors (not dirt) 94% 80% 92% 
Television 94% 77% 87% 
Computer 17% 6% 20% 
Washing Machine 25% 17% 48% 
Refrigerator 73% 50% 71% 
Population 
Size/Number of 
houses 
228** 4,441 669,408 
 
NOTE: These percentages reflect the number of houses that have these features. These numbers are 
comparable to the student survey population since each student is representing one house.  
**232 students participated in the survey, 228 responded to these questions 
SOURCE: The municipality of Calnali and the state of Hidalgo data are from the 2010 Mexican census 
(INEGI 2010) 
 
                                                 
54 Corn, beans, and green chili are the main crops and the main farm staples include eggs and milk; grouse, 
sheep, turkey and cows are the dominant meats. 
  156
 
Serving the student population throughout the municipality are 25 preschools, 27 
primary schools, two indigenous or community schools, 1 technical middle school, 12 
telesecundaria middle schools, and two high schools (INEGI 2010). More than 60% of 
students and their families in the municipality benefit from Oportunidades and the 
program has been active here for over 10 years.55 
In the capital city of the municipality, Calnali (population 4,100), there is one 
general science and technology high school serving 510 students, and one technical 
middle school educating 207 students. Students come from all around the municipality to 
go to these schools. Most students in the district stay in school until the age of 14 (93%) 
but only 37% of youth ages 15 to 24 go on to high school. Most of these school’s 
graduating students participated in the survey shown in Appendix 5D. Of the 147 
students graduating from the general technology and science high school (CECyTEH), 
132 or 90% responded to the survey and 70% of these students reported receiving the 
Oportunidades benefit.56 From the technical middle school, 63 of the 67 graduating 
students or 94% participated in the survey and of these students, 55% reported that they 
were receiving Oportunidades monies.57  
                                                 
55 The state of Hidalgo was part of the initial PROGRESA implementation. Requests to the central 
Oportunidades office to confirm if the Calnali municipality was part of the original grouping went 
unanswered. Members of the community communicated to the author that the program has been active 
there since 2000.   
56 The “H” at the end of CECyTEH stands for Hidalgo and indicates that it is a CECyTE high school run 
by the state of Hidalgo (each CECyTE is state run). 
57 There were two surveys – one for high school and one for middle school students. The only difference 
between the surveys was question 7 and asked about the student’s plans post-graduation. The middle 
school survey asked the student to indicate which high school or vocational school he or she planned to 
attend whereas the high school survey asked which vocational school or university the student planned to 
attend. 
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Papatlatla (population 2,750) is the second largest town in Calnali and has a 
telesecundaria middle school serving 157 students as well as a general baccalaureate 
high school or COBAEH (Colegio de Bachilleres del Estado de Hidalgo) that serves less 
than 100 students.58 Of the 40 graduating telesecundaria students in Papatlatla, 37 or 
93% were surveyed for this study. Approximately 80% of the students who participated 
at the telesecundaria receive Oportunidades benefits and this makes analysis of the 
policy’s impact on student performance difficult; it is statistically difficult to compare 
80% of a population with 20%. Table V-2 profiles the middle and high school 
populations that were surveyed.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 The high school students in Papatlatla were not surveyed; the school appeared to be going through 
renovations and was vacant each time the researcher was in the town during the summer of 2012. 
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Table V–2. Profile of Surveyed Schools 
 Total Students 
Male 
Students 
Female 
Students 
Total 
Graduating 
(third year) 
Students 
Total 
Graduating 
Student 
Survey 
Participants 
Number of 
Graduating 
Female 
Student 
Survey 
Participants 
Number of 
Graduating 
Male 
Student 
Survey 
Participants 
% Graduating 
Students 
Receiving 
Oportunidades 
Full-
Time 
Teachers 
Part-
Time 
Teachers 
Teacher 
to 
Student 
Ratio 
Technical 
Middle 
School 
 
207 96 111 67 63 (94%)* 27 34** 55% 3 8 1:19 
Tele-
secundaria 
Middle 
School 
 
157 79 78 40 37 (93%)* 20 17 80% 6 _____ 1:27 
CECyTEH 
High 
School 
 
510 248 262 147 132 (90%)* 63 49** 70% 8 8 1:32 
 
* Percent of the graduating class that responded to the survey 
** Not all students responded to this survey question so numbers do not add to total student survey participants 
SOURCE: Interviews with School Principals and Survey responses 
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The telesecundaria does not have any part-time teachers and even though the 
lessons are taught virtually, there are six on-site “teachers” who help students work 
through their lessons. While there is much debate in the education literature around what 
is the best teacher-to-student ratio, the classroom sizes reported here were not considered 
unwieldy or difficult to manage.59 Table V-3 lists the surveyed middle school students’ 
2012 average ENLACE scores.  
 
Table V–3. Middle School 2012 ENLACE Scores of the Graduating Class* 
 Total Graduating Students Spanish Math Science
Technical Middle School 67 482 557 514 
Technical Middle School:  
National Average  _____ 484 499 494 
Technical Middle School:   
State Average _____ 479 541 509 
Telesecundaria Middle School 40 479 521 508 
Telesecundaria:  
National Average _____ 484 569 516 
Telesecundaria:  
 State Average _____ 475 581 522 
 
* Graduating students at all schools are in their respective third years  
SOURCE: ENLACE 
 
 
Since the ENLACE exams are annually administered it is possible to get the 
scores for the class that was surveyed in 2012 and for each of the preceding 2 years. 
Though it is not clear how much of the original cohort remains in the graduating class, 
the average scores have not improved over time (SEP 2012b).  
                                                 
59 This assertion is based on observation, student interviews, and teacher comments.  
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As would be predicted based on previous studies, the telesecundaria students’ 
2012 ENLACE scores are not as high as their technical school peers in Calnali 
(Behrman, et al. 2009). The technical middle school in Calnali assigns students to one of 
three vocational focus areas: Agriculture, Farm Products, and Secretary. Students in 
Agriculture learn how to plant and harvest while those in the Farm Products group learn 
how to manage the production of milk, cheese, and other farm goods. Those students in 
the Secretary section focus on administrative skills and all students take a core set of 
classes that cover Spanish, math, and science from the same set of teachers.  
The focus areas group the students but they do not receive significantly different 
resources from the school (this is not like the Advanced Placement or remedial programs 
in the United States). Their specialization exposes them to one unique class that is 
germane to their field but the rest of their classes are the same. The ENLACE test scores 
show that in 2012 the graduating class in Calnali scored above the national and state 
averages for technical middle schools throughout Mexico in all three subjects except 
Spanish where students score below the state average. Based on these assessments, the 
school is performing competitively within Mexico. 
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Table V–4. Graduating Middle and High School Student Academic Grades and Year Repetition 
 Grades* % of students who repeated a year or more in: 
 6 7 8 9 10 Elementary 
School 
Middle 
School 
High 
School 
Technical Middle School – Overall 0% 19% 32% 38% 10% 13% 5% ____ 
Technical Middle School – 
Agriculture Students 0% 14% 41% 41% 4% 22% 9% ____ 
Technical Middle School – 
Farm Product Students 0% 18% 32% 32% 18% 4% 0% ____ 
Technical Middle School – 
Secretary Students 0% 27% 20% 47% 6% 13% 7% ____ 
Telesecundaria 5% 38% 41% 16% 0% 19% 6% ____ 
High School – Overall 0% 7% 51% 41% 1% 16% 2% 2% 
High School – Automotive 
mechanics 0% 16% 58% 26% 0% 31% 3% 3% 
High School - Nursing 0% 5% 65% 30% 0% 19% 0% 0% 
High School – Computer 
Science 0% 3% 41% 55% 1% 9% 2% 3% 
* Grades in Mexico correspond to the U.S. system as follows: 6 = F, 7 = D, 8 = C, 9=B, 10 = A 
NOTE: Students who completed the survey reported their grades and year repetition. Four technical middle school students and six high school 
students did not report grades; all telesecundaria students reported. One telesecundaria student and three high school students did not report grade 
repetition in elementary and middle school; all technical middle school students reported. Three high school students did not report grade repetition 
in high school. Averages are based on the number reporting. Percentages in bold indicate the grade received by the majority of students. 
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Most technical middle school students (94%) responded to survey question three 
asking them to report their average grade for the previous year. As shown in Table V-4, 
most students had an average grade of “8” or “C” though there is variation between 
focus areas; the Secretary students reported a higher average of a “7” or B grade. All 
technical middle school students responded to question 4 of the survey asking them how 
many times they had to repeat a year of elementary or middle school, and 5% of students 
reported repeating a year of middle school whereas 13% repeated a year of elementary 
school. These rates of year repetition are lower than the national average that is 
estimated to be 33% for elementary and lower middle school (Puryear, et al. 2012, 88).  
In the telesecundaria students are not broken into groups – all students receive 
the same video classes as mandated and scheduled by the SEP. On the ENLACE exams, 
Papatlatla’s middle school students score worse than their telesecundaria peers with the 
exception of Spanish; here they score above the state average but below the national 
average. Noteworthy is that in 2012 the telesecundaria students in Papatlatla scored 
above the average technical middle school students in the state of Hidalgo in math and 
science. When it comes to grades, all the third year/graduating telesecundaria students 
responded to the question and reported averaging mostly C’s (41%) and D’s (38%) 
across all subjects. All but one student answered the survey question about grade 
repetition and 19% said they repeated at least one year of elementary school but only 6% 
reported repeating a year of middle school – again, this is well below the estimated 
national average.   
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The graduating/third year high students at the general technology and science 
high school in Calnali (CECyTEH) are also required to take the ENLACE exams. Their 
raw scores are not available but what is published is the percent of CECyTEH students 
who score poorly or well on the exam and these percentages are reported at the school, 
state, and national levels. Based on that data, in communication (Spanish) and math, the 
students at the Calnali high school have higher ENLACE scores on average than their 
counterparts in other CECyTEH high schools in Hidalgo and nationwide. For this type 
of high school then, students who are interested in these subjects would do well to go to 
the Calnali high school. In so far as the high school students’ grades and year repetition, 
Table 5.4 profiles the graduating class overall as well as by sub-field. In general, with 
98% of students responding, 16% repeated a grade in elementary school, 6% repeated in 
middle school, and only 2% reported repeating a year in high school. Most students 
(51%) said they had C averages last year but 55% of computer science students reported 
having a B average. 
 
Section 5.5. School Budgets and Challenges 
 
According to the sub-principal at the technical school and the principal of the 
telesecundaria, the biggest challenges to the schools in Calnali are the lack of science 
and audio-visual equipment, computers, and instructional materials, as well as the lack 
of an Internet connection. Moreover, neither school has adequate support staff. The 
technical school also felt that they had inadequate furniture but did not feel they were 
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missing any teaching expertise. Both schools have libraries but neither has a librarian, 
and claim to have between 1500 and 2000 books.  
Both schools confirmed that teachers are hired and fired by the state and federal 
SEP with input from the SNTE, and that the state pays the teachers. Budgets for school 
maintenance and supplies are established at the state and federal level for both schools 
but the telesecundaria principal indicated that he had approximately US$2500 that he 
could allocate – about half coming from monies collected from students’ families and 
the other half coming from a government program called Support to the School 
Management or Apoyos a la Gestion Escolar (AGE).60  The money was spent on school 
supplies and furniture, needed maintenance, and even cultural events. At the technical 
school the principal indicated that he, rather than the state, could allocate how the money 
he was sent could be spent and his priorities were quite similar to those of the 
telesecundaria principal.  
In terms of where the money comes from for salaries and major expenses, the 
telesecundaria indicated that it was federally funded whereas the technical middle 
school principal indicated that 90% was from the federal SEP and 10% was from the 
state. This is in contrast with the high school principal who indicated that 47% of 
funding is from the national government and 47% is from the state government with 4% 
coming from the municipality, 1% from families and 1% from other donations.  
                                                 
60 AGE is designed to get parents involved in their student’s school and education. For a school to receive 
around $1000 from the program, teachers, principals, and parents need to develop and submit a working 
plan to SEP that is designed to improve the school. The plan can request things such as school furniture, 
supplies, or even needed maintenance. http://www.conafe.gob.mx/contraloriasocial/Documents/cs-cartel-
age-2011.pdf 
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For students who choose to go to the local science and technology high school, 
they have three areas of study they can pursue: nursing, auto mechanics, or computer 
science.61 As in the middle technical school, students must complete a set of core classes 
in addition to those that are part of their selected focus area though in high school they 
are not required to choose a particular area of study. Students who go into nursing tend 
to be female and upon graduation have to do a year of service in which they practice 
basic nursing in a smaller town in the municipality. Students can then go on to a nursing 
college or another profession altogether if they so choose (if they do not want to go on to 
have a nursing career, they could skip the year of service). The students who choose auto 
mechanics are usually male and they learn how to repair cars along with principles of 
electricity and other basic sciences. The computer science students learn about 
networking and basic computer repair in addition to the core classes and are fairly 
evenly divided between male and female. The lack of Internet connectivity at the school, 
however, as well as a limited supply of working computers, has constrained the quality 
of the program.  
The high school principal stressed that the biggest challenges they have from an 
instructional perspective is the lack of science equipment and working instructional 
materials. The principal also indicated that they are short on math, nursing, and 
electronics teachers, making these disciplines more difficult to teach.  
                                                 
61 For those students that do not drop out of the education system, some will go to the local high school 
and some will decide to relocate to go to a better or different high school in a different town. These 
students either rent a room or live with relatives when they relocate. Several students surveyed for this 
study indicated that they were living away from home to go to the Calnali high school even though they 
were not asked directly. From the middle school data 31% of the technical school students and 16% of the 
telesecundaria students indicated that they planned to relocate.  
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Table V–5. Principal-Reported Supply Versus Demand-Side Spending 
 Supply-Side Spending Demand-Side Spending 
Teacher 
Salaries 
Non-
Teacher 
Salaries 
Infrastructure 
Funding Curriculum
Financial 
Aid 
Cash 
Benefits Other
Technical 
Middle 
School 
 
70% 20% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
High School 
 
60% 25% 13% 2% 0% 0% 5% 
 
NOTE: The schools’ principals reported these percentages and the telesecundaria principal did not 
respond to this question. The high school principal’s estimate exceeds 100%.  
 
Finally, the principals at the technical middle school and the general technology 
and science high school were able to indicate how much of their total funding for a 
typical school year went to supply versus demand-side expenditures. Their answers are 
shown in Table V-5 and confirm that salaries exhaust most available funds explicitly 
allocated for education purposes. The principals reported that 90% of the middle 
school’s funds go towards salaries and 85% of the high school’s funds go toward teacher 
and non-teacher salaries. At the high school the principal indicated that there are 21 
general technology and science high schools in Hidalgo and that three are renovated 
every year so that every seven years the school is eligible for upgrades determined by the 
state SEP. Further, at both schools the principals are not involved in curriculum spending 
decisions and the only demand-side spending from the high school reflects money used 
to help students with some supply or uniform costs.  
Unfortunately it is not possible to create an EPI index for each school in this case 
study. While we have some idea of the percentages of funding allocated to each category 
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of supply-side spending, it is not known how much money is actually being spent. On 
the demand side of the EPI equation, the number of students receiving benefits is known 
but other benefits going to their families are unknown thus the needed data are 
unavailable. What we do know, however, is that some students are receiving a particular 
cash benefit that is means-tested and that this could be contributing to their social and 
subsequently human capital development in addition to the resources available at their 
school.  
 
Section 5.6. Student Attitudes Towards Their Schools and Career Plans 
To determine what students thought about the usefulness of their school, they 
were asked seven questions. Four questions (question 5a through 5d) asked them if they 
totally agreed, agreed, disagreed, or totally disagreed with the following four statements:  
1) School has done little to prepare me for adult life when I leave school 
2) School has been a waste of time 
3) School has helped give me confidence to make decisions 
4) School has taught me things which could be useful in a job 
 
On average, students responded that school has taught them skills they would use 
in a job and that they gained confidence from their experience; only 3% felt that school 
was a waste of time or that it did not help them gain the skills they needed for a career. 
While the majority saw school as an advantage, as many as 30% of students felt school 
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did not prepare them for adult life and some 10% felt that school did not help them gain 
the confidence they needed to make good decisions.  
Question 6 is an open-ended question and asks students to consider what specific 
skills or knowledge they had gained in school that could be useful in a job and the 
overwhelming majority of students felt that having an area of study, gaining a vocational 
skill, was the biggest advantage for coming to school. Second was general knowledge or 
subjects outside of their area of study, and third was learning self-confidence and being 
respectful or getting along with others. The fourth most popular response was that they 
learned a lot about technology and computers. Learning English was not important to 
most students but it was mentioned enough to be in the top five. Some specific skills that 
were noteworthy responses include time management, animal care, cooking, and 
landscape drawing.   
Questions 10 and 11 asked students to consider what they liked most and least 
about their educational experience at school. Every student mentioned that they liked 
learning something new or socializing with their friends. Playing soccer was also 
mentioned frequently. The least liked aspects of school were studying math and getting 
too much homework. A close third were complaints about teachers. Either teachers were 
not showing up at all, they had meetings during class time, or they had a negative 
attitude towards the students. One respondent wrote that, “Sometimes not everyone 
complies with the rules of the school – neither the students nor the teachers.” Mean or 
bullying students, uniforms, even nail inspections made the list of the least liked aspects 
of the schools. Throughout the comments the issue of respect repeatedly surfaced. There 
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is a general attitude among students that learning to respect elders, others, and ones self 
is an integral part of what one learns in school, and this was much lauded by students at 
all three schools.  
To evaluate students’ expectations of their academic and professional future, 
survey respondents were asked about their plans in two ways. Question 7 asked students 
to consider what they planned to do after they graduated in terms of more schooling or 
professionally, and question 12 asked them to consider what they wanted to be when 
they grew up. These two questions allowed for responses to be validated and gave space 
for respondents to consider their answers more fully. Of the high school students who 
responded to the survey 77% articulated a career choice and they overwhelmingly were 
interested in the jobs they were currently preparing for (nursing, auto mechanics, or 
computer networking) even if they indicated that they wanted to continue their 
education. Approximately 30% wanted to pursue higher education to work in more 
selective jobs that required more advanced university degrees (e.g., medical doctors or 
lawyers). 
Middle school students had a much harder time describing their future plans 
beyond high school. From the technical and telesecundaria middle schools, of those 
students that responded to questions 7 and 12 with a particular career in mind, the 
majority sought highly selective jobs that require high-level degrees.    
To compare students’ job aspirations against peers as well as their parents, all 
jobs mentioned by survey respondents have been organized into 5 categorizes. The 
lowest category is a “1” and includes jobs that do not require any literacy or education, 
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namely domestic and field labor work. Category “2” includes vendors, building 
assistants and farmers – jobs that require a low level of math and Spanish literacy. Those 
jobs in category “3” include jobs that require technical know-how and a fair amount of 
literacy (e.g., mechanics, plumbers, and carpenters). Category “4” is for jobs that require 
further schooling or certification such as police officers, teachers, nurses, or accountants. 
Lastly, category “5” is for those professions that require extensive schooling and 
cognitive skill: professors, lawyers, engineers, doctors, and architects. Appendix 5F 
summarizes each category and lists the professions that were explicitly mentioned by 
survey respondents.  
The challenge of establishing an occupational hierarchy is multifaceted. The 
approach taken for this chapter is based on education and cognitive requirements for the 
jobs under consideration. Past literature has used composite socioeconomic indexes 
based on “three measures of occupational standing: educational level, wage rate, and 
prestige” (Hauser and Warren 1997, 225).  In the Hauser and Warren (1997) analysis 
cited above, the authors make the case that a job’s required educational level is more 
important to determine a job’s occupational standing than the prestige and wage factors 
– both of which can be highly variable over time and location. In addition to education 
level requirements, however, the categories in this chapter also consider the necessary 
aptitudes and skills a job demands. To discuss the details of a job’s skill requirements, 
researchers used to look to the now defunct Dictionary of Occupational Titles or DOT 
(Hartog 2000). This dictionary listed job requirements based on interviews with human 
resource personnel as well as people who held the job under review. The DOT has been 
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replaced by O*NET – an online database maintained by the U.S. Department of Labor – 
and provides occupation details such as skill and experience requirements, and the types 
of tasks workers have to perform on the job. Given that this analysis is geared towards 
careers in rural Mexico, however, this guide was not particularly useful for occupational 
categorization. 
In 2008 the International Labor Office (ILO) of the United Nations asked experts 
on labor statistics to update the International Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ISCO). While this classification is extensive it does not reflect a job hierarchy based on 
skill or salary, nor does it offer occupational information such as job requirements. The 
ISCO does, though, provide a useful outline for job categories. The occupational 
categories used in this chapter are based on the ISCO and considers the current jobs held 
by the parents of students who participated in the survey as well as students’ career 
aspirations. Given the current employment opportunities in Calnali, Hidalgo, as well as 
the educational offerings available to its population, the ordered occupational categories 
created for this chapter captures the regional character and indicates, as the numbers on 
the scale increase, upward mobility for workers.  
The argument in this dissertation is that the demand-side spending that helps 
students get to a school is critical for enabling students who would otherwise drop out, 
but this type of spending is beyond the purview of individual schools. The only way to 
assess demand-side spending impacts on building social and human capital at the 
individual level, therefore, is to evaluate students who do benefit from the policies and to 
see how they compare to their classmates who do not receive the benefit.  
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Section 5.7. Survey Data Analysis 
Hypothesis 5.1 claims that middle school student who benefit from 
Oportunidades are at least as likely as their peers who do not benefit from 
Oporutnidades to go on to high school. At the telesecundaria in Papatlatla, 80% of 
students receive Oportunidades and of those who do not receive the benefit (7 of the 37 
students), more of them do not want to go on to high school (question 7 of the student 
survey). A cross-tabulation (see Table V-6), shows that there is a significant correlation 
(P= .004) between the telesecundaria students who receive Oportunidades and those 
who plan to go on to high school.  
For this population, a group more disadvantaged than the technical middle school 
students, hypothesis 5.1 holds and the students who benefit from Oportunidades are 
more likely than their peers who do not benefit from Oportunidades to go on to high 
school. At the technical middle school in Calnali, however, 89% of students plan to go 
on to high school and this does not have a significant correlation with whether or not the 
students receive Oportunidades benefits. As more middle school students in a population 
decide to pursue a high school diploma, the effect of Oportunidades may be less about 
influencing such decisions as it is about helping students to have the same options as 
their wealthier peers.  
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Table V–6. Telesecundaria and Technical Middle School Students and Their Plans for High School 
 Telesecundaria students* Technical middle school students** 
 Does not 
receive 
Oportunidades 
Receives 
Oportunidades
 
Total
Percent 
Receiving 
Oportunidades
Does not 
receive 
Oportunidades
Receives 
Oportunidades
 
Total
Percent 
Receiving 
Oportunidades
No 
high 
school 
plans 
4 3 7 43% 2 5 7 71% 
High 
School 
plans 
3 27 30 90% 25 30 55 55% 
Total 7 30 37 81% 27 35 62 56% 
NOTE: All Telesecundaria students responded to this question whereas one technical middle school student did not.  
*Pearson X2 = 8.22, P= .004 
** Pearson X2 = .72, P= .40
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At the high school level, 78% of all student respondents indicated that they 
wanted to pursue more schooling. The correlation between whether or not a student 
received Oportunidades and his or her desire for more education was barely significant 
(P=.10) but it does indicate that students who are able to stay in school thanks to 
Oportunidades are as likely as their peers to want to pursue higher education. Table V-7 
shows this tabulated correlation. 
 
Table V–7. Surveyed High School Students and Their Plans for Higher Education 
 Does not receive 
Oportunidades 
Receive 
Oportunidades 
Total Percent 
Receiving 
Oportunidades
No plans for 
higher level 
degree/university 
   
5 24 29 83% 
Plans to go on to 
higher level 
degree/university 
University  
 
34 69 103 67% 
Total 39 93 132 70% 
 
NOTE: All high school students responded to this question. 
Pearson X2 = 2.70, P= .10 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 5.2: Female middle school students who benefit from Oportunidades 
are at least as likely as their male counterparts to go on to high school 
 
 
Looking at just the students who receive Oportunidades at all of the schools 
surveyed, 58% of the telesecundaria beneficiaries are girls, 67% are girls at the technical 
middle school, and at the high school, 59% of beneficiaries are girls. In the 
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telesecundaria all of the 20 girls in the graduating class (100% of the female students) 
receive cash transfers. Overall, at the middle schools and the high school surveyed, 
among Oportunidades beneficiaries there is no statistically significant relationship 
between the sex of students and their desire to continue their education. This could mean 
that there is a negligible gender gap for beneficiaries and that the opportunities for 
education at the middle and high school levels in this region are equalizing. In other 
words, female Oportunidades students may be just as likely as male Oportunidades 
students to stay in (or leave) school. However, with such a small sample this would need 
to be validated in future studies with larger populations.   
At the high school level, however, there is a statistical difference between girls 
who receive cash transfers and those who do not (See Table V-8). Of the graduating girls 
in the high school, 70% receive Oportunidades benefits and there is a statistically 
significant relationship (P=.04) between receiving cash benefits and their desire for more 
education. One explanation for this is that at the high school the students who are 
registered in nursing are all female, and nearly all want to become nurses or another type 
of medical professional, and all of these occupations require more schooling.  
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Table V–8. Is There a Difference Between Graduating Female High School 
Students Who Get Cash Transfers and Those That Do Not? 
 Graduating 
Female students 
who do not receive 
Oportunidades 
Graduating 
Female students 
who receive 
Oportunidades 
Total 
No plans for 
higher level 
degree/university 
1 13 14 
Plans to go on to 
higher level 
degree/university 
University 
17 32 49 
Total 18 45 63 
 
*Pearson X2 = 4.05, P = .04 
 
 
 
Looking more broadly at the middle school population, without considering 
which students are receiving demand-side policy benefits, there is a significant 
relationship between the sex of the student and whether or not they plan to go on to high 
school. The results of the analysis are shown in Table V-9 for both middle schools 
(telesecundaria, P=.02; the technical middle school, P=.08). What appears to be driving 
the relationship is that there are more boys deciding to go to work instead of pursuing 
high school.    
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Table V–9. Middle School Gender Differences in High School Aspirations 
 Telesecundaria Technical Middle School 
 Females Males Females Males 
No plans for 
High School 
 
1 6 1 6 
Plans for High 
School 19 11 26 27 
 20 17 27 33 
 Pearson X
2 = 5.50 
P= .02 
Pearson X2 = 3.02 
P= .08 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 5.3: Middle school students who benefit from Oportunidades are at 
least as likely as their peers who do not benefit from Oportunidades to want to 
attain a higher level of education than their parents 
 
 
Most students in school in rural Mexico exceed their parents’ level of education 
if they go to high school and usually they match their parents’ education by completing 
middle school. (As mentioned earlier, the average level of education in this region is 
sixth grade). Of the students surveyed, no students at the telesecundaria reported having 
a mother with an education level above middle school. The education level of mothers is 
of particular importance since it often serves as an indicator for students’ academic 
advantages that stem from the home learning environment a mother can provide. 
Research has shown that there is usually a strong positive correlation between “mothers’ 
educational attainment and children’s test scores, academic outcomes, and cognitive 
development” (Magnuson 2007, 1497). Table V-10 shows the telesecundaria students’ 
expectations and their parents’ education level regardless of their receipt of 
Oportunidades. 
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Table V–10. Influences of Parents’ Education Level on all Telesecundaria  
Students’ Academic Expectations (Regardless of Whether or Not They Receive 
Oportunidades) 
 Mother’s Education Level* Total 
 No School 
Elementary 
School 
Middle 
School 
High 
School College/University  
No high 
school 
plans 
4 2 1 0 0 7 
High 
School 
plans 
12 14 4 0 0 30 
Total 16 16 5 0 0 37 
 Father’s Education Level** Total 
 No School 
Elementary 
School 
Middle 
School 
High 
School College/University  
No high 
school 
plans 
5 0 2 0 0 7 
High 
School 
plans 
10 13 4 1 1 29 
Total 15 13 6 1 1 36 
 
NOTE: One student did not respond to the father’s education level question (37 telesecundaria students 
participated). 
* Pearson X2 = .82, P= .66 
** Pearson X2 = 6.2, P= .18 
 
Since fathers are less reliably a part of the home life, their influence beyond 
fiscal contribution is not usually discussed in the literature. For the telesecundaria 
sample, 94% of the fathers have no more than a middle school education – one father 
had completed high school and one other father had completed some sort of college 
degree. Regardless of whether or not the student at the telesecundaria benefitted from 
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Oportunidades, the lack of variation in parents’ education level yielded no results for 
this population. Essentially none of the parents are educated and so a student’s plans to 
further his or her education is coming from other influences. It could be that students 
realize that education matters for economic gain and perhaps the cash benefit of 
Oportunidades is incentivizing them to continue their education. Based on some of the 
responses to the open-ended questions on the surveys, there is a general appreciation for 
education and the gains it can bring. 
Seventy-five percent of the students in the technical middle school who 
responded to the survey have parents who did not go on to high school and some 40% 
have parents who did not go beyond elementary school. More mothers of students in the 
middle school did go on to high school and college than fathers, but there is no 
relationship between mothers’ education level and students’ desire for more school. 
However, for this population there is a slightly significant (P=.09) relationship between 
the fathers’ education level and students’ planning to get more education. This may 
indicate that, in this region at least, fathers are having an influence on their children (See 
Table V-11 for the detailed analysis). There are two students who, even though their 
fathers pursued an education beyond high school, decided to stop their education after 
middle school. In these cases they may not see the advantage of more schooling since 
their fathers were not able to capitalize on their investment in education. Since most 
mothers did not go beyond high school and most students want to pursue higher 
education, there is not enough variation to determine if there is a relationship between 
mothers’ education levels and students’ education plans.  
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Table V–11. Influence of Parents’ Education Level on all Technical Middle School 
Students’ Academic Expectations (Regardless of Whether or Not They Receive 
Oportunidades) 
 Mother’s Education Level* Total 
 No School 
Elementary 
School 
Middle 
School 
High 
School 
College/ 
University  
No high 
school plans 2 1 1 1 2 7 
High School 
plans 7 15 20 7 5 54 
Total 9 16 21 8 7 61 
 Father’s Education Level** Total 
 No School 
Elementary 
School 
Middle 
School 
High 
School 
College/ 
University  
No high 
school plans 2 2 0 0 3 7 
High School 
plans 8 13 20 5 6 52 
Total 10 15 20 5 9 59 
       
NOTE: Not all students responded to these questions (63 technical middle school students participated). 
* Pearson X2 = 4.00, P= .35 
** Pearson X2 = 8.00, P= .09 
 
 
 Looking at just the Oportunidades beneficiaries in the technical middle school, 
however, there is a significant relationship between both mother and fathers’ education 
attainment and students’ expectations to go on to high school (See Table V-12). The 
pattern is stronger for mothers’ education attainment as theory would suggest, and this 
implies that among the poorest students in these rural communities, a push for more 
education for girls especially has the potential to positively impact future generations. 
This does not mean that fathers do not model for their sons the importance of education. 
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Given the data there is clearly a paternal influence that bolsters the case for incentivizing 
boys as well girls to stay in school as long as possible.  
 
Table V–12. Parents’ Education Level and Its Influence on Technical Middle 
School Students Who Benefit from Oportunidades 
 Mother’s Education Level* Total 
 No School Elementary School 
Middle 
School 
High 
School College/University  
No 
high 
school 
plans 
2 0 1 0 2 5 
High 
School 
plans 
4 11 13 2 0 30 
Total 6 11 14 2 2 35 
 Father’s Education Level** Total 
 No School 
Elementary 
School 
Middle 
School 
High 
School College/University  
No 
high 
school 
plans 
2 1 0 0 2 5 
High 
School 
plans 
7 8 12 1 1 29 
Total 9 9 12 1 3 34 
 
NOTE: Total varies because one student with plans to go on to high school did not indicate his or her father’s 
education level. Several students indicated that a parent had passed away or was no longer living with the family. 
There are 25 technical middle school students who benefit from Oportunidades. 
* Pearson X2 = 16.53, P= .002 
** Pearson X2 = 9.20, P= .056 
 
 
Hypothesis 5.4: High school students who benefit from Oportunidades are at 
least as likely as their peers who do not benefit from Oportunidades to want to 
attain a higher level of education than their parents  
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Of the high school student respondents, 91% of their mothers and 86% of their 
fathers went only as far as middle school. Another 5% of mothers and 8% of fathers 
completed high school and more fathers than mothers completed college or a post-high 
school degree. As for their own expectations, 88% of the high school student 
respondents indicated that they plan to go on to some institution of higher learning. By 
making it to the third year of high school, the students overwhelmingly exceeded their 
parents’ academic achievements and appear to be aiming much higher academically. 
Nearly all respondents, regardless of whether they receive Oportunidades, indicated that 
they saw education as key for a prosperous future.  
 
Hypothesis 5.5: Male high school students who benefit from Oportunidades will 
be at least as likely as their peers who do not benefit from Oportunidades to seek 
nonagricultural jobs 
 
The size of the surveyed population that is male, in high school, and indicated a 
career is small (N=35), yet revealing. Only one student planned to pursue a level-1 
occupation (those jobs that are agricultural in nature). Level-2 jobs could be agricultural 
in nature as well (a rancher or farmer), but not one student indicated plans to pursue a 
level-2 occupation. The overwhelming majority of students, 86%, indicated that they 
wanted level-3 or level-4 jobs showing that in fact, all students, regardless of whether or 
not they benefit from Oportunidades, are seeking higher paying, more prestigious jobs 
that require more education.   
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Hypothesis 5.6: Students who go to technical middle schools are more likely to 
plan to go on to high school than students who go to telesecundaria middle 
schools 
 
 
 Of the students in the technical middle school who responded to the survey and 
answered the questions about their educational plans (N=62), 89% planned to go on to 
high school. All telesecundaria students (N=37) answered the survey questions and 81% 
plan to continue on to high school. There is no statistical difference between the two 
groups. What the surveys did reveal is that the students in Calnali’s technical middle 
school mostly planned to pursue high school at the CECyTEH while those in Papatlatla 
planned to go the COBAEH, a lower quality high school. Isolating the career 
expectations of the students at each middle school was also not statistically different; 
most students want level-4 or level-5 jobs. Only a longitudinal study would allow us to 
see if students actually do what they claim they are going to do and where their goals 
take them.   
 
Section 5.8. Conclusion 
Without the demand-side policy of Oportunidades, most of the students at the 
rural schools surveyed for this chapter would not be able to afford investing in 
education. Living in poverty and having parents who have not gone past a middle-school 
education limits students in many ways. What the analysis presented here shows is that 
the investment in the poorest families has been paying off so that these students’ 
academic and professional choices are beginning to mirror those students who have 
more advantages.  
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First we saw that middle school students who benefit from Oportunidades in 
Calnali, Hidalgo in Mexico are just as likely and in some cases more likely than non-
beneficiaries to pursue a high school degree. Second, females are becoming just as likely 
as their male classmates to pursue high school and even more likely to pursue a higher 
level degree. This is significant for the next generation of students who should benefit 
from having more educated mothers.  Previous studies have addressed how 
Oportunidades has helped girls stay in middle school and this study extends that 
discussion to how Oportunidades impacts girls’ plans once they are in high school. One 
high school nursing student who responded to the survey wrote that she wants to “work 
in a health center, [and] also to study to specialize in something so that when I form a 
family they receive the best.”62 This particular student’s mother is a stay at home mom 
and her father had been a day laborer but had recently passed away. Both of her parents 
had only finished elementary school. Clearly she has embraced the importance of 
continuing her education so that she can provide for her future children.   
Since most parents in this region did not finish middle school, students who are 
completing middle and high school are surpassing them and Oportunidades is helping to 
make that possible – adding to Mexico’s overall level of human capital. The type of jobs 
students plan to pursue also surpasses their parents’ careers in terms of educational 
requirements, prestige, and salary. All students in this region, not just male high school 
students, are less likely to pursue work in agriculture. While it is not possible to know 
what happens to these students without a more complete longitudinal study, it will be 
                                                 
62 Translated from the Spanish. 
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worthwhile to follow what happens economically in the region over the next ten years to 
see if these policies are having an impact in the aggregate. 
In conclusion, so long as the demand-side policies continue to aid the poorest 
families so that sending their children to school remains their best economic option, 
Mexico can focus its monies on the serious supply-side issues it faces including the 
quality of the schools and teachers. Based on the findings in Chapter IV, we can also 
conclude that Mexico needs to localize decision making so that schools can more easily 
negotiate with officials for the things they need to effectively teach students.   
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: INSIGHTS GAINED, SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
  
 
What does it mean for a government to invest in education? Is it just spending 
money on schools and teachers, or does it include family benefits spending that 
specifically targets parents and their children who will be going to school? This 
dissertation expands the definition of education spending so that in addition to 
expenditures allocated to schools (supply-side expenditures), it includes benefits that 
help families participate in the education system (demand-side expenditures). The 
simultaneous funding of both schools and family benefits, I argue, contributes both 
directly and indirectly to the development of a country’s level of human capital, or 
students’ level of marketable skills and knowledge. This dissertation presents compelling 
evidence that both types of expenditures do make a difference for students – especially 
those coming from the most disadvantaged circumstances. 
In the introduction to this dissertation, I presented Figure I-1 as a response to W. 
Norton Grubb’s call for a new model of schooling (Grubb 2009). The model I developed 
shows how education spending is interconnected with political institutions and with the 
ideology of government leadership (Chapter III). The model also indicates that spending 
policies can have an incentivizing influence on families to send their students to school 
as well as on the students who go, and funding can also have an effect on the quality of 
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the schools themselves (Chapters IV and V). At the heart of the model is the Education 
Policy Index (EPI; Chapter II) that captures both traditional school spending as well as 
family benefits. The approach presented in this dissertation recognizes the necessity of 
both school (supply-side) and family (demand-side) policies for helping students 
develop their human capital, and the final measure for everyone is how well prepared 
students are for what awaits them after graduation. My finding that both supply- and 
demand-side expenditures matter for the development of student skills and knowledge is 
important because gains in human capital should have positive impacts on individual 
students’ earnings potential, as well as for their country’s level of economic growth 
(Grosh, et al. 2008; Woessmann and Hanushek 2012).   
In Chapter II, I introduced the EPI as a spending indicator designed to reveal the 
balance of a country’s expenditures on families relative to schools and teachers; 
demand-side spending helps students access schools whereas supply-side spending is 
indicative of the average quality of the country’s school system. The balance of these 
two types of expenditures can be a useful tool for policy-makers who need to get an idea 
of where fiscal resources are going, and can be used by researchers to assess the impact 
spending is having on student outcomes. Further, the EPI serves as an innovative 
measure for comparing how countries fund education and human capital development 
more broadly. The EPI is also a novel way to assess what political factors are associated 
with differing levels of education spending.  
Countries’ level of wealth, inequality, and poverty do not have an impact on the 
balance of the EPI scores. Rather, as discussed in Chapter III, political factors such as 
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the country’s electoral system, leadership ideology, and labor union power have a strong 
influence over how redistributive a country’s policies will be and thus how much 
spending will be allocated to demand-side policies. When the electoral system is a 
proportional representative (PR) system, labor unions are able to influence demand-side 
spending positively. Moreover, PR systems tend to redistribute more then majoritarian or 
mixed systems, and left-learning governments also favor more generous demand-side 
expenditures. Spending on family benefits and students is considered more redistributive 
than spending on schools where all students, regardless of their family background or 
wealth, can go to learn. One advantage of the EPI in analytical models is that it can help 
identify which students are, based on demand-side benefits, making gains through the 
school system.   
 An analysis in Chapter II shows that the rate of student resilience, the percentage 
of students from a country’s bottom quartile on the SES spectrum to score in the top 
quartile on the 2009 Programme for International Assessment (PISA) exam, was 
positively correlated with higher EPI scores, i.e. higher investments in supply-side items 
like school infrastructure. This finding indicates that supply-side spending in the 
aggregate can make a difference for less advantaged students.  
This is confirmed in Chapter IV when I analyze the impact of the EPI-M on 
PISA exam results. The EPI-M, the ratio of supply-side spending to means-tested 
demand-side spending only (see Chapter II for details), was positively correlated with 
reading, science, and math PISA scores. When the three components of supply-side 
spending were unpacked, spending on teachers’ compensation and non-compensation 
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expenditures had a positive impact on reading and math scores, while capital 
expenditures positively impacted student performance on each of the PISA exams. 
School expenditures thus appear to help disadvantaged students develop their human 
capital as measured by exam performance. However, the two middle-income countries in 
the dataset with a high EPI, Mexico and Brazil, are not getting desirable results on the 
PISA exams despite a strong investment in schools and teachers. The spending on 
schools is evidently not producing results; one contributing factor may be corruption 
with respect to expenditures on school infrastructures and teacher salaries.63 A more 
detailed investigation of where the money actually goes in these countries would help to 
reveal spending inefficiencies.  
The findings in this dissertation support the argument that formal schooling can 
help students across the SES spectrum gain useful skills and knowledge (Hedges, et al. 
1994; Nye, et al. 2004). If schools are important, then it is key that students actually go 
to school. In Chapter V, which provided case studies of three schools in a poor 
municipality, Calnali, in rural Mexico, many students benefit from a federal means-
tested conditional cash transfer (CCT) program called Oportunidades that benefits about 
a quarter of Mexico’s population. To receive benefits, families must meet a myriad of 
requirements that include getting their students to school 85% of the time. Students 
                                                 
63 Several measures of corruption confirm that within the dataset used throughout the dissertation, Brazil 
and Mexico have the highest levels of corruption. The measures are Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index and the Political Risk Services group’s International Country Risk Guide 
indicator of Quality of Government that combines corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy quality 
measures. In February 2013, Elba Esther Gordillo, the head of the Mexican teachers’ union, Sindicato 
Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación, or SNTE, was arrested on embezzlement charges adding to 
concerns that the teachers union in particular is misusing funds.  
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receiving Oportunidades in Calnali overwhelmingly indicated that they would not be 
able to attend middle or high school were it not for fiscal assistance. Indeed, across 
countries, demand-side spending is positively correlated with enrollment rates (Chapter 
IV).  
Further, in the case studies presented in Chapter V, the student beneficiaries of 
the means-tested cash benefits indicate on surveys that their academic and professional 
goals are comparable to those of their more advantaged classmates; in some cases their 
plans even exceed those of their classmates. Girls, even more than boys, are positively 
impacted by such expenditures and have greater academic expectations. With the known 
influence of mothers’ level of education on their children’s futures, this has the potential 
to increase levels of human capital development in Mexico (Magnuson 2007).  
 
Section 6.1. Suggestions for Future Research 
This dissertation shows the utility of measuring education expenditures in a way 
that includes both supply- and demand-side spending, which is a novel contribution to a 
literature that has long measured education spending as only supply-side spending. 
However, this project also leaves many questions unanswered and points to many 
fruitful directions for further research.  
If more nuanced spending measures were available at the national level so that 
the supply-side and demand-side expenditures could be unpacked even further, we could 
better understand how these spending initiatives matter. For example, gross teacher 
compensation levels could reflect that either fewer teachers are paid more, or that there 
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are more teachers being paid less. These distinctions are not possible with the data used 
throughout this dissertation. Further, due to the nature of the data available (i.e., the 
countries that participate in the PISA exams and that make government expenditures 
data available), I sampled only wealthy and high-middle income countries. Studying the 
full spectrum of global economic development would allow greater exploration of how 
both demand- and supply-side spending interact and impact student performance in cases 
where a large percentage of students would not be likely to enroll in, or stay in school if 
the government did not aggressively make policy to include them. In less developed 
countries especially such policies are often influenced by investments from international 
sources such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund.  
Most of the countries in this dataset are wealthy and only four (Turkey, Mexico, 
Chile, and Brazil) have major loans from the World Bank, other countries, or other 
international monetary funding sources. These loans are important for funding the 
means-tested demand-side programs, such as conditional cash transfers, that are part of 
the EPI.  Many other countries have adopted similar cash transfer programs that target 
getting children to enroll in, and stay in school, so there are additional countries that 
could be included in future analyses, though most of those countries are not participants 
in the PISA testing program and data from these countries are not always available due 
to a lack of fiscal transparency. 
A longitudinal study that would follow students from middle through high 
school, and on to either vocational school or university, and finally into the workplace, 
would provide a great deal more insight into how much human capital is being 
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developed within these institutions. Vocational schools are especially germane to this 
research topic given their intent to train students for specific careers. A possible model is 
the National Child Development Study in Great Britain that follows a cohort of children 
who were born in one week in 1958. By the age of 16, students from this cohort were 
able to fairly accurately predict their first job after graduating from school (Brown, et al. 
2011). Such a dataset in a country with available government expenditures data would 
make it possible to assess the effectiveness of different spending categories on human 
capital development.  
In Chapter IV I extended the research on human capital development from strict 
measures of spending to the level of government that actually makes education policy 
decisions. Concentration of decision making at the national level clearly showed a 
negative impact on PISA exam results, while decision-making at the local was the most 
promising for student outcomes. It would be interesting to delve further into this finding 
and to interview local-level decision makers in countries that are having the best success.  
Finally, there are two things that were not incorporated into the EPI: taxation 
policy and private expenditures on public institutions. The EPI did not, for example, 
account for tax credits as part of a voucher system that helps fund families sending their 
children to government-dependent private schools (as in Germany and Portugal). Future 
constructions of the EPI should find ways to account for these variations between 
countries since these differences may impact the balance of spending.  
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon wrote “The power of education 
to transform lives is universal. When you ask parents what they want for their children—
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even in war zones and disaster areas—they seek the same thing first: education. Parents 
want their children in school” (Ki-moon September 2012). To meet this demand, 
governments can allocate funds to families in their society that most need support, and 
simultaneously make sure that the schools students experience are worth the effort to get 
there. Both investments are necessary for a thriving economy and a self-sustaining 
population. This dissertation contributes to our understanding of how the “package” of 
education spending, broadly defined, impacts students and by extension human capital 
development. 
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Appendix A. Family Benefits and Financial Aid by Country, 2006 
AUSTRALIA 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-
Tested  
Demand-
side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  
Cash benefits 
  
Family allowances     
  
Family tax benefit (Part A and B) X   
Parenting payment (Single and Partnered) X   
Maternity and parental leave     
  
Maternity immunization allowance X   
Baby Bonus (previously Maternity payment) X   
Other cash benefits     
  Partner allowance X   
Benefits in kind 
  
Day care / Home-help services 
  
Child care for eligible parents undergoing training via the 
Jobs, Education and Training Program, or JET X X 
Support for child care X X 
Support for child care: specific purpose payment X X 
Child care benefit X X 
Child care (pre-primary education) X   
Child care (pre-primary education - 4-5yo) X   
Other benefits in kind 
  
Child abuse prevention X   
Grants to family relationship support organizations X X 
National illicit drug strategy X   
Services for families with children X X 
Stronger families and communities strategy: families 
initiative X X 
Services for families with children: specific purpose 
payment X X 
Family and child welfare - State and Territory  X X 
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary school students X X 
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to 
students in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are 
other HOUSING and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may assist families but it is not 
clear how much of an impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Some 
programs that may be worth investigating in future research are the Household organizational 
management expenses (HOME) program, social housing subsidy program, rent assistance, other 
welfare services, unaccompanied humanitarian minors, family and community network initiative, 
and the stronger families and communities strategy - local answers.  
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Appendix A, continued
AUSTRIA 
Total 
Demand-
side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  
Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Child benefit (tax system) X   
Child benefit (Öffenliche Hand)  X   
Child benefit (Sozialleistungen der Länder) X   
Alimony supplements (Familienlastenausgleichsfonds) X   
Family support (egalitarian benefits) X   
Family allowance (Länder) (non means-tested) X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Maternity/parental leave benefit X   
Maternity/parental leave benefit (means-tested) X X 
Aid at child birth X   
Parental leave (Familien-lastenaus-gleichsfonds) X   
Other cash benefits 
  Other benefits in cash (Familienlastenausgleichsfonds)  X   
Other benefits in cash (Länder) X   
Other cash lump sum benefits  X   
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services X   
  Child day care (Kindergarten) X   
Child day care (Kindergarten) (Sozialleis-tungen der Länder) X   
Child day care (pre-primary - adjustment for 6yo) X   
Family accommodation benefits (Sozialleistungen der Länder) X   
Accommodation benefits (means-tested) X X 
Home help X   
Home help (means-tested) X X 
Other benefits in kind 
  Other benefits in kind (Sozialleistungen der Länder)  X   
Family support (Familienlastenausgleichsfonds) X   
Other benefits in kind (non means-tested) X   
Other benefits in kind (means-tested) X X 
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING 
and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may assist families but it is not clear how much of an 
impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Some programs that may be worth 
investigating in future research are the rent subsidy (Wohnbeihilfen)s, other cash lump sum benefits 
(Länder means-tested), accommodation (Länder means-tested and non means-tested), and other benefits in 
kind (Sozialleis-tungen der Gemeinden means-tested).  
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Appendix A, continued 
BELGIUM Total Demand-side Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  National office for employees' family allowances X   
Self-employed persons (INASTI) X   
Employees of public enterprises X   
National social security office for provincial and local government X   
Employees of local government enterprises X   
Employees of hospital welfare centres (CPAS) X   
Employees of Belgocontrol X   
 Postal services employees (PTT-La Poste)  X   
Civil servants and comparable categories, military and police members X   
Overseas social security office X   
Family allowances (means-tested) X X 
Maternity and parental leave 
  Parental leave: employees of local government enterprises X   
Other parental leave X   
Maintenance income: employed persons (INAMI & INASTI) X   
Income maintenance: civil servants and comparable categories, military and police members X   
Birth grant: National office for employees' family allowances X   
Birth grant: self-employed persons (INASTI) X   
Birth grant: employees of public enterprises X   
Birth grant: National social security office for provincial and local government X   
Birth grant: Postal services employees (PTT-La Poste)  X   
Birth grant: assistance to welfare centres (CPAS) X X 
Birth grant: civil servants and comparable categories, military and police members X   
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Appendix A, continued 
 
BELGIUM, continued Total Demand-side Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
  
 
Birth grant (not means-tested) X   
Birth grant (means-tested) X X 
Other cash benefits 
  Other cash periodic benefits X   
 
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Home-help services X   
Child day care: all residents X   
Child care (pre-primary education) X   
Accommodation: all residents X   
Home-help: private-sector employees  X   
  
Other benefits in kind 
  Other benefits in kind: assistance to welfare centres (CPAS) and others X X 
  Other benefits in kind (not means-tested) X   
  Other benefits in kind: Belgian Railways employees (SNCB) X   
  Other benefits in kind: private-sector employees (pension provision) X   
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
 
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students in primary and secondary schools) are 
considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may assist families but it is not clear 
how much of an impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Some programs that may be worth investigating in future 
research are: Social housing and Other cash benefits: Income Maintenance, assistance to welfare centres (CPAS). 
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Appendix A, continued 
 
BRAZIL Total Demand-side Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash Benefits 
  Bolsa Familia X X 
Benefits in Kind 
  Social Assistance X X 
FINANCIAL AID to students in primary and secondary school X X 
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students in primary and secondary schools) are 
considered for demand-side spending. The OECD's SOCX database did not contain data for family benefits in Brazil because data are not centralized 
(municipalities bear most of the fiscal responsibility for social programs). Data for the Conditional Cash Transfer program, Bolsa Familia, as well as 
social assistance spending (the Social Assistance Reference Centres or CRAS and the Comprehensive Family Care Programme or PAIF) were available 
from Soares 2012, Soares et al. 2010, and Lindert et al. 2007. Other major social assistance programs available in Brazil that are not family-focused 
include the Continuous Cash Benefit (BPC) which targets the disabled and the elderly (anyone 65 or older) and the General Social Security Regime 
(RGPS) that employers and employees pay into. 
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Appendix A, continued 
CANADA Total Demand-side Spending 
Means-Tested  
Demand-side Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Canada Child Tax Benefit  X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Related family benefits (Parental) (EI)  X   
Related family benefits (Compassionate Care) (EI) X   
Québec maternity and parental leave program X   
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Provincial/territorial regulated childcare allocation  X X 
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students N/A N/A 
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students in primary and secondary schools) are 
considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may assist families but it is not clear 
how much of an impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Some programs that may be worth investigating in future 
research are housing programs, provincial welfare programs, and net municipal welfare. Canada also does not offer financial aid for primary and 
secondary students.  
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Appendix A, continued 
CHILE Total Demand-side Spending 
Means-Tested  
Demand-side Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Family allocations (tax benefits) X   
Extraordinary Bonds X   
Life Insurance X   
Family subsidies X X 
Chile Solidario (CCT Program) X X 
Maternity and parental leave 
  Maternal Subsidies X   
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services  
  Child day-care: Pre-school education X   
FINANCIAL AID to students in primary and secondary school X X 
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students in primary and secondary schools) are 
considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may assist families but it is not clear 
how much of an impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Chile has seen a marked decrease in poverty and has increased 
social spending on housing and other social welfare initiatives but these data were not available for 2006. The data for Chile Solidario comes from three 
sources: Guardia et al. 2011, Fiszbein and Schady 2009, and the OECD publication “Maintaining Momentum: OECD Perspectives on Policy Challenges 
in Chile” (OECD 2011d).   
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Appendix A, continued 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  All residents: children's allowance (income based) X X 
Maternity and parental leave 
  Child-birth grant X   
Parental allowance X   
Income maintenance in the event of childbirth: employed X   
Income maintenance in the event of childbirth: self employed X   
Income maintenance in the event of childbirth X   
Other cash benefits 
  Social allowance X X 
State social benefits     
Other cash benefits (Employer’s contributions)     
Other cash benefits (non means-tested)     
Other cash benefits (means-tested) X X 
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Child day care (regions/municipalities)  X   
Child care (pre-primary education) X   
Child day care (pre-primary - adjustment for 6yo) X   
Accommodation X   
FINANCIAL AID to students in primary and secondary school X X 
 
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING 
and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may assist families but it is not clear how much of an 
impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Some programs that may be worth 
investigating in future research are the housing allowance and income maintenance social assistance. 
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Appendix A, continued 
DENMARK 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Child family benefit X   
Child maintenance benefit paid in advance X X 
Maternity and parental leave 
  Income maintenance benefit in the event of childbirth X   
Parental leave benefits X   
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Institutions and family care X   
Child day care X   
Child day care (adjustment for 6yo) X   
Home help for families X   
Other benefits in kind 
  Other benefits in kind X   
FINANCIAL AID to students in primary and secondary school X X 
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING 
and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may assist families but it is not clear how much of an 
impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Some programs that may be worth 
investigating in future research include: Social housing benefits and benefits in kind - social assistance 
family allowances accommodation. 
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Appendix A, continued 
 
ESTONIA 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS  
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Family allowance (non means tested) (Social Insurance 
Board) X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Income maintenance  (Social Insurance Board) X X 
Parental leave (Social Insurance Board) - income based but 
has a base amount for parents who were unemployed the 
year preceding the child's birth 
X   
Birth grant (Social Insurance Board) X   
Other cash benefits 
  Other cash periodic benefits (non means tested) (State) X   
Other cash lump sum benefits (Social Insurance Board) X X 
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Accommodation  (non means tested) (Ministry of Social 
Affairs) X   
Child day care (adjustment for 6yo) X   
Child care (pre-primary education) X   
Other benefits in kind 
  Other benefits in kind (non means-tested) - in 2007 this is 
split between the Social Insurance Board and the Ministry 
of Social Affairs. In 2006 these are combined. 
X   
FINANCIAL AID to students in primary and secondary school X X 
 
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING 
and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that are means-tested and may assist families but it is not clear 
how much of an impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. The means-tested 
benefits that may be worth investigating in future research include social housing and rent benefits, and 
income support cash benefits from the Ministry of Social Affairs.  
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Appendix A, continued 
 
FINLAND 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Child allowance X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Maternity grant (maternity benefit) X   
Parental leave benefit non means-tested (Child home care 
allowance) X   
Parental leave benefit (Municipal supplements to child day 
care subsidies) X X 
Other cash benefits 
  Maintenance support (health care and social services) X   
Other cash benefits (Sickness insurance) X   
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Child day care (Services provided by municipalities) (non 
means-tested) X   
Child day care (Services provided by municipalities) 
(means-tested) X X 
Child day care (Municipal supplements to child day care 
subsidies) X X 
Help at home X   
Other benefits in kind 
  Institutional care of children and youth X   
Other benefits in kind (health care and social services) X   
Other benefits in kind (The Slot Machine Association) X   
Parental leave benefit means-tested (Child home care 
allowance) X X 
Income maintenance (Sickness insurance) X   
FINANCIAL AID to primary and secondary students X X 
 
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING 
and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that are means-tested and may assist families but it is not clear 
how much of an impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. The benefits that 
may be worth investigating in future research include housing allowances, income support, and special 
support provided by the state in the form of benefits in kind or cash benefits. 
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Appendix A, continued 
FRANCE 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Child allowances: CNAF (not means tested) X   
Child allowances: State  X   
Child allowances: Civil servants X   
Child allowances: Miscellaneous central government agencies 
employees (ODAC) X  
Child allowances: Local governments employees X   
Child allowances: Social security employees X   
Child allowances: Public hospital employees X   
Other cash lump sum benefits: agricultural employees X   
Other cash lump sum benefits: State  (means-tested) X X 
Other cash lump sum benefits: Local government (APUL) 
(means-tested) X X 
Institutions de prévoyance X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Employees and other insured persons: CNAMTS, general 
scheme (social security) X   
Income maintenance: other bodies X   
Income maintenance: Agricultural employees X   
Parental leave benefit (CNAF) X   
Income maintenance: Miners (CANSSM) X   
Income maintenance: Seamen (ENIM) X   
Income maintenance: Notaries' clerks (CRPCEN) X   
Income maintenance: Chambre of Commerce of Paris 
employees (CCIP) X   
Birth grant: CNAF (means-tested) X X 
Birth grant: Social regime for the self-employed (RSI) (Non 
means-tested)  X   
Other cash benefits  
  Other cash lump sum benefits: Social regime for the self-
employed (RSI) (non means-tested) X   
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Appendix A, continued 
FRANCE, continued 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
 
Benefits in kind  Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services     
 
Child care: CNAF (means tested) X X 
Child care: CRPEN (means tested) X X 
Child care: State  (means-tested) X X 
Child care: Local government (APUL) (means-tested) X X 
Pre-primary education X   
Child care: Civil servants (means tested) X X 
Child care: National Family Allowances Fund Caisse (Caisse 
Nationale des Allocations Familiales (CNAF)) X   
Home help: CNAF (means-tested) X X 
Home help: Caisse nationale militaire de sécurité sociale 
(CNMSS) X  
Home help: Local government (APUL) X   
Home help: Notaries' clerks (CRPCEN) X   
Other benefits in kind  
  Other benefits in kind: Caisse nationale militaire de sécurité 
sociale (CNMSS) (means-tested) X X 
Other benefits in kind: Local government employees 
(CNRACL) X   
Other benefits in kind: ARRCO X   
Other benefits in kind: State   (non means-tested) X   
Other benefits in kind: Local government (APUL) (non 
means-tested) X   
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending.  There may be other 
HOUSING and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may assist families but it is not clear if such 
initiatives impact helping students get to school.  
 
 
 
  
  223
Appendix A, continued 
GERMANY Total Demand-side Spending 
Means-
Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Family allowance (Statutory pension insurance) X   
Family allowance (Child benefit) X   
Public transfers to support families with children X   
Family allowance (Social compensation, assistance to war 
victims) (non means-tested) X   
Family allowance (Social compensation, assistance to war 
victims) (means-tested) X X 
Family allowance (Family supplements on wages for civil 
servants) X   
Family allowance (UV) X   
Family allowance (Social assistance) X X 
Family allowance for farmers X   
Family allowance (ALG II) X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Parental leave benefits (KV) X   
Parental leave benefits (ALG II) X   
Parental leave benefits (means-tested) Child-raising 
allowance  X X 
Other cash benefits 
  Other cash benefits (Pension insurance for independent 
professions) X   
Other cash benefits (Social compensation, assistance to war 
victims, unemployment assistance) X   
Other cash benefits (Social assistance) X X 
Other cash benefits (other compensations) X   
Other cash benefits (BAFöG) X   
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Appendix A, continued 
GERMANY, continued Total Demand-side Spending 
Means-
Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
 
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services  
  Child day care (Youth assistance) X   
Child  day care (pre-primary - adjustment for 6yo) X   
Other benefits in kind    
  Youth assistance X   
Social assistance X X 
FINANCIAL AID to students in primary and secondary school X X 
 
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING 
and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that are means-tested and may assist families but it is not clear 
if such initiatives impact helping students get to school. Benefits that may be worth investigating in future 
research include housing assistance cash benefits, income support social assistance, and other social 
assistance cash benefits and benefits in kind.  
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Appendix A, continued 
HUNGARY 
Total 
Demand-
side 
Spending 
Means-
Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Family or child allowance (non means-tested) X   
Family or child allowance (means-tested) X X 
Birth grant (non means-tested) X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Income maintenance in the event of childbirth (non means-tested) X   
Parental leave benefit (non means-tested) X   
Other cash benefits 
  Other cash periodic benefits (means-tested) X X 
Other cash lump sum benefits (means-tested) X X 
Other cash periodic benefits (GYV-GYJO) X   
Other cash lump sum benefits (non means-tested) X   
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Child day care (non means-tested) X   
  Child care (pre-primary education) X   
Other benefits in kind 
  Accommodation (non means-tested) X   
  Other benefits in kind (non means-tested) X   
  Other benefits in kind (means-tested) X X 
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING 
and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that are means-tested and may assist families but it is not clear 
how much of an impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Benefits that are 
means-tested and may be worth investigating in future research include housing assistance (rent benefits 
and benefits to owner-occupiers), income maintenance/income support, other cash periodic benefits, cash 
lump sum benefits, and other means-tested benefits in kind. 
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Appendix A, continued 
ICELAND 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Family allowances X X 
Maternity and parental leave 
  Maternity/Paternity Leave Fund X   
Other cash benefits 
  Other cash periodic benefits: Communal Alimony 
Collection Centre X   
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Municipal child day-care services X   
Municipal home-help services X   
Other benefits in kind 
  Social assistance, children welfare, institutions for 
addicts: accommodation X X 
Municipal youth services: other benefits in kind X   
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING 
and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may assist families but it is not clear how much of an 
impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Benefits that may be worth 
investigating in future research include social housing assistance (benefits in kind) and income 
maintenance/children welfare cash benefits. 
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Appendix A, continued 
IRELAND 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  All residents: standard child benefit X   
Children's allowance for civil servants: teachers, army X   
Family allowance (non-contributory) X   
Family allowance (social insurance fund) X   
All residents: family income supplement X X 
Maternity and parental leave 
  Employees: maternity benefits (social security) (3) X   
Income maintenance (Health benefits) X   
Other cash benefits 
  Deserted wives' allowance X   
All residents: lone parent's allowance X   
Cash benefits by Health services X   
Other cash benefits: employees X X 
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Child care (pre-primary education) X   
Accommodation X   
Home help X   
Other benefits in kind 
  Family allowances through national health services X   
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING 
and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may assist families but it is not clear how much of an 
impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Benefits that may be worth 
investigating in future research include social housing assistance (benefits in kind) and income 
maintenance/children welfare cash benefits. 
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Appendix A, continued 
ISRAEL 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Child allowance (NII) X   
Study grant (NII) - to help school-age children buy school 
equipment (means-tested) X X 
Alimony (NII) X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Maternity allowance and vacation pay (NII) X   
Other cash benefits 
  Cash benefits for needy families X X 
Birth grant (NII) X   
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Local authorities day care programs X   
Child care programs (NPIs) X   
Pre-primary educational institutions X   
Other benefits in kind 
  Child and family welfare services  X X 
Rehabilitation programs for youth X X 
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
        
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING 
and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may assist families but it is not clear how much of an 
impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Benefits that may be worth 
investigating in future research include housing assistance, cash benefits for the socially excluded and 
needy, the earned income tax credit, assistance to the socially excluded and new immigrants, food 
provisions to the needy, philanthropy funds, and subsidized public transportation. 
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Appendix A, continued 
ITALY Total Demand-side Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Family or child allowances (means-tested) X X 
Family or child allowances (means-tested): Employees' 
temporary benefits [managed by INPS] X X 
Family or child allowances (means-tested): Social 
Security Funds for professional categories X X 
Family or child allowances (means-tested): Occupational 
Injury Insurance [managed by INAIL] X X 
Maternity and parental leave 
  Income in the event of childbirth (non means-tested) X   
Income in the event of childbirth (means-tested) X X 
Other cash benefits  
  Other cash periodic benefits (means-tested) X X 
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Child care (pre-primary education) X   
Child day care X   
Other benefits in kind 
  Other benefits in kind for family (non means-tested) X   
Other benefits in kind for family (means-tested) X X 
Accommodation for family     
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING 
and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may assist families but it is not clear how much of an 
impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Benefits that may be worth 
investigating in future research include housing assistance and income maintenance, as well as mandatory 
private cash benefits such as the means-tested compulsory occupational social insurance that is managed 
by public sector employers. 
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Appendix A, continued 
JAPAN 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Children's allowances X   
Rearing allowances for handicapped children X   
Allowances for children in lone parents' family X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Maternity allowance: Japan Health Insurance Association X   
Maternity allowance: society managed health insurance X   
Maternity allowance: National health insurance X   
Maternity allowance: seamen's insurance X   
Maternity allowance: Promotion and Mutual Aid 
corporation for Private Schools of Japan (Former Mutual 
aid association of private school personnel) 
X   
Maternity allowance: National public service mutual aid 
association X   
Maternity allowance: local public employees' mutual aid 
association X   
Maternity allowance: unemployment insurance X   
Other cash benefits 
  Local public employees' mutual aid association X   
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Children's allowances X   
Social welfare (subsidies for children's protection) X X 
Child care (pre-primary education) X   
Other benefits in kind 
  Children's allowances (other) X   
Social welfare (subsidies for children's protection, other) X X 
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING 
and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may assist families but it is not clear how much of an 
impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Benefits that may be worth 
investigating in future research include income maintenance cash benefits for public assistance and social 
welfare.  
 
 
 
  
  231
Appendix A, continued 
KOREA Total Demand-side Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS  
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Lone parent families X   
Patriots and veteran pension, etc. X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Prenatal and postnatal leave allowances (Employment 
Insurance) X   
Maternity leave allowances (Employment Insurance) X   
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Day care for child & adolescent X   
Pre-school education only X   
Child care (pre-primary education) X   
Support for day care for family X X 
Other benefits in kind 
  Welfare centers X X 
Children facilities X   
Family welfare X X 
Residential service for women & families X   
Sub-other X   
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
    
NOES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING 
and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may assist families but it is not clear how much of an 
impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Benefits that may be worth 
investigating in future research include food bank social assistance, price reductions for low-income 
families, and public housing costs for low-income families. Mandatory private benefits-in-kind that may 
have an impact on students in particular is the transportation and telecommunication fee reduction (for 
children). 
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Appendix A, continued 
MEXICO 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Other cash benefits 
  Education, health and feeding national program: 
PROGRESA/Oportunidades (SEDESOL, The Ministry of 
Social Development) 
X X 
Nutritional Support Program (SEDESOL)  X X 
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Child day care institutions (ISSSTE, Social and Security 
Services for State Workers) X X 
Child day care institutions (IMSS, Mexican Social 
Healthcare Institute) X X 
Child care (pre-primary education) X   
Home-help services to children (abandoned or abused 
children, DIF) X X 
Other benefits in kind 
  Food to families program (DIF) X X 
Food program school breakfast (DIF) X X 
Social milk program (SEDESOL) X X 
Sports promotion (ISSSTE) X X 
Rural Supply Program (SEDESOL-DICONSA) X X 
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
     
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. Nearly all of Mexico's 
programs target the poor given the rate of poverty in the country. The World Bank estimates that about 
43% of the Mexican population lived at or below the poverty line in 2006 (World Bank 2012a). The only 
benefit not considered means-tested is the pre-primary education child care since it is available to 
everyone. Yet, since most wealthy families opt to sent their children to private schools, even this benefit is 
really more of a help to poor families. There are other HOUSING and SOCIAL POLICY AREA 
expenditures that may also assist poor families but it is not clear how much of an impact these particular 
initiatives have helping students get to school. Benefits that may be worth investigating in future research 
include the rural housing program and worthy housing initiative sponsored by the Ministry of Social 
Development or SEDESOL, as well as the social housing credit provided by the National Trust fund for 
Popular Housing or FONHAPO. 
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Appendix A, continued 
NETHERLANDS 
Total 
Demand-
side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS  
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  All residents: child allowance X   
Maternity and parental leave X   
Other cash benefits 
  Other periodic cash benefits X   
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  All residents: family help and care, home help financed 
through AWBZ X   
Child care (pre-primary education) X   
Child day care (non means-tested) X   
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
        
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. Starting in 2008 a means-
tested child allowance cash benefit was introduced. Only 2006 benefits are listed here though the means-
tested benefit is included for the 2006-2009 EPI averages. There are other HOUSING and SOCIAL 
POLICY AREA expenditures that may also help families but it is not clear how much of an impact these 
particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Benefits that may be worth investigating in future 
research include social provisions to the poor.  
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Appendix A, continued 
NEW ZEALAND Total Demand-side Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Cash benefits 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Family allowances 
  
  
  
  
  
Family (Support) Tax Credit X X 
Child Tax Credit X X 
Parental Tax Credit X   
In Work Payment X  
Minimum Family Tax Credit X  
Maternity and parental leave 
  Maternity and parental leave X   
Other cash benefits 
  Domestic Purposes Benefit for sole parents X   
Benefits in kind 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Day care / Home-help services 
  
  
  
  
  
Childcare Assistance X X 
Out of school care and recreation (OSCAR) X   
Early Childhood Education Subsidies X X 
Early Childhood Education Grants X X 
Child care (pre-primary education: 5 years old) X   
Other benefits in kind 
  
  
  
  
  
Commissioner for children X   
Education and prevention services X X 
Family wellbeing services X X 
Counseling and rehabilitation services X   
Families Commission X   
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
      
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING 
and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may also assist families but it is not clear how much of an 
impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Benefits that may be worth 
investigating in future research include housing assistance, community housing rental subsidies, strong 
families benefits in kind, and the youth development partnership fund. 
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Appendix A, continued 
NORWAY 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Family allowances for children X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Maternity and parental leave benefits X   
Income maintenance in the event of childbirth X   
Birth grant X   
Other cash benefits 
  Lone parent cash benefit X   
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Child day care institutions X   
Other benefits in kind 
  Accommodation X X 
Other benefits in kind X X 
Home help X   
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
        
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING 
and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may also assist families but it is not clear how much of an 
impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Benefits that may be worth 
investigating in future research include means-tested income support cash benefits, as well as social 
assistance and means-tested accommodation benefits in kind.  
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Appendix A, continued 
POLAND Total Demand-side Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Family allowances for children X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Parental leave (non means-tested) X   
Parental leave (means-tested) X X 
Birth grant X   
Income maintenance in the event of childbirth X   
Other cash benefits 
  Other cash periodic benefits (social assistance) X X 
Other cash periodic benefits (means-tested) X X 
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services   
  Child care (pre-primary education) X   
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
        
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING 
and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may also assist families but it is not clear how much of an 
impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Benefits that may be worth 
investigating in future research include means-tested income maintenance cash benefits, social assistance 
for housing, and accommodation social assistance benefits in kind. 
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Appendix A, continued 
PORTUGAL 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-
Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Benefits managed by the central administration X   
Benefits managed by the local administration X   
Child allowance (CGA) X   
Social Security Subsystem for family protection  X X 
Social Security Subsystem for solidarity (means-tested) X X 
Social services (public sector) (means-tested) X X 
General retirement fund (civil servants, pensioners) X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Benefits managed by the central administration X   
Social Security Subsystem:  income maintenance X   
Social Security Subsystem for solidarity: income 
maintenance X X 
Central administration X   
Other cash benefits 
  Social Security Subsystem for family protection  X   
Social Security Subsystem for solidarity X   
Social Security Subsystem for solidarity (means-tested) X X 
Benefits managed by the central administration: other cash 
periodic benefits X   
Benefits managed by the local administration: other cash 
periodic benefits X   
CGA: other cash periodic benefits X   
Social services (public sector): other cash periodic benefits 
(non means-tested) X   
Social services (public sector): other cash periodic benefits 
(means-tested) X X 
General retirement fund (civil servants, pensioners): other 
cash periodic benefits X   
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Appendix A, continued 
PORTUGAL, continued 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-
Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
 
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Social services (public sector) (non means-tested) X   
Social services (public sector) (means-tested) X X 
Child care (pre-primary education) X   
Other benefits in kind  
  Social Security Subsystem for solidarity (means-tested) X X 
Social services (public sector) (non means-tested) X   
Benefits managed by the local administration X   
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
            
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. Some programs in this 
category transition so, for example, in 2008 the social security subsystem for solidarity (income 
maintenance) ends and the social security welfare and social protection program begins. The average EPI 
for 2006-2009 will capture these changes in the aggregate. Only the active programs in 2006 are listed 
here. There are other HOUSING and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may also assist families 
but it is not clear how much of an impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. 
Benefits that may be worth investigating in future research include means-tested income maintenance cash 
benefits and social services that are tied to housing assistance. 
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Appendix A, continued 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Birth grant (non means-tested) X   
  Family allowances (non means-tested) X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Financial assistance in maternity (non means-tested) X   
  Parental leave benefits (non means-tested) X   
Other cash benefits 
  Other cash periodic benefits X X 
  Other cash sickness lump sum benefits (non means-tested) X   
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Children's homes (non means-tested) X   
  Child care (pre-primary education) X   
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
        
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. Means-tested children 
allowances were introduced in 2009 along with child day care state social support and other state social 
support. These additions are accounted for in the average EPI scores but only the benefits paid out in 2006 
are listed here. There are other HOUSING and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may also assist 
families but it is not clear how much of an impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to 
school. Benefits that may be worth investigating in future research include means-tested social help cash 
benefits intended for income maintenance and accommodation benefits in kind, as well as mandatory 
private family benefits in kind. 
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Appendix A, continued 
SLOVENIA 
Total 
Demand-
side 
Spending 
Means-
Tested 
Demand-
side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Other rights from Family Income Act X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Maternity leave compensation X   
Parental leave: Maternity leave compensation X   
Parental leave: Other rights from Family Income Act X   
Other cash benefits 
  Other cash periodic benefits: Other rights from Family Income Act X   
Other cash lump sum benefits: Other rights from Family Income Act X   
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Accommodation: Social welfare X X 
Child day-care: Pre-school education X   
Other benefits in kind 
  Other rights from Family Income Act X   
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
            
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. In 2007 Slovenia adopted the 
EURO and in 2009 spending dropped significantly due to the global recession. The family allowance 
spending data were pulled for this research in April 2012 and confirmation review of the data in February 
2013 show changes in these expenditures. The SOCX support team responded to an inquiry and explained 
that tax credits had been incorporated in the total. The data were updated accordingly. There are other 
HOUSING and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may also assist families but it is not clear how 
much of an impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Benefits that may be 
worth investigating in future research include social welfare spending for income maintenance, social 
assistance, and other benefits in kind. 
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Appendix A, continued 
SPAIN 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Family allowance: employees and self-employed (social 
security) (non means-tested) X   
Family allowance: employees and self-employed (social 
security) (means-tested) X X 
Family allowance: civil servants, military personnel and 
local government employees X   
Family allowance: other social protection schemes (non 
means-tested) X   
Family allowance: companies (non means-tested) X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Income maintenance for employees and self-employed 
(social security) X   
Income maintenance for civil servants, military personnel 
and local government X   
Income maintenance (companies) X   
Birth grant: employees and self-employed (social security) X   
Birth grant: employees and self-employed (social security) 
(non means-tested) X   
Birth grant: employees and self-employed (social security) 
(means tested) X X 
Other cash benefits 
  Other cash lump-sum benefits (non means-tested) X   
Other  periodic benefits for other social protection schemes 
(means-tested) X X 
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Appendix A, continued 
SPAIN, continued 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
 
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Day care: other social protection schemes X   
Day care: companies X   
Accommodation: other social protection schemes (means-
tested) X X 
Accommodation: companies (means-tested) X X 
Home-help: other social protection schemes (means-tested) X X 
Other benefits in kind 
  Other benefits in kind: other social protection schemes (non 
means-tested) X   
Other benefits in kind: other social protection schemes 
(means-tested) X X 
Other benefits in kind: other social protection schemes 
(means-tested) X X 
Other benefits in kind: companies (non means-tested) X   
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
            
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING 
and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may also assist families but it is not clear how much of an 
impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Benefits that may be worth 
investigating in future research include housing benefits in kind and cash benefits for income maintenance 
and support for other social protection schemes, and accommodation for social assistance benefits in kind. 
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Appendix A, continued 
SWEDEN 
Total 
Demand-
side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Family or child allowance X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Income support during parental leave (operated through 
"parental insurance" since 1999) X   
Income maintenance (parental insurance) X   
Adoption allowance X   
Other cash benefits 
  Other cash benefits X   
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Child care X   
Child day care (adjustment for 6yo) X   
Child care (pre-primary education) X   
Accommodation X   
Child day care (social services bought by local government) X X 
Accommodation (social services bought by local government) X X 
Home help X   
Home help (Privately produced social-services provision) (non 
means-tested) X   
Other benefits in kind 
  Other benefits in kind X   
  Other benefits in kind (social services bought by local 
government) X X 
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
            
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY BENEFITS and FINANCIAL AID (to students 
in primary and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending.  There are other HOUSING 
and SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may also assist families but it is not clear how much of an 
impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Benefits that may be worth 
investigating in future research include social assistance spending in the areas of income maintenance, 
accommodation, and other social services. 
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Appendix A, continued 
SWITZERLAND 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Family allowances in agricultural sector (not means tested) X   
Family allowances in agricultural sector (means tested) X X 
Family allowances (AF)  (cantonal level) X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Maintenance income: salary paid during maternity leave X   
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Child care: youth protection X X 
Accommodation:  youth protection X X 
Child care (pre-primary education) X   
FINANCIAL AID to students in primary and secondary school X X 
            
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY and FINANCIAL AID (to students in primary 
and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING and 
SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may assist families but it is not clear how much of an impact 
these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Some programs that may be worth 
investigating in future research includes: Social housing benefits, social assistance rent benefits, 
maintenance income - scholarships and social assistance, other benefits in kind: social assistance. 
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Appendix A, continued 
TURKEY 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Maternity and parental leave 
  Maternity benefits X   
Social Solidarity Fund - SSF - Conditional Cash Transfer X X 
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Household services X   
FINANCIAL AID to students in primary and secondary school X   
            
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY and FINANCIAL AID (to students in primary 
and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. Turkey does not provide much social 
policy expenditure data to the OECD/SOCX database and had included their Conditional Cash Transfer 
spending (the Social Solidarity Fund or SSF) in FINANCIAL AID. For comparability purposes, this 
spending was moved to the cash benefits category. There are other  POLICY SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 
(Public cash benefits and public benefits in kind) listed as broad categories and this spending may assist 
families but it is not clear how much of an impact these initiatives have helping students get to school.  
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Appendix A, continued 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Total 
Demand-
side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  All residents: child benefit X   
Maternity and parental leave 
  Employees: statutory maternity pay (SMP) (social security) X   
Income maintenance  X   
Other cash benefits 
  Working Tax Credit (cash part, less child care component) X   
Child Tax credit (cash part) X   
Lump sum: income support, family credit and social funds 
(means-tested) X X 
Periodic: income support, family credit and social funds 
(means-tested) X X 
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Child care pre primary (3 and 4 years old) X   
Child care component of FC/WFTC/WTC X X 
Child care pre primary (adjustment for pre-primary education: 
5 years old) X   
Family support: local authority personal social services X X 
Home help: local authority personal social services X X 
Other benefits in kind 
  All residents: free school milk and/or meals (non means-tested) X   
All residents: free school milk and/or meals (means-tested) X X 
All residents: Central Government personal social services X X 
All residents: welfare foods provision X X 
Accommodation: Local Authority personal social services X X 
FINANCIAL AID for primary and secondary students X X 
            
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY and FINANCIAL AID (to students in primary 
and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING and 
PUBLIC SOCIAL EXPENDITURES that may also assist families but it is not clear how much of an 
impact these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Benefits that may be worth 
investigating in future research include social housing, benefits in kind, public cash benefits, and public 
benefits in kind. 
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Appendix A, continued 
THE UNITED STATES 
Total 
Demand-side 
Spending 
Means-Tested 
Demand-side 
Spending 
FAMILY BENEFITS  
  Cash benefits 
  Family allowances 
  Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) X X 
Benefits in kind 
  Day care / Home-help services 
  Child care (pre-primary education) X X 
Other benefits in kind 
  Child welfare: IV-B programs X X 
Child welfare: IV-E (Foster care programs) (Federal) X X 
Social Service Block Grant (SSBG) X X 
Child Care Development Block grant (CCDBG) X X 
Child Support Enforcement (CSE) X   
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, 
Infants and Children (WIC) X X 
Child nutrition and special milk programs X X 
Commodity donations (CSFP and others) X X 
FINANCIAL AID to students in primary and secondary school N/A N/A 
            
NOTES: Only social spending categorized under FAMILY and FINANCIAL AID (to students in primary 
and secondary schools) are considered for demand-side spending. There are other HOUSING and 
SOCIAL POLICY AREA expenditures that may help families but it is not clear how much of an impact 
these particular initiatives have helping students get to school. Some programs that may be worth 
investigating further include: Food stamps, earned income tax credit (refundable part), and the low-income 
housing energy assistance program.  
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Appendix B. Chapter III Hypotheses and Independent Variables Unpacked 
Hypotheses Operationalization 
Expected 
Sign Relative 
to the EPI  
(Dependent 
Variable)* 
Data Source 
Hypothesis 3.1: Countries that are 
considered liberal welfare regimes will 
allocate more resources to schools (supply-
side policies) than to family or student 
benefits (demand-side policies); 
conservative regimes will allocate funds a 
bit more evenly whereas univeralist 
regimes will devote more resources to 
demand-side policies. 
 
See Table III-1 for country scores. Each score in the 
capital welfare typology is between 0 and 12 and is 
based on a variety of stratification indices. 
Depending on how the country handles pensions, 
unemployment, etc., it is given a score that indicates 
to what degree it falls into each category: liberal, 
conservative, or social democratic 
Liberal (+) 
 
Conservative (+)
 
Social (-) 
The Three Worlds 
of Welfare 
Capitalism, Gøsta 
Esping-Andersen 
(1990) - Table 3.1, 
70-1  
Hypothesis 3.2: Proportionally 
Representative (PR) Systems will spend 
relatively more than majoritarian systems 
on demand-side policies that are student 
and family-oriented than on supply-side 
policies that target schools and teacher 
wages. 
Classification of the electoral system. 
(1) Majoritarian 
(2) Combined (mixed) 
(3) Proportional (PR) _ 
Quality of 
Government 
database 
(University of 
Gothenberg) 
Hypothesis 3.3: More democratic countries 
will invest more in education (supply-side 
policies) than in family and student 
benefits (demand-side policies) to assure 
that citizens are able to participate in the 
economy as well as the running and 
monitoring of government.  
 
Each country is scored on its level of political rights 
and civil liberties. A rating of 1 indicates the highest 
degree of freedom and 7 the lowest level of 
freedom. All countries in this dataset are between 1 
and 3.  + 
Freedom House - 
Freedom in the 
World Survey 
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Appendix B, continued 
Hypotheses Operationalization 
Expected 
Sign Relative 
to the EPI  
(Dependent 
Variable)* 
Data Source 
Hypothesis 3.4: Left-learning governments 
will spend more on demand-side policies 
that are student and family-oriented than 
on supply-side policies that target schools 
and teacher wages. 
 
Ideology of the largest party in government OR 
ideology of the executive's party: 
(1) Right    
(2) Center  
(3) Left 
_ 
The World Bank's 
Database of 
Political 
Institutions 
Hypothesis 3.5: When a country has strong 
unions and a PR (proportionally 
representative) electoral system, spending 
on supply-side expenses (schools and 
wages) would be expected to be higher 
relative to demand-side spending 
(expenditures that go directly to students 
and families). 
This is tested with an interaction between the PR 
measure and the Labor Union Power Index (UP).  
 
The UP measures the protection and power of 
unions on a weighted scale of seven factors that 
together equal one: 
(1) Do employees have the right to unionize? 
(2) Do employees have the right to bargain 
collectively?   
(3) Do employees have the legal duty to bargain 
with unions? 
(4) Are collective contracts extended to third parties 
by law? 
(5) Does the law allow closed shops? 
(6) Do workers, or unions, or both have a right to 
appoint members to the Boards of Directors? 
(7) Are workers’ councils mandated by law? 
+** 
Quality of 
Government 
database 
(University of 
Gothenberg) 
 
* More demand spending means the EPI will be lower (closer to 0) while more supply spending means that the EPI will be higher (closer to 1) 
**The interaction multiplies two negative numbers together so the coefficient will be positive even though the effect is expected to be negative. This is 
why the interaction coefficient cannot be directly interpreted and a marginal effect figure is necessary (See Figure 3.5). 
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Appendix C. Elections in 2005 and 2006 
Country 
Legislative Elections Executive Elections 
2005 2006 2005 2006 
Australia 0 0 0 0 
Austria 0 1 0 0 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 
Brazil 0 1 0 1 
Canada 0 1 0 0 
Chile 1 0 1 0 
Czech Republic 0 1 0 0 
Denmark 1 0 0 0 
Estonia 0 0 0 1 
Finland 0 0 0 1 
France 0 0 0 0 
Germany 1 0 0 0 
Hungary 0 1 1 0 
Iceland 0 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 
Israel 0 1 0 0 
Italy 0 1 0 0 
Japan 1 0 0 0 
S. Korea 0 0 0 0 
Mexico 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0 1 0 1 
New Zealand 1 1 0 0 
Norway 1 0 0 0 
Poland 1 0 1 0 
Portugal 1 0 0 0 
Slovak Republic 0 1 0 0 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 
Spain 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 0 1 0 0 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 
UK 1 0 0 0 
United States 0 1 0 0 
Total 9 12 3 4 
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Appendix D. What’s the difference? Legislative Ideology Versus Executive Ideology 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 
EPI-A  EPI-M EPI-A  EPI-M 
Executive Ideology -.05 (.03)* -.03 (.03) - - 
Legislative Ideology - - -.05 (.03)* -.03 (.03) 
Electoral System 
-.24 
(.07)** -.04 (.08) -.24 (.07)** -.04 (.08) 
Union Power 
-.94 
(.29)** -.04 (.35) -.94 (.29)** -.04 (.35) 
Electoral System*Union Power .42 (.13)** .06 (.15) .42 (.13)** .06 (.15) 
Freedom Index .12 (.07) -.07 (.09) .12 (.07) -.07 (.09) 
Political Constraint .01 (.27) .06 (.32) .01 (.27) .06 (.32) 
GDPpc -.00 (.00)* .00 (.00) -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
Model p-value .03 .71 .03 .71 
 
N=26, Standard errors are in parentheses 
*p<.10, ** p<.01 
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APPENDIX E. PISA Scores Unpacked 
Country School Type 
Percent 
School Type 
Percent 
School Type 
(SE) 
Reading 
Mean 
Score 
Reading 
Mean Score 
(SE) 
Math 
Mean 
Score 
Math 
Mean 
Score (SE) 
Science 
Mean 
Score 
Science 
Mean 
Score (SE) 
Australia Public 59.72 0.75 497 3.89 499 4.04 511 4.31 
Australia Private 40.28 0.75 542 3.01 537 3.05 552 2.67 
Australia Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Australia All     515 2.30 514 3 527 3 
Austria Public 86.76 2.51 465 3.54 493 3.36 491 3.95 
Austria Private 12.52 2.4 497 13.68 505 13.11 509 11.9 
Austria Other 0.72 0.71 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Austria All     470 2.90 496 3 494 3 
Belgium Public 30.51 0.65 475 4.08 483 4.22 475 4.44 
Belgium Private 69.49 0.65 520 2.93 529 2.71 520 3.18 
Belgium Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Belgium All     506 2.30 515 2 507 3 
Brazil Public 84.91 1.09 398 3.16 373 2.65 393 2.81 
Brazil Private 11.86 0.61 516 6.68 485 6.59 505 5.9 
Brazil Other 3.23 0.89 381 12.58 355 13.51 379 10.32 
Brazil All     412 2.70 386 2 405 2 
Canada Public 92.52 0.67 521 1.51 522 1.68 526 1.67 
Canada Private 7.48 0.67 566 7.15 582 7.24 567 6.97 
Canada Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Canada All     524 1.50 527 2 529 2 
Chile All     449 3.10 421 3 447 3 
Chile         Public 40.61 1.61 423 5.17 398 4.66 425 4.45 
Chile         Private 56.09 2.06 469 3.9 438 4.36 464 3.95 
Chile         Other 3.3 1.72 452 17.94 417 20.51 439 17.57 
Czech Republic Public 95.56 1.2 477 2.99 492 2.95 499 3.21 
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Appendix E, continued 
Country School Type 
Percent 
School Type 
Percent 
School Type 
(SE) 
Reading 
Mean 
Score 
Reading 
Mean Score 
(SE) 
Math 
Mean 
Score 
Math 
Mean 
Score (SE) 
Science 
Mean 
Score 
Science 
Mean 
Score (SE) 
Czech Republic Private 3.52 1.03 509 19.77 513 16.42 536 15.22 
Czech Republic Other 0.92 0.65 436 13.77 454 43.7 457 21.6 
Czech Republic All     478 2.90 493 3 500 3 
Denmark Public 77.2 2.77 491 2.23 500 2.74 495 2.52 
Denmark Private 22.8 2.77 508 5.67 514 6.42 515 6.84 
Denmark Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Denmark All     495 2.10 503 3 499 3 
Estonia Public 96.74 1.18 501 2.68 512 2.6 528 2.69 
Estonia Private 3.26 1.18 510 18.87 502 26.1 529 23.23 
Estonia Other a  a  a  a  a  a  a  a  
Estonia All     501 2.60 512 3 528 3 
Finland Public 96.07 1.16 536 2.2 541 2.15 554 2.31 
Finland Private 3.93 1.16 542 18.68 535 14.11 564 17.22 
Finland Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Finland All     536 2.30 541 2 554 2 
France Public a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
France Private a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
France Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
France All     496 3.40 497 3 498 4 
Germany Public 94.93 1.54 497 3.24 512 3.54 520 3.6 
Germany Private 5.07 1.54 513 19.64 533 24.55 537 20.08 
Germany Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Germany All     497 2.70 513 3 520 3 
Hungary Public 87.04 2.53 492 3.73 488 3.93 501 3.73 
Hungary Private 12.96 2.53 507 12.4 507 14.77 515 11.14 
Hungary Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
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Appendix E, continued 
Country School Type 
Percent 
School Type 
Percent 
School Type 
(SE) 
Reading 
Mean 
Score 
Reading 
Mean Score 
(SE) 
Math 
Mean 
Score 
Math 
Mean 
Score (SE) 
Science 
Mean 
Score 
Science 
Mean 
Score (SE) 
Hungary All     494 3.20 490 4 503 3 
Iceland Public 99.13 0.09 498 1.47 504 1.47 493 1.42 
Iceland Private 0.87 0.09 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iceland Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Iceland All     500 1.40 507 1 496 1 
Ireland Public 38.5 0.39 474 4.93 472 4.34 489 5.65 
Ireland Private 61.5 0.39 509 3.69 497 3.07 520 3.89 
Ireland Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Ireland All     496 3.00 487 3 508 3 
Israel All     474 3.60 447 3 455 3 
Israel        Public 81.61 2.62 470 4.47 443 3.94 451 4.14 
Israel        Private 17.78 2.56 498 12.97 471 13 478 11.84 
Israel        Other 0.61 0.56 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy Public 93.55 0.58 489 1.65 486 2 492 1.9 
Italy Private 5.81 0.63 448 8.96 446 7.25 455 8.13 
Italy Other 0.64 0.29 385 19.24 406 26.32 401 26.01 
Italy All     486 1.60 483 2 489 2 
Japan Public 70.7 1.26 522 4 531 3.8 542 3.8 
Japan Private 29.3 1.26 514 8.13 525 7.68 533 7.74 
Japan Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Japan All     520 3.50 529 3 539 3 
Korea Public 62.62 4.33 533 5.23 542 6.47 535 5.51 
Korea Private 37.38 4.33 549 5.38 554 6.71 544 5.74 
Korea Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Korea All     539 3.50 546 4 538 3 
Mexico Public 88.48 1.14 420 2.09 414 1.86 411 1.82 
  255
Appendix E, continued 
Country School Type 
Percent 
School Type 
Percent 
School Type 
(SE) 
Reading 
Mean 
Score 
Reading 
Mean Score 
(SE) 
Math 
Mean 
Score 
Math 
Mean 
Score (SE) 
Science 
Mean 
Score 
Science 
Mean 
Score (SE) 
Mexico Private 11.52 1.14 468 4.37 457 5.24 456 4.3 
Mexico Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Mexico All     425 2.00 419 2 416 2 
Netherlands Public 33.96 3.89 515 9.59 531 9.8 526 11.73 
Netherlands Private 66.04 3.89 504 8.12 523 7.29 520 7.94 
Netherlands Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Netherlands All     508 5.10 526 5 522 5 
New Zealand Public 94.34 0.43 517 2.31 516 2.36 529 2.57 
New Zealand Private 5.66 0.43 586 10.64 580 8.66 588 11.11 
New Zealand Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
New Zealand All     521 2.40 519 2 532 3 
Norway Public 98.63 0.43 503 2.57 498 2.42 500 2.61 
Norway Private 1.37 0.43 465 26.77 454 23.53 456 20.76 
Norway Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Norway All     503 2.60 498 2 500 3 
Poland Public 97.87 0.1 499 2.66 493 2.86 507 2.46 
Poland Private 2.13 0.1 554 11.74 557 11.86 563 10.76 
Poland Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Poland All     500 2.60 495 3 508 2 
Portugal Public 85.53 2.7 485 3.31 482 3.12 489 3.13 
Portugal Private 14.47 2.7 516 9.21 514 10.39 516 9.27 
Portugal Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Portugal All     489 3.10 487 3 493 3 
Slovak Republic Public 91.01 2.38 475 3.03 495 3.47 489 3.29 
Slovak Republic Private 8.99 2.38 499 14.34 512 15.53 505 12.74 
Slovak Republic Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
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Appendix E, continued 
Country School Type 
Percent 
School Type 
Percent 
School Type 
(SE) 
Reading 
Mean 
Score 
Reading 
Mean Score 
(SE) 
Math 
Mean 
Score 
Math 
Mean 
Score (SE) 
Science 
Mean 
Score 
Science 
Mean 
Score (SE) 
Slovak Republic All     477 2.50 497 3 490 3 
Slovenia Public 97.34 0.06 481 1.05 499 1.23 509 1.16 
Slovenia Private 2.66 0.06 561 6 596 7.25 598 7.27 
Slovenia Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Slovenia All     483 1.00 501 1 512 1 
Spain Public 65.92 0.88 469 2.28 473 2.37 478 2.43 
Spain Private 34.08 0.88 505 3.76 504 3.73 509 3.4 
Spain Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Spain All     481 2.00 483 2 488 2 
Sweden Public 89.96 0.82 494 2.84 491 2.88 492 2.71 
Sweden Private 10.04 0.82 529 11.08 521 11.43 521 11.47 
Sweden Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Sweden All     497 2.90 494 3 495 3 
Switzerland Public 91.87 2.1 500 2.61 534 3.48 516 2.98 
Switzerland Private 6.26 1.57 518 9.63 541 11.67 529 7.94 
Switzerland Other 1.86 1.43 443 17.33 492 21.66 480 19.17 
Switzerland All     501 2.40 534 3 517 3 
Turkey Public 99.21 0.56 464 3.59 444 4.49 453 3.65 
Turkey Private 0.79 0.56 546 2.25 571 4.91 545 4.81 
Turkey Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
Turkey All     464 3.50 445 4 454 4 
UK Public 93.52 1.09 492 2.54 490 2.74 510 2.81 
UK Private 6.31 1.1 553 5.37 546 5.69 583 6.81 
UK Other 0.17 0.1 504 11.47 491 4.6 512 3.47 
UK All     494 2.30 492 2 514 3 
USA Public 91.18 1.37 494 3.35 482 3.55 496 3.41 
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Appendix E, continued 
Country School Type 
Percent 
School Type 
Percent 
School Type 
(SE) 
Reading 
Mean 
Score 
Reading 
Mean Score 
(SE) 
Math 
Mean 
Score 
Math 
Mean 
Score (SE) 
Science 
Mean 
Score 
Science 
Mean 
Score (SE) 
USA Private 8.82 1.37 565 15.28 543 13.62 564 18.4 
USA Other a   a   a   a   a   a   a   a   
USA All     500 3.70 487 4 502 4 
 
NOTES: SE = Standard Error, a = not applicable 
SOURCE: OECD PISA 2009 Data File - Interactive Selection based on school surveys asking principals to indicate if their school was "Private" or 
"Public". France respondents did not answer this question so only the scores for the entire country are listed here. 
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Appendix F. 2010 Monthly Oportunidades payouts (USD)* 
Elementary Grade Boys Girls 
3 11.49 11.49 
4 13.48 13.48 
5 17.45 17.45 
6 22.99 22.99 
Middle School Boys Girls 
7 (1st) 33.7 35.67 
8 (2nd) 35.67 39.26 
9 (3rd) 37.67 43.22 
High School Boys Girls 
10 (1st) 56.7 65.03 
11(2nd) 60.67 69.39 
12(3rd) 64.24 73.35 
* 1 USD = 12.6 MXP (Mexican Pesos) 
SOURCE: SEDESOL 2010 
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Appendix G. The Mexican Public School System 
 School 
Categories 
Targeted 
Student Ages 
Equivalent 
Grades in the U.S. 
Types of Schools 
Basic 
Education 
Pre-Primary 
Education 
3 to 5 Pre-K and 
Kindergarten 
N/A 
Primary 
Education 
6 to 11 Grades 1 to 6 1) Traditional Schools 
2) Technical Schools (vocational in nature) 
3) Community schools (target indigenous, and smaller 
populations) 
4) Distance learning schools 
Lower 
Secondary 
Education 
12 to 14 Grades 7 to 9 1) Traditional schools 
2) Technical schools (vocational in nature) 
3) Community schools (target indigenous, and smaller 
populations) 
4) Distance learning schools (called telesecundarias and 
rely on television programming to deliver lessons) 
Upper 
Secondary 
Education 
 
Upper 
Secondary 
Education 
15 to 17 Grades 10 to 12 1) General baccalaureate (general college preparation)  
2) Technical baccalaureate (prepare students to work in 
agriculture, ocean science and technology, industrial 
technology, or general science and technology) 
3) Professional technical schools or National Colleges of 
Professional Technical Education (CONALEP) 
4) National and state job training centers to prepare students 
for jobs ranging from tourism to printing systems 
Tertiary 
Education 
Senior 
Technician 
18 and older N/A Technical universities (including teacher universities) 
 
 Degree-granting 18 and older N/A Grant undergraduate degrees 
 Graduate  18 and older N/A Specialized degrees, masters and doctorate degrees 
SOURCES: Hopkins, et al. 2007 and the Mexican Education Ministry Web site (http://www.sems.gob.mx) 
NOTE: School types in bold are the school types that were surveyed for this chapter 
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Appendix H. Chapter V Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 5.1: Middle school students who benefit from Oportunidades are at 
least as likely as their peers who do not benefit from Oportunidades to go on to 
high school 
 
Hypothesis 5.2: Female middle school students who benefit from Oportunidades 
are at least as likely as their male counterparts to go on to high school 
 
Hypothesis 5.3: Middle school students who benefit from Oportunidades are at 
least as likely as their peers who do not benefit from Oportunidades to want to 
attain a higher level of education than their parents 
 
Hypothesis 5.4: High school students who benefit from Oportunidades are at 
least as likely as their peers who do not benefit from Oportunidades to want to 
attain a higher level of education than their parents  
 
Hypothesis 5.5: Male high school students who benefit from Oportunidades will 
be at least as likely as their peers who do not benefit from Oportunidades to seek 
nonagricultural jobs 
 
Hypothesis 5.6: Students who go to technical middle schools are more likely to 
plan to go on to high school than students who go to telesecundaria middle 
schools 
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Appendix J. Principal Surveys 
Q1. As of May 1, 2012 what was the total school enrollment (number of students)? 
(Please write a number in each line. Write 0 (zero) if there are none.)      
a) Number of boys: __________ b) Number of girls: _____________ 
 
Q2. How many of the following teachers are on the staff of your school? Include both 
full- and part-time teachers. A full-time teacher is employed at least 90% of the time as a 
teacher for the full school year. All other teachers should be considered part-time. 
(Please write a number in each space provided. Write 0 (zero) if there is none.) 
 Full-time Part-time 
Total Teachers   
Teachers certified by the SEP (Maestros certificados por la 
Secretaría de Educación Pública) 
  
Teachers with other qualifications (Maestros egresados de una 
licenciatura en educación normalista, licenciatura 
universitaria, licenciatura tecnológica, especialización o 
maestría) 
  
  
Q3. Is your school’s capacity to provide instruction hindered by any of the following 
issues? (Please tick one box in each row) 
 Not 
at all 
Very 
little 
To some 
extent 
A 
lot 
a) A lack of qualified science teachers     
b) A lack of qualified mathematics teachers     
c) A lack of qualified English teachers     
d) A lack of qualified teachers of other subjects 
Which subjects? 
    
e) A lack of library staff     
f) A lack of other support personnel     
g) Shortage or inadequacy of science lab equipment     
h) Shortage or inadequacy of instructional materials (e.g. 
textbooks) which materials? 
    
i) Shortage or inadequacy of computers for instruction     
j) Lack or inadequacy of Internet connectivity     
k) Shortage or inadequacy of computer software for 
instruction 
    
l) Shortage or inadequacy of library materials 
Which materials would be helpful? 
    
m) Shortage or inadequacy of audio-visual resources     
 
Q3n. Additional details about what they are lacking:  
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Appendix J, continued 
 
Q3.o. What do you see as the top 3 challenges for educating students in your 
school? In general? (Are they the same?) 
 
Q4. Approximately how many computers are available in your school?  
a) What are they primarily used for?  
b) Approximately how many of these computers are connected to the Internet? 
c) Where are they located in the school?  
d) How often do students have access to the computers?  
Daily  Weekly   Once a month 
 
Q5. Does your school have a library?   Sí   /   No 
a) If yes, approximately how many books? _____________________________ 
b) How long can students keep books out for? 
c) Do you have any newspaper subscriptions?   Sí   /   No 
 C1. If no, would you want some? Which ones? 
C2. If yes, which ones? 
d) Do you have any magazine subscriptions?   Sí   /   No 
D1. If no, would you want some? Which ones? 
D2. If yes, which ones? 
 
Q6. Regarding your school, who has a considerable responsibility for the following 
tasks? (Please tick as many boxes as appropriate in each row) 
 
 Principals Teachers School 
Governing 
board 
Regional or local 
education 
authority 
National 
education 
authority 
a) Selecting teachers for hire      
b) Firing teachers      
c) Establishing teachers’ 
starting salaries 
     
d) Determining teachers’ 
salaries increases  
     
e) Formulating the school 
budget 
     
f) Deciding on budget 
allocations within the school 
     
g) Establishing student 
disciplinary policies 
     
h) Establishing student 
assessment policies 
     
i) Approving students for 
admission to the school 
     
j) Choosing which 
textbooks are used 
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 Principals Teachers School 
Governing 
board 
Regional or local 
education 
authority 
National 
education 
authority 
k) Determining course 
content 
     
l) Deciding which courses 
are offered 
     
 
Q7. Regarding your school, which of the following bodies exert a direct influence on 
decision making about staffing, budgeting, instructional content and assessment 
practices? (Please tick as many boxes as apply) 
 
 Area of Influence 
 Staffing Budgeting Instructional 
Content 
Assessment 
Practices 
a) Regional or national education 
authorities (e.g. inspectorates) 
    
b) The school’s council or governing 
board (El consejo escolar y órgano de 
gobierno de la escuela) 
    
c) Parent groups (Grupos de padres de 
familia) 
    
d) Teacher groups (Grupos de maestros 
(ej. asociaciones, comités de planes de 
estudios, sindicato)) 
    
e) Student groups (e.g. Student 
Association, youth organisation) (Grupos 
de alumnos 
(ej. asociación de alumnos, 
organización de jóvenes)) 
    
f) External examination boards (Consejos 
externos de 
evaluación) 
    
g) When a teacher has a problem en their 
classroom,  
(Cuando un maestro tiene un problema en 
su salón de clases, tomo la iniciativa de 
hablar sobre eso con él) 
    
h) Informo a los maestros sobre cómo 
actualizar sus conocimientos y 
competencias 
    
i) Me cercioro de que las actividades que 
ocurren en las clases van de acuerdo con 
nuestra metas educativas 
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Appendix J, continued 
 
Q8. About what percentage of students in your school repeated a grade last academic 
year? (Please write a number in each row. Write 0 (zero) if nobody repeated a grade.)  
 The approximate 
percentage of students 
repeating this grade 
Grade not 
available in 
this school 
a) First grade of middle school (Primer grado de 
Secundaria)/7th grade 
  
b) Second grade of middle school (Segundo grado de 
Secundaria)/8th grade 
  
c) Third grade of middle school (Tercer grado de 
Secundaria)/9th grade 
  
d) First grade of high school (Primer grado de 
prepa)/10th grade 
  
e) Second grade of high school (Segundo grado de 
prepa)/11th grade 
  
f) Third grade of high school (Tercer grado de 
prepa)/12th grade 
  
 
Q9. About what percentage of your total funding for a typical school year comes from 
the following sources? (Please write a number in each row. Write 0 (zero) if no 
funding comes from that source.)  
 % 
a) Local Government (includes departments)   
b) Municipal Government   
c) Regional Government   
d) State Government   
e) National Government   
f) Student fees or school charges paid by parents  
g) Benefactors, donations, bequests, sponsorships, parent fund raising  
h) Other  
TOTAL 100% 
 
Q10. About what percentage of your total funding for a typical school year goes to the 
following sources? (Please write a number in each row. Write 0 (zero) if no funding 
comes from that source.) 
 % 
a) Teachers  
b) Non-Teacher Personnel (Administrative, teaching assistants, etc)  
c) Building maintenance/infrastructure  
d) Curriculum/teaching materials  
e) Financial aid (meals, fees, etc)  
f) other (describe)  
Total 100% 
  267
Appendix J, continued 
 
Q11. May I see a copy of your budget?    Yes / No 
Q12. Approximately what percent of your student population receives Oportunidades 
monies? 
a. Do you think Oportunidades has helped keep students in school?  
Q13. What percent of your graduating students do you think will go on to … 
 % 
High school  
Vocational school  
College/university  
 
 
Q14. For those students that do not go to high school or vocational school, what types of 
jobs do you think they will have next year? In 5 year’s time? 
 
 
Q15. How much of an impact do you think school has had on your students in terms of 
their future? A lot / a little / Not much / None 
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Appendix K. Occupation Rankings 
Level Description/Criteria Occupations 
High School 
student 
Preferences* 
1  Manual labor 
intensive 
 Worker does not need 
to be literate 
 No formal education 
required 
 Day laborer 
 Homemaker 
 Launderer 
 Shoe shiner 
 Builder’s assistant 
1 (1%) 
2  Some manual labor 
required (though less 
than for level 1 jobs) 
 Some literacy and 
math skills needed 
 Primary education 
helpful if not required 
 
 Taxi driver 
 Truck/delivery truck driver 
 Painter 
 Farmer 
 Rancher 
 Seamstress 
 Stylist 
 Cook 
 Soldier 
 Security guard 
 Street or small shop vendor 
1 (1%) 
3  May require some 
manual labor 
 Worker needs to be 
literate 
 An elementary if not 
middle school 
education would be 
helpful if not required 
– no certification or 
degrees are necessary 
 Auto mechanic 
 Plumber 
 Carpenter 
 Blacksmith 
 Chef 
 Secretary 
 Miner 
 Electrician 
 Librarian 
 Fireman 
 Builder/basic construction 
10 (10%) 
 
4  Requires a low level 
university or 
vocational degree  
 Teacher 
 Nurse 
 Police Officer 
 Accountant 
 Administrator 
 Network engineer/computer systems expert 
60 (59%) 
5  Requires a high level 
university degree  
 
 Lawyer 
 Medical doctor 
 University professor/researcher 
 Architect 
 Engineer 
29 (29%) 
*Of the 132 high school students who responded to survey questions, 101 (77%) answered this question 
(Q12). The middle school students who responded to survey questions varied considerably at the 
individual level. For example, one student wanted to either become a doctor or work in a rodeo. Due to the 
nature of student responses, only high school student responses could be coded with clarity and these are 
reported. 
